Global regulation of the knowledge-based economy: The rise of standards in educational services

This article examines the extent and limits of non-state forms of authority in international relations. It analyses how the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure for the tradability of services in a global knowledge-based economy relies on informal regulatory practices for adjustment of ICT-related skills. Companies and associations provide training and certification programmes as part of a growing market for educational services setting their own standards. The existing literature on non-conventional forms of authority in the global political economy has emphasised that the consent of actors subject to informal rules and explicit or implicit state recognition remains crucial for the effectiveness of those new forms of power. However, analyses based on a limited sample of actors tend toward a narrow understanding of the issues and fail to fully explore the differentiated space in which non-state authority is emerging. This paper examines the form of authority underpinning the global knowledge-based economy within the broader perspective of the issues likely to be standardised by technical ICT specification, the wide range of actors involved, and the highly differentiated space where standards become authoritative. The empirical findings highlight the role of different private actors in establishing international educational norms in this field. They also pinpoint the limits of profit-oriented standard-settings, notably with regard to generic norms.

Beyond the Transatlantic Divide: The Multiple Authorities of Standards in the Global Political Economy of Services

This paper explores the plurality of institutional environments in which standards for the service sector are expected to support the rise of a global knowledge-based economy. Despite the careful wording of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a whole range of international bodies still have the capacity to define technical specifications affecting how services are expected to be traded on worldwide basis. The analysis relies on global political economy approaches to extend to the area of service standards the assumption that the process of globalization is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression of both of them including new patterns and agents of structural change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. It analyses on a cross-institutional basis patterns of authority in the institutional setting of service standards in the context of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the European Union, and the United States. In contrast to conventional views opposing the American system to the ISO/European framework, the paper questions the robustness of this opposition by showing that institutional developments of service standards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises across those systems and between two opposing models of standardisation.

Hybrids and Regulation in the Global Political Economy

While regulation theory literature has made important contributions to the much-debated domain of globalisation by focusing on various aspects of post-Fordism, it has not yet fully engaged with the implications that can be drawn from critical approaches in international political economy. Recent studies have explored the transnational bases of new patterns and agents of change beyond states, firms and institutions traditionally involved in regulatory practices. Hybrid is often used as a default attribute reflecting lack of clear understanding of the breadth of this new type of influence and the opacity of the means involved. Drawing on the insights of philology and mythology, the paper argues that the notion of hybrid is relevant in elucidating the ontological ambiguity between imaginary and real aspects of globalisation. Furthermore, it specifies the categories involved in the analysis of emerging forms of hybrid regulation. Recent scholarship on globalisation tends to focus on the private-public nexus of the subjects involved in new forms of institutional arrangements and authority. Here, subjects, objects and space are analysed as joint issues. By focusing particularly on transformations affecting the role of the state, forms of competition, and their rescaling on a transnational basis, the concept of global hybrid is seen as complementary to the emancipation of regulation approaches from early emphasis on national levels of compromises.

Transnational authority in the knowledge-based economy: Who sets the standards of ICT training and certification?

This article examines the extent and limits of nonstate forms of authority in international relations. It analyzes how the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure for the tradability of services in a global knowledge-based economy relies on informal regulatory practices for the adjustment of ICT-related skills. By focusing on the challenge that highly volatile and short-lived cycles of demands for this type of knowledge pose for ensuring the right qualification of the labor force, the article explores how companies and associations provide training and certification programs as part of a growing market for educational services setting their own standards. The existing literature on non-conventional forms of authority in the global political economy has emphasized that the consent of actors, subject to informal rules and some form of state support, remains crucial for the effectiveness of those new forms of power. However, analyses based on a limited sample of actors tend toward a narrow understanding of the issues concerned and fail to fully explore the differentiated space in which non state authority is emerging. This article develops a three-dimensional analytical framework that brings together the scope of the issues involved, the range of nonstate actors concerned, and the spatial scope of their authority. The empirical findings highlight the limits of these new forms of nonstate authority and shed light on the role of the state and international governmental organizations in this new context.

Gare aux hybrides : mythes et réalités de la gouvernance de la mondialisation

Hybrid is often used as a default attribute reflecting lack of clear understanding of the influence of new patterns and actors of structural change beyond states, firms and institutions traditionally involved in regulatory practices across nations. The article argues that the notion of hybrid has a distinct relevance for engaging shortcomings of global governance literature. It explores the lessons to be drawn from ancient mythology by highlighting that ontological ambiguity and emotional ambivalence represent core features of hybrid creatures. It then builds upon critical scholarship in global political economy to conceptualise three generic levels of transfers of authority at which situating the hybrid dimension of governance in contemporary capitalism. Following this approach, the concept of hybrid explicates the ambiguity between formal and informal transfers of authority, which in turn provides an insight into the contested nature of the procedures used to reinforce this type of governance practices.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The relationship between HRM practices and organizational commitment of knowledge workers. Facts obtained from Swiss SMEs

This paper explores the effects of human resource management (HRM) practices in Swiss small -to-medium enterprises (SMEs). More specifically, the main objective of this study is to assess the impacts of HRM practices developed in Swiss SMEs upon the commitment of knowledge workers. Using data from a survey of over 198 knowledge workers, this study shows the importance of looking closer at HRM practices and, furthermore, to really investigate the impacts of the different HRM practices on employees' commitment. Results show, for example, that organisational support, procedural justice and the reputation of the organisation may clearly influence knowledge workers' commitment, whereas other HRM practices such as involvement in the decision-making, skills management or even the degree of satisfaction with pay do not have any impact on knowledge workers' commitment.