Harmonization guidelines for HLA-peptide multimer assays derived from results of a large scale international proficiency panel of the Cancer Vaccine Consortium.

PURPOSE: The Cancer Vaccine Consortium of the Cancer Research Institute (CVC-CRI) conducted a multicenter HLA-peptide multimer proficiency panel (MPP) with a group of 27 laboratories to assess the performance of the assay. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: Participants used commercially available HLA-peptide multimers and a well characterized common source of peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC). The frequency of CD8+ T cells specific for two HLA-A2-restricted model antigens was measured by flow cytometry. The panel design allowed for participants to use their preferred staining reagents and locally established protocols for both cell labeling, data acquisition and analysis. RESULTS: We observed significant differences in both the performance characteristics of the assay and the reported frequencies of specific T cells across laboratories. These results emphasize the need to identify the critical variables important for the observed variability to allow for harmonization of the technique across institutions. CONCLUSIONS: Three key recommendations emerged that would likely reduce assay variability and thus move toward harmonizing of this assay. (1) Use of more than two colors for the staining (2) collect at least 100,000 CD8 T cells, and (3) use of a background control sample to appropriately set the analytical gates. We also provide more insight into the limitations of the assay and identified additional protocol steps that potentially impact the quality of data generated and therefore should serve as primary targets for systematic analysis in future panels. Finally, we propose initial guidelines for harmonizing assay performance which include the introduction of standard operating protocols to allow for adequate training of technical staff and auditing of test analysis procedures.

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

Expanding to institutionally different countries. Reasons, Firm International Experience, and Entry Mode Choice

We examine entry mode choice and its consequences when a multinational enterprise (MNE) expands into an institutionally different country. We argue that discussions of entry mode should distinguish between informal (e.g., culture) and formal (e.g., laws) institutions, and should take into account not just the home country of the MNE and its distance to the focal host country, but the MNE's overall footprint and experience across the world in general, especially in countries with an institutional structure that is similar to that of the focal host country. Specifically, we argue that firms with experience in countries with different informal institutions will be more likely to enter via acquisitions than firms without such experience, that such experience will not matter as much in the case of formal institutions, and that such firms will exit more quickly when they enter via equity alliances than through full acquisitions. We also distinguish between balanced and unbalanced alliances and argue that balanced alliances will be more enduring, but only when the host country is culturally (not legally) different from the other countries where the MNE has experience. Our arguments suggest that entry mode should be conditioned on a firm's experience in other markets, and that intercountry differences in formal versus informal institutions have distinct influences on entry mode.

Ownership Effects on Unrelated Diversification: An Institutions' Perspective

Purpose To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure. Methodology/approach We draw on longitudinal data and use a panel analysis specification to test our hypotheses. Findings We find that unrelated diversification destroys value; pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners in a firm’s equity reduce unrelated diversification, whereas pressure-resistant domestic owners increase unrelated diversification; the greater the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the negative effect of pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners on unrelated diversification. Research limitations/implications We contribute to corporate governance and strategy research by bringing in owners’ institutional origin as a shaper of owner preferences in particular with regards to unrelated diversification. Future research may expand our investigation to more than one home institutional context, and theorize on institutional origin effects beyond the dichotomy between Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American (not oriented toward shareholder value maximization) owners. Practical implications Policy makers, financial analysts, owners, and managers may want to reflect about the implications of ownership structure, as well as promoting or joining corporations with particular ownership configurations. Social implications A shareholder value-destroying strategy, such as unrelated diversification has adverse consequences for society at large, in terms of opportunity costs, that is, resources could be allocated to value-creating activities instead. Promoting an ownership configuration that creates value should contribute to social welfare. Originality/value Owners may not be exclusively driven by shareholder value maximization, but can be influenced by normative beliefs (biases) stemming from the institutional context they originate from.