Leadership at the upper echelons : three essays

"IT'S THE ECONOMY STUPID", BUT CHARISMA MATTERS TOO: A DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OUTCOMES. ABSTRACT Because charisma is assumed to be an important determinant of effective leadership, the extent to which a presidential nominee is more charismatic than his opponent should be an important determinant of voter choices. We computed a composite measure of the rhetorical richness of acceptances speeches given by U.S. presidential candidates at their national party convention. We added this marker of charisma to Ray C. Fair's presidential vote-share equation (1978; 2009). We theorized that voters decide using psychological attribution (i.e., due to macroeconomics and incumbency) as well as inferential processes (i.e., due to leader charismatic behavior) when voting. Controlling for the macro-level variables and incumbency in the Fair model, our results indicated that difference between nominees' charisma is a significant determinant of electoral success, particularly in close elections. This extended model significantly improves the precision of the Fair model and correctly predicts 23 out of the last 24 U.S. presidential elections. Paper 2: IT CEO LEADERSHIP, CORPORATE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. ABSTRACT We investigated whether CEO leadership predicted corporate financial performance (CFP) and corporate social performance (CSP). Using longitudinal data on 258 CEOs from 117 firms across 19 countries and 10 industry sectors, we found that determinants of CEO leadership (i.e., implicit motives) significantly predicted both CFP and CSP. As expected, the most consistent positive predictor was Responsibility Disposition when interacting with n (need for) Power. n Achievement and n Affiliation were generally negatively related or unrelated to outcomes. CSP was positively related to accounting measures of CFP. Our findings suggest that executive leader characteristics have important consequences for corporate level outcomes. Paper 3. PUNISHING THE POWERFUL: ATTRIBUTIONS OF BLAME AND LEADERSHIP ABSTRACT We propose that individuals are more lenient in attributing blame to leaders than to nonleaders. We advance a motivational explanation building on the perspective of punishment and on system justification theory. We conducted two scenario experiments which supported our proposition. In study 1, wrongdoer leader status was negatively related to blame and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing. In study 2, controlling for the Big-Five personality factor and individual differences in moral evaluation (i.e., moral foundations), wrongdoer leader status was negatively related with desired severity of punishment, and fair punishments were perceived as more just for non-leaders than for leaders.

What Transaction Costs are Acceptable in Life Insurance Products from the Policyholders' Viewpoint?

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze what transaction costs are acceptable for customers in different investments. In this study, two life insurance contracts, a mutual fund and a risk-free investment, as alternative investment forms are considered. The first two products under scrutiny are a life insurance investment with a point-to-point capital guarantee and a participating contract with an annual interest rate guarantee and participation in the insurer's surplus. The policyholder assesses the various investment opportunities using different utility measures. For selected types of risk profiles, the utility position and the investor's preference for the various investments are assessed. Based on this analysis, the authors study which cost levels can make all of the products equally rewarding for the investor. Design/methodology/approach - The paper notes the risk-neutral valuation calibration using empirical data utility and performance measurement dynamics underlying: geometric Brownian motion numerical examples via Monte Carlo simulation. Findings - In the first step, the financial performance of the various saving opportunities under different assumptions of the investor's utility measurement is studied. In the second step, the authors calculate the level of transaction costs that are allowed in the various products to make all of the investment opportunities equally rewarding from the investor's point of view. A comparison of these results with transaction costs that are common in the market shows that insurance companies must be careful with respect to the level of transaction costs that they pass on to their customers to provide attractive payoff distributions. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, their research question - i.e. which transaction costs for life insurance products would be acceptable from the customer's point of view - has not been studied in the above described context so far.

Three essays on the psychology of investment and financial markets

Préface My thesis consists of three essays where I consider equilibrium asset prices and investment strategies when the market is likely to experience crashes and possibly sharp windfalls. Although each part is written as an independent and self contained article, the papers share a common behavioral approach in representing investors preferences regarding to extremal returns. Investors utility is defined over their relative performance rather than over their final wealth position, a method first proposed by Markowitz (1952b) and by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), that I extend to incorporate preferences over extremal outcomes. With the failure of the traditional expected utility models in reproducing the observed stylized features of financial markets, the Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offered the first significant alternative to the expected utility paradigm by considering that people focus on gains and losses rather than on final positions. Under this setting, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2000) and McQueen and Vorkink (2004) were able to build a representative agent optimization model which solution reproduced some of the observed risk premium and excess volatility. The research in behavioral finance is relatively new and its potential still to explore. The three essays composing my thesis propose to use and extend this setting to study investors behavior and investment strategies in a market where crashes and sharp windfalls are likely to occur. In the first paper, the preferences of a representative agent, relative to time varying positive and negative extremal thresholds are modelled and estimated. A new utility function that conciliates between expected utility maximization and tail-related performance measures is proposed. The model estimation shows that the representative agent preferences reveals a significant level of crash aversion and lottery-pursuit. Assuming a single risky asset economy the proposed specification is able to reproduce some of the distributional features exhibited by financial return series. The second part proposes and illustrates a preference-based asset allocation model taking into account investors crash aversion. Using the skewed t distribution, optimal allocations are characterized as a resulting tradeoff between the distribution four moments. The specification highlights the preference for odd moments and the aversion for even moments. Qualitatively, optimal portfolios are analyzed in terms of firm characteristics and in a setting that reflects real-time asset allocation, a systematic over-performance is obtained compared to the aggregate stock market. Finally, in my third article, dynamic option-based investment strategies are derived and illustrated for investors presenting downside loss aversion. The problem is solved in closed form when the stock market exhibits stochastic volatility and jumps. The specification of downside loss averse utility functions allows corresponding terminal wealth profiles to be expressed as options on the stochastic discount factor contingent on the loss aversion level. Therefore dynamic strategies reduce to the replicating portfolio using exchange traded and well selected options, and the risky stock.

Three essays in financial economics: asset pricing, optimal portfolio selection and financial integration

Executive Summary The unifying theme of this thesis is the pursuit of a satisfactory ways to quantify the riskureward trade-off in financial economics. First in the context of a general asset pricing model, then across models and finally across country borders. The guiding principle in that pursuit was to seek innovative solutions by combining ideas from different fields in economics and broad scientific research. For example, in the first part of this thesis we sought a fruitful application of strong existence results in utility theory to topics in asset pricing. In the second part we implement an idea from the field of fuzzy set theory to the optimal portfolio selection problem, while the third part of this thesis is to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical application of some general results in asset pricing in incomplete markets to the important topic of measurement of financial integration. While the first two parts of this thesis effectively combine well-known ways to quantify the risk-reward trade-offs the third one can be viewed as an empirical verification of the usefulness of the so-called "good deal bounds" theory in designing risk-sensitive pricing bounds. Chapter 1 develops a discrete-time asset pricing model, based on a novel ordinally equivalent representation of recursive utility. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use a member of a novel class of recursive utility generators to construct a representative agent model to address some long-lasting issues in asset pricing. Applying strong representation results allows us to show that the model features countercyclical risk premia, for both consumption and financial risk, together with low and procyclical risk free rate. As the recursive utility used nests as a special case the well-known time-state separable utility, all results nest the corresponding ones from the standard model and thus shed light on its well-known shortcomings. The empirical investigation to support these theoretical results, however, showed that as long as one resorts to econometric methods based on approximating conditional moments with unconditional ones, it is not possible to distinguish the model we propose from the standard one. Chapter 2 is a join work with Sergei Sontchik. There we provide theoretical and empirical motivation for aggregation of performance measures. The main idea is that as it makes sense to apply several performance measures ex-post, it also makes sense to base optimal portfolio selection on ex-ante maximization of as many possible performance measures as desired. We thus offer a concrete algorithm for optimal portfolio selection via ex-ante optimization over different horizons of several risk-return trade-offs simultaneously. An empirical application of that algorithm, using seven popular performance measures, suggests that realized returns feature better distributional characteristics relative to those of realized returns from portfolio strategies optimal with respect to single performance measures. When comparing the distributions of realized returns we used two partial risk-reward orderings first and second order stochastic dominance. We first used the Kolmogorov Smirnov test to determine if the two distributions are indeed different, which combined with a visual inspection allowed us to demonstrate that the way we propose to aggregate performance measures leads to portfolio realized returns that first order stochastically dominate the ones that result from optimization only with respect to, for example, Treynor ratio and Jensen's alpha. We checked for second order stochastic dominance via point wise comparison of the so-called absolute Lorenz curve, or the sequence of expected shortfalls for a range of quantiles. As soon as the plot of the absolute Lorenz curve for the aggregated performance measures was above the one corresponding to each individual measure, we were tempted to conclude that the algorithm we propose leads to portfolio returns distribution that second order stochastically dominates virtually all performance measures considered. Chapter 3 proposes a measure of financial integration, based on recent advances in asset pricing in incomplete markets. Given a base market (a set of traded assets) and an index of another market, we propose to measure financial integration through time by the size of the spread between the pricing bounds of the market index, relative to the base market. The bigger the spread around country index A, viewed from market B, the less integrated markets A and B are. We investigate the presence of structural breaks in the size of the spread for EMU member country indices before and after the introduction of the Euro. We find evidence that both the level and the volatility of our financial integration measure increased after the introduction of the Euro. That counterintuitive result suggests the presence of an inherent weakness in the attempt to measure financial integration independently of economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, the results about the bounds on the risk free rate appear plausible from the view point of existing economic theory about the impact of integration on interest rates.

Three essays in risk management in financial institutions

The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for operational risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New Capital Accord This paper investigates the choice of the operational risk approach under Basel II requirements and whether the adoption of advanced risk measurement approaches allows banks to save capital. Among the three possible approaches for operational risk measurement, the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) is the most sophisticated and requires the use of historical loss data, the application of statistical tools, and the engagement of a highly qualified staff. Our results provide evidence that the adoption of AMA is contingent on the availability of bank resources and prior experience in risk-sensitive operational risk measurement practices. Moreover, banks that choose AMA exhibit low requirements for capital and, as a result might gain a competitive advantage compared to banks that opt for less sophisticated approaches. - Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank Solvency Recent cases in financial sector showed the importance of risk management controls on risk taking and firm performance. Despite advances in the design and implementation of risk management mechanisms, there is little research on their impact on behavior and performance of firms. Based on data from a sample of 88 banks covering the period between 2004 and 2010, we provide evidence that internal risk controls impact the solvency of banks. In addition, our results show that the level of internal risk controls leads to a higher degree of solvency in banks with a major shareholder in contrast to widely-held banks. However, the relationship between internal risk controls and bank solvency is negatively affected by BHC growth strategies and external restrictions on bank activities, while the higher regulatory requirements for bank capital moderates positively this relationship. - The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches under Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value Previous research showed the importance of external regulation on banks' behavior. Some inefficient standards may accentuate risk-taking in banks and provoke a financial crisis. Despite the growing literature on the potential effects of Basel II rules, there is little empirical research on the efficiency of risk-sensitive capital measurement approaches and their impact on bank profitability and market valuation. Based on data from a sample of 66 banks covering the period between 2008 and 2010, we provide evidence that prudential ratios computed under Basel II standards predict the value of banks. However, this relation is contingent on the degree of sophistication of risk measurement approaches that banks apply. Capital ratios are effective in predicting bank market valuation when banks adopt the advanced approaches to compute the value of their risk-weighted assets.

Rewarding civil service performance through team bonuses : findings, analysis and recommendations

Performance-related pay within public organizations is continuing to spread. Although it can help to strengthen an entrepreneurial spirit in civil servants, its implementation is marred by technical, financial, managerial and cultural problems. This article identifies an added problem, namely the contradiction that exists between a managerial discourse that emphasizes the team and collective performance, on the one hand, and the use of appraisal and reward tools that are above all individual, on the other. Based on an empirical survey carried out within Swiss public organizations, the analysis shows that the team is currently rarely taken into account and singles out the principal routes towards an integrated system for the management and rewarding of civil servants.

Information, learning, and risk in financial markets

Cette thèse comprend trois essais qui abordent l'information le processus d'ap-prentissage ainsi que le risque dans les marchés finances. Elle se concentre d'abord sur les implications à l'équilibre de l'hétérogénéité des agents à travers un processus d'apprentissage comprtemental et de mise à jour de l'information. De plus, elle examine les effets du partage des risques dans un reseau entreprise-fournisseur. Le premier chapitre étudie les effets du biais de disponibili sur l'évaluation des actifs. Ce biais décrit le fait que les agents surestiment l'importance de l'information acquise via l'expérience personnelle. L'hétérogénéité restante des différentes perceptions individuelles amène à une volonté d'échanges. Conformé¬ment aux données empiriques, les jeunes agents échangent plus mais en même temps souffrent d'une performance inférieure. Le deuxième chapitre se penche sur l'impact qu'ont les différences de modelisation entre les agents sur leurs percevons individuelles du processus de prix, dans le contexte des projections de modèles. Les agents sujets à un biais de projection pensent être représentatifs et interprètent les opinions des autres agents comme du bruit. Les agents, avec des modèles plus persistants, perçoivent que les prix réagissent de façon excessive lors des périodes de turbulence. Le troisième chapitre analyse l'impact du partage des risques dans la relation entreprise-fournisseur sur la décision optimale de financement de l'entreprise. Il étudie l'impact sur l'optimisation de la structure du capital ainsi que sur le coût du capital. Les résultats indiquent en particulier qu'un fournisseur avec un effet de levier faible est utile pour le financement d'un nouveau projet d'investissement. Pour des projets très rentables et des fournisseurs à faible effet de levier, le coût des capitaux propres de l'entreprise peut diminuer.