Economics of public governance with strategic production of information: four essays

SUMMARY This paper analyses the outcomes of the EEA and bilateral agreements vote at the level of the 3025 communities of the Swiss Confederation by simultaneously modelling the vote and the participation decisions. Regressions include economic and political factors. The economic variables are the aggregated shares of people employed in the losing, Winning and neutral sectors, according to BRUNETTI, JAGGI and WEDER (1998) classification, Which follows a Ricardo-Viner logic, and the average education levels, which follows a Heckscher-Ohlin approach. The political factors are those used in the recent literature. The results are extremely precise and consistent. Most of the variables have the predicted sign and are significant at the l % level. More than 80 % of the communities' vote variance is explained by the model, substantially reducing the residuals when compared to former studies. The political variables do have the expected signs and are significant as Well. Our results underline the importance of the interaction between electoral choice and participation decisions as well as the importance of simultaneously dealing with those issues. Eventually they reveal the electorate's high level of information and rationality. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Unser Beitrag analysiert in einem Model, welches gleichzeitig die Stimm- ("ja" oder "nein") und Partizipationsentscheidung einbezieht, den Ausgang der Abstimmungen über den Beitritt zum EWR und über die bilateralen Verträge für die 3025 Gemeinden der Schweiz. Die Regressionsgleichungen beinhalten ökonomische und politische Variabeln. Die ökonomischen Variabeln beinhalten die Anteile an sektoriellen Arbeitsplatzen, die, wie in BRUNETTI, JAGGIl.1I1d WEDER (1998), in Gewinner, Verlierer und Neutrale aufgeteilt Wurden, gemäß dem Model von Ricardo-Viner, und das durchschnittliche Ausbildungsniveau, gemäß dem Model von Heckscher-Ohlin. Die politischen Variabeln sind die in der gegenwärtigen Literatur üblichen. Unsere Resultate sind bemerkenswert präzise und kohärent. Die meisten Variabeln haben das von der Theorie vorausgesagte Vorzeichen und sind hoch signifikant (l%). Mehr als 80% der Varianz der Stimmabgabe in den Gemeinden wird durch das Modell erklärt, was, im Vergleich mit früheren Arbeiten, die unerklärten Residuen Wesentlich verkleinert. Die politischen Variabeln haben auch die erwarteten Vorzeichen und sind signifikant. Unsere Resultate unterstreichen die Bedeutung der Interaktion zwischen der Stimm- und der Partizipationsentscheidung, und die Bedeutung diese gleichzeitig zu behandeln. Letztendlich, belegen sie den hohen lnformationsgrad und die hohe Rationalität der Stimmbürger. RESUME Le présent article analyse les résultats des votations sur l'EEE et sur les accords bilatéraux au niveau des 3025 communes de la Confédération en modélisant simultanément les décisions de vote ("oui" ou "non") et de participation. Les régressions incluent des déterminants économiques et politiques. Les déterminants économiques sont les parts d'emploi sectoriels agrégées en perdants, gagnants et neutres selon la classification de BRUNETTI, JAGGI ET WEDER (1998), suivant la logique du modèle Ricardo-Viner, et les niveaux de diplômes moyens, suivant celle du modèle Heckscher-Ohlin. Les déterminants politiques suivent de près ceux utilisés dans la littérature récente. Les résultats sont remarquablement précis et cohérents. La plupart des variables ont les signes prédits par les modèles et sont significatives a 1%. Plus de 80% de la variance du vote par commune sont expliqués par le modèle, faisant substantiellement reculer la part résiduelle par rapport aux travaux précédents. Les variables politiques ont aussi les signes attendus et sont aussi significatives. Nos résultats soulignent l'importance de l'interaction entre choix électoraux et décisions de participation et l'importance de les traiter simultanément. Enfin, ils mettent en lumière les niveaux élevés d'information et de rationalité de l'électorat.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Reception of Walras' theory of exchange and theory of production in Russia

This paper evaluates the reception of Léon Walras' ideas in Russia before 1920. Despite an unfavourable institutional context, Walras was read by Russian economists. On the one hand, Bortkiewicz and Winiarski, who lived outside Russia and had the opportunity to meet and correspond with Walras, were first class readers and very good ambassadors for Walras' ideas, while on the other, the economists living in Russia were more selective in their readings. They restricted themselves to Walras' Elements of Pure Economics, in particular, its theory of exchange, while ignoring its theory of production. We introduce a cultural argument to explain their selective reading. JEL classification numbers: B 13, B 19.

The challenges of building theory by combining lenses

The article presents a discussion of foundational issues in the field of management science, focusing on advances in management theory and research. The metaphor of explanatory lenses is used as a rubric to illustrate the theoretical challenges involved in elucidating the interrelationships of various factors in organizational behavior. The importance of clarifying such interrelationships is emphasized, from the standpoint of editing scholarly papers on such topics for publication. Topics discussed include communication and psychology in management, economics, and behavioral finance.

The profiling of MDMA tablets: a study of the combination of physical characteristics and organic impurities as sources of information

The profiling of MDMA tablets can be carried out using different sets of characteristics. The first type of measurements performed on MDMA tablets are physical characteristics (i.e. post-tabletting characteristics). They yield preliminary profiling data that may be valuable in a first stage for investigation purposes. However organic impurities (i.e. pre-tabletting characteristics) are generally considered to bring more reliable information, particularly for presentation of evidence in court. This work aimed therefore at evaluating the added value of combining pre-tabletting characteristics and post-tabletting characteristics of seized MDMA tablets. In approximately half of the investigated cases, the post-tabletting links were confirmed with organic impurities analyses. In the remaining cases, post-tabletting batches (post-TBs) were divided in several pre-tabletting batches (pre-TBs), thus supporting the hypothesis that several production batches of MDMA powder (pre-TBs) were used to produce one single post-TB (i.e. tablets having the same shape, diameter, thickness, weight and score; but different organic impurities composition). In view of the obtained results, the hypotheses were discussed through illustrating examples. In conclusion, both sets of characteristics were found relevant alone and combined together. They actually provide distinct information about MDMA illicit production and trafficking.

The evolution of information suppression in communicating robots with conflicting interests.

Reliable information is a crucial factor influencing decision-making and, thus, fitness in all animals. A common source of information comes from inadvertent cues produced by the behavior of conspecifics. Here we use a system of experimental evolution with robots foraging in an arena containing a food source to study how communication strategies can evolve to regulate information provided by such cues. The robots could produce information by emitting blue light, which the other robots could perceive with their cameras. Over the first few generations, the robots quickly evolved to successfully locate the food, while emitting light randomly. This behavior resulted in a high intensity of light near food, which provided social information allowing other robots to more rapidly find the food. Because robots were competing for food, they were quickly selected to conceal this information. However, they never completely ceased to produce information. Detailed analyses revealed that this somewhat surprising result was due to the strength of selection on suppressing information declining concomitantly with the reduction in information content. Accordingly, a stable equilibrium with low information and considerable variation in communicative behaviors was attained by mutation selection. Because a similar coevolutionary process should be common in natural systems, this may explain why communicative strategies are so variable in many animal species.