Transcriptional profiling of CD4 T cells identifies distinct subgroups of HIV-1 elite controllers.

Human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) elite controllers maintain undetectable levels of viral replication in the absence of antiretroviral therapy (ART), but their underlying immunological and virological characteristics may vary. Here, we used a whole-genome transcriptional profiling approach to characterize gene expression signatures of CD4 T cells from an unselected cohort of elite controllers. The transcriptional profiles for the majority of elite controllers were similar to those of ART-treated patients but different from those of HIV-1-negative persons. Yet, a smaller proportion of elite controllers showed an alternative gene expression pattern that was indistinguishable from that of HIV-1-negative persons but different from that of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART)-treated individuals. Elite controllers with the latter gene expression signature had significantly higher CD4 T cell counts and lower levels of HIV-1-specific CD8(+) T cell responses but did not significantly differ from other elite controllers in terms of HLA class I alleles, HIV-1 viral loads determined by ultrasensitive single-copy PCR assays, or chemokine receptor polymorphisms. Thus, these data identify a specific subgroup of elite controllers whose immunological and gene expression characteristics approximate those of HIV-1-negative persons.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Theory of mind tasks and executive functions: A systematic review of group studies in neurology.

A growing number of studies have been addressing the relationship between theory of mind (TOM) and executive functions (EF) in patients with acquired neurological pathology. In order to provide a global overview on the main findings, we conducted a systematic review on group studies where we aimed to (1) evaluate the patterns of impaired and preserved abilities of both TOM and EF in groups of patients with acquired neurological pathology and (2) investigate the existence of particular relations between different EF domains and TOM tasks. The search was conducted in Pubmed/Medline. A total of 24 articles met the inclusion criteria. We considered for analysis classical clinically accepted TOM tasks (first- and second-order false belief stories, the Faux Pas test, Happe's stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and Cartoon's tasks) and EF domains (updating, shifting, inhibition, and access). The review suggests that (1) EF and TOM appear tightly associated. However, the few dissociations observed suggest they cannot be reduced to a single function; (2) no executive subprocess could be specifically associated with TOM performances; (3) the first-order false belief task and the Happe's story task seem to be less sensitive to neurological pathologies and less associated to EF. Even though the analysis of the reviewed studies demonstrates a close relationship between TOM and EF in patients with acquired neurological pathology, the nature of this relationship must be further investigated. Studies investigating ecological consequences of TOM and EF deficits, and intervention researches may bring further contributions to this question.

The longitudinal association between social functioning and theory of mind in first episode psychosis

Introduction. There is some cross-sectional evidence that theory of mind ability is associated with social functioning in those with psychosis but the direction of this relationship is unknown. This study investigates the longitudinal association between both theory of mind and psychotic symptoms and social functioning outcome in first-episode psychosis. Methods. Fifty-four people with first-episode psychosis were followed up at 6 and 12 months. Random effects regression models were used to estimate the stability of theory of mind over time and the association between baseline theory of mind and psychotic symptoms and social functioning outcome. Results. Neither baseline theory of mind ability (regression coefficients: Hinting test 1.07 95% CI 0.74, 2.88; Visual Cartoon test 2.91 95% CI 7.32, 1.51) nor baseline symptoms (regression coefficients: positive symptoms 0.04 95% CI 1.24, 1.16; selected negative symptoms 0.15 95% CI 2.63, 2.32) were associated with social functioning outcome. There was evidence that theory of mind ability was stable over time, (regression coefficients: Hinting test 5.92 95% CI 6.66, 8.92; Visual Cartoon test score 0.13 95% CI 0.17, 0.44). Conclusions. Neither baseline theory of mind ability nor psychotic symptoms are associated with social functioning outcome. Further longitudinal work is needed to understand the origin of social functioning deficits in psychosis.