On optimal learning schedules and the marginal value of cumulative cultural evolution.

The age-dependent choice between expressing individual learning (IL) or social learning (SL) affects cumulative cultural evolution. A learning schedule in which SL precedes IL is supportive of cumulative culture because the amount of nongenetically encoded adaptive information acquired by previous generations can be absorbed by an individual and augmented. Devoting time and energy to learning, however, reduces the resources available for other life-history components. Learning schedules and life history thus coevolve. Here, we analyze a model where individuals may have up to three distinct life stages: "infants" using IL or oblique SL, "juveniles" implementing IL or horizontal SL, and adults obtaining material resources with learned information. We study the dynamic allocation of IL and SL within life stages and how this coevolves with the length of the learning stages. Although no learning may be evolutionary stable, we find conditions where cumulative cultural evolution can be selected for. In that case, the evolutionary stable learning schedule causes individuals to use oblique SL during infancy and a mixture between IL and horizontal SL when juvenile. We also find that the selected pattern of oblique SL increases the amount of information in the population, but horizontal SL does not do so.

Cumulative cultural dynamics and the coevolution of cultural innovation and transmission: an ESS model for panmictic and structured populations.

When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural dynamics are at a steady-state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture.

The co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random group formation.

Limited migration results in kin selective pressure on helping behaviors under a wide range of ecological, demographic and life-history situations. However, such genetically determined altruistic helping can evolve only when migration is not too strong and group size is not too large. Cultural inheritance of helping behaviors may allow altruistic helping to evolve in groups of larger size because cultural transmission has the potential to markedly decrease the variance within groups and augment the variance between groups. Here, we study the co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping behaviors and two alternative cultural transmission rules for such behaviors. We find that conformist transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy prevalent cultural variants (e.g., beliefs or values), has a strong adverse effect on the evolution of culturally inherited helping traits. This finding is at variance with the commonly held view that conformist transmission is a crucial factor favoring the evolution of altruistic helping in humans. By contrast, we find that under one-to-many transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy a "leader" (or teacher), altruistic helping can evolve in groups of any size, although the cultural transmission rule itself hitchhikes rather weakly with a selected helping trait. Our results suggest that culturally determined helping behaviors are more likely to be driven by "leaders" than by popularity, but the emergence and stability of the cultural transmission rules themselves should be driven by some extrinsic factors.

Rates of cultural change and patterns of cultural accumulation in stochastic models of social transmission.

Cultural variation in a population is affected by the rate of occurrence of cultural innovations, whether such innovations are preferred or eschewed, how they are transmitted between individuals in the population, and the size of the population. An innovation, such as a modification in an attribute of a handaxe, may be lost or may become a property of all handaxes, which we call "fixation of the innovation." Alternatively, several innovations may attain appreciable frequencies, in which case properties of the frequency distribution-for example, of handaxe measurements-is important. Here we apply the Moran model from the stochastic theory of population genetics to study the evolution of cultural innovations. We obtain the probability that an initially rare innovation becomes fixed, and the expected time this takes. When variation in cultural traits is due to recurrent innovation, copy error, and sampling from generation to generation, we describe properties of this variation, such as the level of heterogeneity expected in the population. For all of these, we determine the effect of the mode of social transmission: conformist, where there is a tendency for each naïve newborn to copy the most popular variant; pro-novelty bias, where the newborn prefers a specific variant if it exists among those it samples; one-to-many transmission, where the variant one individual carries is copied by all newborns while that individual remains alive. We compare our findings with those predicted by prevailing theories for rates of cultural change and the distribution of cultural variation.

On the number of independent cultural traits carried by individuals and populations.

In species subject to individual and social learning, each individual is likely to express a certain number of different cultural traits acquired during its lifetime. If the process of trait innovation and transmission reaches a steady state in the population, the number of different cultural traits carried by an individual converges to some stationary distribution. We call this the trait-number distribution. In this paper, we derive the trait-number distributions for both individuals and populations when cultural traits are independent of each other. Our results suggest that as the number of cultural traits becomes large, the trait-number distributions approach Poisson distributions so that their means characterize cultural diversity in the population. We then analyse how the mean trait number varies at both the individual and population levels as a function of various demographic features, such as population size and subdivision, and social learning rules, such as conformism and anti-conformism. Diversity at the individual and population levels, as well as at the level of cultural homogeneity within groups, depends critically on the details of population demography and the individual and social learning rules.

Social network architecture and the maintenance of deleterious cultural traits.

How have changes in communications technology affected the way that misinformation spreads through a population and persists? To what extent do differences in the architecture of social networks affect the spread of misinformation, relative to the rates and rules by which individuals transmit or eliminate different pieces of information (cultural traits)? Here, we use analytical models and individual-based simulations to study how a 'cultural load' of misinformation can be maintained in a population under a balance between social transmission and selective elimination of cultural traits with low intrinsic value. While considerable research has explored how network architecture affects percolation processes, we find that the relative rates at which individuals transmit or eliminate traits can have much more profound impacts on the cultural load than differences in network architecture. In particular, the cultural load is insensitive to correlations between an individual's network degree and rate of elimination when these quantities vary among individuals. Taken together, these results suggest that changes in communications technology may have influenced cultural evolution more strongly through changes in the amount of information flow, rather than the details of who is connected to whom.

Conflits politiques et réseaux sociaux au XVIIIe siècle

Abstract: On Sunday 1745-8-29 a small upheaval occurred in Bagnes, a rather marginal mountain valley in the Swiss Alps, against the abbot of St-Maurice, the local feudal lord. In our perspective, this movement was nothing but one element in a long-term struggle, carried out by a stable and quite well organized political faction. The detailed analysis of the conflicts, of their protagonists as well as an analysis of the mobilization networks allows to highlight crucial aspects of local political life and reveals the active role of working classes. The micro-historical approach leads to some conclusions which challenge classical interpretation of pre-modern rural revolts. The case of Bagnes sheds light on the active and innovative character of popular politics, still underestimated in studies about pre-modern rural societies. The participants in the struggle against the abbot had a political program which was not limited to the quest for local autonomy. They fought for an opening of local corporations and a weakening of the control mechanism, for economic, political and cultural evolution of their valley. Bagnes rebels were decidedly "innovative rebels" Résumé: Le dimanche 29 août 1745, une petite émeute éclate à Bagnes, une vallée marginale des Alpes suisses, contre le seigneur, l'abbé de St-Maurice. Dans notre perspective, cette révolte n'est qu'un élément d'une lutte de longue haleine, pendant laquelle l'opposition au seigneur représente une partie active et bien organisée du conflit. L'analyse détaillée des protagonistes des luttes politiques, ainsi que des réseaux sociaux qui influencent la mobilisation, permet de mieux comprendre les dynamiques d'organisation de la vie politique locale et le rôle actif des couches populaires. Cette perspective autorise quelques conclusions, qui remettent en question les interprétations classiques des révoltes rurales d'Ancien Régime. Dans le cas de Bagnes, le caractère actif et novateur de la « politique populaire » encore négligé dans les études sur la période moderne, apparaît évident. Les protagonistes de la lutte contre l'abbé soutiennent un projet politique qui ne se réduit pas à une autonomie maximale de la région. Au contraire, ils prônent une ouverture des corporations locales, une transformation des structures économiques, politiques et culturelles de la vallée. Les émeutiers du Châble étaient décidément des « rebelles-novateurs ».

The handaxe and the microscope: individual and social learning in a multidimensional model of adaptation

When individuals learn by trial-and-error, they perform randomly chosen actions and then reinforce those actions that led to a high payoff. However, individuals do not always have to physically perform an action in order to evaluate its consequences. Rather, they may be able to mentally simulate actions and their consequences without actually performing them. Such fictitious learners can select actions with high payoffs without making long chains of trial-and-error learning. Here, we analyze the evolution of an n-dimensional cultural trait (or artifact) by learning, in a payoff landscape with a single optimum. We derive the stochastic learning dynamics of the distance to the optimum in trait space when choice between alternative artifacts follows the standard logit choice rule. We show that for both trial-and-error and fictitious learners, the learning dynamics stabilize at an approximate distance of root n/(2 lambda(e)) away from the optimum, where lambda(e) is an effective learning performance parameter depending on the learning rule under scrutiny. Individual learners are thus unlikely to reach the optimum when traits are complex (n large), and so face a barrier to further improvement of the artifact. We show, however, that this barrier can be significantly reduced in a large population of learners performing payoff-biased social learning, in which case lambda(e) becomes proportional to population size. Overall, our results illustrate the effects of errors in learning, levels of cognition, and population size for the evolution of complex cultural traits. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Cultural transmission can inhibit the evolution of altruistic helping.

The study of culturally inherited traits has led to the suggestion that the evolution of helping behaviors is more likely with cultural transmission than without. Here we evaluate this idea through a comparative analysis of selection on helping under both genetic and cultural inheritance. We develop two simple models for the evolution of helping through cultural group selection: one in which selection on the trait depends solely on Darwinian fitness effects and one in which selection is driven by nonreproductive factors, specifically imitation of strategies achieving higher payoffs. We show that when cultural variants affect Darwinian fitness, the selection pressure on helping can be markedly increased relative to that under genetic transmission. By contrast, when variants are driven by nonreproductive factors, the selection pressure on helping may be reduced relative to that under genetic inheritance. This occurs because, unlike biological offspring, the spread of cultural variants from one group to another through imitation does not reduce the number of these variants in the source group. As a consequence, there is increased within-group competition associated with traits increasing group productivity, which reduces the benefits of helping. In these cases, selection for harming behavior (decreasing the payoff to neighbors) may occur rather than selection for helping.

Coevolution of adaptive technology, maladaptive culture and population size in a producer-scrounger game.

Technology (i.e. tools, methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of construction and appropriation, machines) has increased the vital rates of humans, and is one of the defining features of the transition from Malthusian ecological stagnation to a potentially perpetual rising population growth. Maladaptations, on the other hand, encompass behaviours, customs and practices that decrease the vital rates of individuals. Technology and maladaptations are part of the total stock of culture carried by the individuals in a population. Here, we develop a quantitative model for the coevolution of cumulative adaptive technology and maladaptive culture in a 'producer-scrounger' game, which can also usefully be interpreted as an 'individual-social' learner interaction. Producers (individual learners) are assumed to invent new adaptations and maladaptations by trial-and-error learning, insight or deduction, and they pay the cost of innovation. Scroungers (social learners) are assumed to copy or imitate (cultural transmission) both the adaptations and maladaptations generated by producers. We show that the coevolutionary dynamics of producers and scroungers in the presence of cultural transmission can have a variety of effects on population carrying capacity. From stable polymorphism, where scroungers bring an advantage to the population (increase in carrying capacity), to periodic cycling, where scroungers decrease carrying capacity, we find that selection-driven cultural innovation and transmission may send a population on the path of indefinite growth or to extinction.

Strong reciprocity or strong ferocity? A population genetic view of the evolution of altruistic punishment.

Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism. However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial structure) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our analytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them), strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombination can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves kinship (be it genetic or cultural).

Cumulative frequency-dependent selective episodes allow for rapid morph cycles and rock-paper-scissors dynamics in species with overlapping generations.

Rock-paper-scissors (RPS) dynamics, which maintain genetic polymorphisms over time through negative frequency-dependent (FD) selection, can evolve in short-lived species with no generational overlap, where they produce rapid morph frequency cycles. However, most species have overlapping generations and thus, rapid RPS dynamics are thought to require stronger FD selection, the existence of which yet needs to be proved. Here, we experimentally demonstrate that two cumulative selective episodes, FD sexual selection reinforced by FD selection on offspring survival, generate sufficiently strong selection to generate rapid morph frequency cycles in the European common lizard Zootoca vivipara, a multi-annual species with major generational overlap. These findings show that the conditions required for the evolution of RPS games are fulfilled by almost all species exhibiting genetic polymorphisms and suggest that RPS games may be responsible for the maintenance of genetic diversity in a wide range of species.

Analyses of six homologous proteins of Protochlamydia amoebophila UWE25 encoded by large GC-rich genes (lgr): a model of evolution and concatenation of leucine-rich repeats.

BACKGROUND: Along the chromosome of the obligate intracellular bacteria Protochlamydia amoebophila UWE25, we recently described a genomic island Pam100G. It contains a tra unit likely involved in conjugative DNA transfer and lgrE, a 5.6-kb gene similar to five others of P. amoebophila: lgrA to lgrD, lgrF. We describe here the structure, regulation and evolution of these proteins termed LGRs since encoded by "Large G+C-Rich" genes. RESULTS: No homologs to the whole protein sequence of LGRs were found in other organisms. Phylogenetic analyses suggest that serial duplications producing the six LGRs occurred relatively recently and nucleotide usage analyses show that lgrB, lgrE and lgrF were relocated on the chromosome. The C-terminal part of LGRs is homologous to Leucine-Rich Repeats domains (LRRs). Defined by a cumulative alignment score, the 5 to 18 concatenated octacosapeptidic (28-meric) LRRs of LGRs present all a predicted alpha-helix conformation. Their closest homologs are the 28-residue RI-like LRRs of mammalian NODs and the 24-meres of some Ralstonia and Legionella proteins. Interestingly, lgrE, which is present on Pam100G like the tra operon, exhibits Pfam domains related to DNA metabolism. CONCLUSION: Comparison of the LRRs, enable us to propose a parsimonious evolutionary scenario of these domains driven by adjacent concatenations of LRRs. Our model established on bacterial LRRs can be challenged in eucaryotic proteins carrying less conserved LRRs, such as NOD proteins and Toll-like receptors.

Debris flows as a factor of hillslope evolution controlled by a continuous or a pulse process?

Flood effectiveness observations imply that two families of processes describe the formation of debris flow volume. One is related to the rainfall?erosion relationship, and can be seen as a gradual process, and one is related to additional geological/geotechnical events, those named hereafter extraordinary events. In order to discuss the hypothesis of coexistence of two modes of volume formation, some methodologies are applied. Firstly, classical approaches consisting in relating volume to catchments characteristics are considered. These approaches raise questions about the quality of the data rather than providing answers concerning the controlling processes. Secondly, we consider statistical approaches (cumulative number of events distribution and cluster analysis) and these suggest the possibility of having two distinct families of processes. However the quantitative evaluation of the threshold differs from the one that could be obtained from the first approach, but they all agree in the sense of the coexistence of two families of events. Thirdly, a conceptual model is built exploring how and why debris flow volume in alpine catchments changes with time. Depending on the initial condition (sediment production), the model shows that large debris flows (i.e. with important volume) are observed in the beginning period, before a steady-state is reached. During this second period debris flow volume such as is observed in the beginning period is not observed again. Integrating the results of the three approaches, two case studies are presented showing: (1) the possibility to observe in a catchment large volumes that will never happen again due to a drastic decrease in the sediment availability, supporting its difference from gradual erosion processes; (2) that following a rejuvenation of the sediment storage (by a rock avalanche) the magnitude?frequency relationship of a torrent can be differentiated into two phases, the beginning one with large and frequent debris flow and a later one with debris flow less intense and frequent, supporting the results of the conceptual model. Although the results obtained cannot identify a clear threshold between the two families of processes, they show that some debris flows can be seen as pulse of sediment differing from that expected from gradual erosion.

Evolutionarily stable learning schedules and cumulative culture in discrete generation models.

Individual learning (e.g., trial-and-error) and social learning (e.g., imitation) are alternative ways of acquiring and expressing the appropriate phenotype in an environment. The optimal choice between using individual learning and/or social learning may be dictated by the life-stage or age of an organism. Of special interest is a learning schedule in which social learning precedes individual learning, because such a schedule is apparently a necessary condition for cumulative culture. Assuming two obligatory learning stages per discrete generation, we obtain the evolutionarily stable learning schedules for the three situations where the environment is constant, fluctuates between generations, or fluctuates within generations. During each learning stage, we assume that an organism may target the optimal phenotype in the current environment by individual learning, and/or the mature phenotype of the previous generation by oblique social learning. In the absence of exogenous costs to learning, the evolutionarily stable learning schedules are predicted to be either pure social learning followed by pure individual learning ("bang-bang" control) or pure individual learning at both stages ("flat" control). Moreover, we find for each situation that the evolutionarily stable learning schedule is also the one that optimizes the learned phenotype at equilibrium.