Randomized observation periods for the compound Poisson risk model: Dividends

In the framework of the classical compound Poisson process in collective risk theory, we study a modification of the horizontal dividend barrier strategy by introducing random observation times at which dividends can be paid and ruin can be observed. This model contains both the continuous-time and the discrete-time risk model as a limit and represents a certain type of bridge between them which still enables the explicit calculation of moments of total discounted dividend payments until ruin. Numerical illustrations for several sets of parameters are given and the effect of random observation times on the performance of the dividend strategy is studied.

Optimal dividend strategies for a compound Poisson risk process under transaction costs and power utility

We characterize the value function of maximizing the total discounted utility of dividend payments for a compound Poisson insurance risk model when strictly positive transaction costs are included, leading to an impulse control problem. We illustrate that well known simple strategies can be optimal in the case of exponential claim amounts. Finally we develop a numerical procedure to deal with general claim amount distributions.

A note on moments of dividends

We reconsider a formula for arbitrary moments of expected discounted dividend payments in a spectrally negative L,vy risk model that was obtained in Renaud and Zhou (2007, [4]) and in Kyprianou and Palmowski (2007, [3]) and extend the result to stationary Markov processes that are skip-free upwards.

Les paiements pour services environnementaux de la Fondation Natura Bolivia entre logiques réciprocitaires, redistributives et marchandes

La diffusion internationale des paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE) a été interprétée en 2010 par le gouvernement bolivien d'Evo Morales comme une réponse strictement néolibérale à la nécessité d'assurer une gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Supposée amener à terme à l'éviction de toute régulation autre que marchande - qu'elle s'applique à la nature ou aux rapports entre personnes -, la mise en place de PSE n'a pas été encouragée par les autorités nationales boliviennes. Des projets de PSE ont toutefois été lancés, dont les Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (ARA), issus d'un partenariat public-privé dans le département de Santa Cruz. En analysant leur conception et leur fonctionnement au prisme du référentiel polanyien, nous montrons que, contrairement aux craintes gouvernementales, ces PSE ne font pas abstraction des logiques organisationnelles réciprocitaires et redistributives, ajustant au contexte local un objet global. The international dissemination of payments for ecosystem services (PES) has been interpreted in 2010 by the Bolivian government of Evo Morales as a strictly neo-liberal response to the need to ensure a sustainable management of natural resources. Supposed to contribute to the crowding-out of any other regulation than market - applied to the nature or the relationship between people - the implementation of PES was not encouraged by the Bolivian national authorities. However some PES projects stemming from a public-private partnership have been initiated at local level, as the Acuerdos Reciprocos por el Agua (ARA), in the department of Santa Cruz. Analysing their design and operating through the Polanyian framework, we show that, contrary to the government fears, these PES do not ignore the reciprocal and redistributive organisational logics, adjusting a global object to the local context.