The Lausanne Institutional Biobank: a new resource to catalyse research in personalised medicine and pharmaceutical sciences.

Breakthrough technologies which now enable the sequencing of individual genomes will irreversibly modify the way diseases are diagnosed, predicted, prevented and treated. For these technologies to reach their full potential requires, upstream, access to high-quality biomedical data and samples from large number of properly informed and consenting individuals and, downstream, the possibility to transform the emerging knowledge into a clinical utility. The Lausanne Institutional Biobank was designed as an integrated, highly versatile infrastructure to harness the power of these emerging technologies and catalyse the discovery and development of innovative therapeutics and biomarkers, and advance the field of personalised medicine. Described here are its rationale, design and governance, as well as parallel initiatives which have been launched locally to address the societal, ethical and technological issues associated with this new bio-resource. Since January 2013, inpatients admitted at Lausanne CHUV University Hospital have been systematically invited to provide a general consent for the use of their biomedical data and samples for research, to complete a standardised questionnaire, to donate a 10-ml sample of blood for future DNA extraction and to be re-contacted for future clinical trials. Over the first 18 months of operation, 14,459 patients were contacted, and 11,051 accepted to participate in the study. This initial 18-month experience illustrates that a systematic hospital-based biobank is feasible; it shows a strong engagement in research from the patient population in this University Hospital setting, and the need for a broad, integrated approach for the future of medicine to reach its full potential.

Are joint audits associated with higher audit fees?

In its October 2010 Green Paper on audit policy, the European Commission suggested that joint audits might be a way of improving the audit market in Europe. However, some parties consider that a joint audit system is not an efficient solution because the perceived improvements in audit quality, if any, are not commensurate with the significant increase in audit fees. We compare audit fees paid during the years 2007-2011 by listed companies in France, where joint audits are mandatory, with those paid by British and Italian companies. Theory suggests that audit fees in countries with high investor protection, such as the UK, are likely to be greater than those in countries with lower investor protection, such as France and Italy, ceteris paribus. However, we find significantly higher audit fees in France after controlling for well-documented auditor, client, and engagement attributes, which vary across countries. Furthermore, since we do not find statistically significant differences in the magnitude of abnormal accruals, the higher audit fees observed in France do not appear to be associated with higher audit quality.