Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

State power and protected areas: Dynamics and contradictions of forest conservation in Madhya Pradesh, India

The traditionally coercive and state-controlled governance of protected areas for nature conservation in developing countries has in many cases undergone change in the context of widespread decentralization and liberalization. This article examines an emerging "mixed" (coercive, community- and market-oriented) conservation approach in managed-resource protected areas and its effects on state power through a case study on forest protection in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The findings suggest that imperfect decentralization and partial liberalization resulted in changed forms, rather than uniform loss, of state power. A forest co-management program paradoxically strengthened local capacity and influence of the Forest Department, which generally maintained its territorial and knowledge-based control over forests and timber management. Furthermore, deregulation and reregulation enabled the state to withdraw from uneconomic activities but also implied reduced place-based control of non-timber forest products. Generally, the new policies and programs contributed to the separation of livelihoods and forests in Madhya Pradesh. The article concludes that regulatory, community- and market-based initiatives would need to be better coordinated to lead to more effective nature conservation and positive livelihood outcomes.

Cooperation in centralised CATI Household Panel Surveys : A Contact-based Multilevel Analysis to Examine Interviewer, Respondent, and Fieldwork Process Effects

In this research, we analyse the contact-specific mean of the final cooperation probability, distinguishing on the one hand between contacts with household reference persons and with other eligible household members, and on the other hand between first and later contacts. Data comes from two Swiss Household Panel surveys. The interviewer-specific variance is higher for first contacts, especially in the case of the reference person. For later contacts with the reference person, the contact-specific variance dominates. This means that interaction effects and situational factors are decisive. The contact number has negative effects on the performance of contacts with the reference person, positive in the case of other persons. Also time elapsed since the previous contact has negative effects in the case of reference persons. The result of the previous contact has strong effects, especially in the case of the reference person. These findings call for a quick completion of the household grid questionnaire, assigning the best interviewers to conducting the first contact. While obtaining refusals has negative effects, obtaining other contact results has only weak effects on the interviewer's subsequent contact outcome. Using the same interviewer for contacts has no positive effects.

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.

Consensus of Official Position of IOF/ISCD FRAX Initiatives in Asia-Pacific Region.

The fracture risk assessment tool (FRAX(®)) has been developed for the identification of individuals with high risk of fracture in whom treatment to prevent fractures would be appropriate. FRAX models are not yet available for all countries or ethnicities, but surrogate models can be used within regions with similar fracture risk. The International Society for Clinical Densitometry (ISCD) and International Osteoporosis Foundation (IOF) are nonprofit multidisciplinary international professional organizations. Their visions are to advance the awareness, education, prevention, and treatment of osteoporosis. In November 2010, the IOF/ISCD FRAX initiative was held in Bucharest, bringing together international experts to review and create evidence-based official positions guiding clinicians for the practical use of FRAX. A consensus meeting of the Asia-Pacific (AP) Panel of the ISCD recently reviewed the most current Official Positions of the Joint Official Positions of ISCD and IOF on FRAX in view of the different population characteristics and health standards in the AP regions. The reviewed position statements included not only the key spectrum of positions but also unique concerns in AP regions.

Diabetes care in Switzerland: good, but perfectible: a population-based cross-sectional survey.

BACKGROUND: While Switzerland invests a lot of money in its healthcare system, little is known about the quality of care delivered. The objective of this study was to assess the quality of care provided to patients with diabetes in the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland. METHODS: Cross-sectional study of 406 non-institutionalized adults with type 1 or 2 diabetes. Patients' characteristics, diabetes and process of care indicators were collected using a self-administered questionnaire. Process indicators (past 12 months) included HbA1C check among HbA1C-aware patients, eye assessment by ophtalmologist, microalbuminuria check, feet examination, lipid test, blood pressure and weight measurement, influenza immunization, physical activity recommendations, and dietary recommendations. Item-by-item (each process of care indicator: percentage of patients having received it), composite (mean percentage of recommended care: sum of received processes of care / sum of possible recommended care), and all-or-none (percentage of patients receiving all specified recommended care) measures were computed. RESULTS: Mean age was 64.4 years; 59% were men. Type 1 and type 2 diabetes were reported by 18.2% and 68.5% of patients, respectively, but diabetes type remained undetermined for almost 20% of patients. Patients were treated with oral anti-diabetic drugs (50%), insulin (23%) or both (27%). Of 219 HbA1C-aware patients, 98% reported ≥ one HbA1C check during the last year. Also, ≥94% reported ≥ one blood pressure measurement, ≥ one weight measurement or lipid test, and 68%, 64% and 56% had feet examination, microalbuminuria check and eye assessment, respectively. Influenza immunization was reported by 62% of the patients.The percentage of patients receiving all processes of care ranged between 14.2%-16.9%, and 46.6%-50.7%, when considering ten and four indicators, respectively. Ambulatory care utilization showed little use of multidisciplinary care, and low levels of participation in diabetes-education classes. CONCLUSIONS: While routine processes-of-care were performed annually in most patients, diabetes-specific risk screenings, influenza immunization, physical activity and dietary recommendations were less often reported; this was also the case for multidisciplinary care and participation in education classes. There is room for diabetes care improvement in Switzerland. These results should help define priorities and further develop country-specific chronic disease management initiatives for diabetes.

Predicting outcome after acute basilar artery occlusion based on admission characteristics.

OBJECTIVE: To develop a simple prognostic model to predict outcome at 1 month after acute basilar artery occlusion (BAO) with readily available predictors. METHODS: The Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS) is a prospective, observational, international registry of consecutive patients who presented with an acute symptomatic and radiologically confirmed BAO. We considered predictors available at hospital admission in multivariable logistic regression models to predict poor outcome (modified Rankin Scale [mRS] score 4-5 or death) at 1 month. We used receiver operator characteristic curves to assess the discriminatory performance of the models. RESULTS: Of the 619 patients, 429 (69%) had a poor outcome at 1 month: 74 (12%) had a mRS score of 4, 115 (19%) had a mRS score of 5, and 240 (39%) had died. The main predictors of poor outcome were older age, absence of hyperlipidemia, presence of prodromal minor stroke, higher NIH Stroke Scale (NIHSS) score, and longer time to treatment. A prognostic model that combined demographic data and stroke risk factors had an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.64. This performance improved by including findings from the neurologic examination (AUC 0.79) and CT imaging (AUC 0.80). A risk chart showed predictions of poor outcome at 1 month varying from 25 to 96%. CONCLUSION: Poor outcome after BAO can be reliably predicted by a simple model that includes older age, absence of hyperlipidemia, presence of prodromal minor stroke, higher NIHSS score, and longer time to treatment.

Treatment and outcomes of acute basilar artery occlusion in the Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS): a prospective registry study.

BACKGROUND: Treatment strategies for acute basilar artery occlusion (BAO) are based on case series and data that have been extrapolated from stroke intervention trials in other cerebrovascular territories, and information on the efficacy of different treatments in unselected patients with BAO is scarce. We therefore assessed outcomes and differences in treatment response after BAO. METHODS: The Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS) is a prospective, observational registry of consecutive patients who presented with an acute symptomatic and radiologically confirmed BAO between November 1, 2002, and October 1, 2007. Stroke severity at time of treatment was dichotomised as severe (coma, locked-in state, or tetraplegia) or mild to moderate (any deficit that was less than severe). Outcome was assessed at 1 month. Poor outcome was defined as a modified Rankin scale score of 4 or 5, or death. Patients were divided into three groups according to the treatment they received: antithrombotic treatment only (AT), which comprised antiplatelet drugs or systemic anticoagulation; primary intravenous thrombolysis (IVT), including subsequent intra-arterial thrombolysis; or intra-arterial therapy (IAT), which comprised thrombolysis, mechanical thrombectomy, stenting, or a combination of these approaches. Risk ratios (RR) for treatment effects were adjusted for age, the severity of neurological deficits at the time of treatment, time to treatment, prodromal minor stroke, location of the occlusion, and diabetes. FINDINGS: 619 patients were entered in the registry. 27 patients were excluded from the analyses because they did not receive AT, IVT, or IAT, and all had a poor outcome. Of the 592 patients who were analysed, 183 were treated with only AT, 121 with IVT, and 288 with IAT. Overall, 402 (68%) of the analysed patients had a poor outcome. No statistically significant superiority was found for any treatment strategy. Compared with outcome after AT, patients with a mild-to-moderate deficit (n=245) had about the same risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.60-1.45) or after IAT (adjusted RR 1.29, 0.97-1.72) but had a worse outcome after IAT compared with IVT (adjusted RR 1.49, 1.00-2.23). Compared with AT, patients with a severe deficit (n=347) had a lower risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.88, 0.76-1.01) or IAT (adjusted RR 0.94, 0.86-1.02), whereas outcomes were similar after treatment with IAT or IVT (adjusted RR 1.06, 0.91-1.22). INTERPRETATION: Most patients in the BASICS registry received IAT. Our results do not support unequivocal superiority of IAT over IVT, and the efficacy of IAT versus IVT in patients with an acute BAO needs to be assessed in a randomised controlled trial. FUNDING: Department of Neurology, University Medical Center Utrecht.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Selection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution.

A key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary models is the 'selection method' which assigns fitness (number of offspring) to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods (proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A cooperator pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation affects the populations' average level of cooperation only under the proportionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.

Affaires de patrons, usages de la frontière : géographie des réseaux marchands entre Niger, Bénin et Nigéria

Résumé L'objectif de la thèse est de comprendre le mode d'organisation économique spécifique aux petits centres urbains qui composent les espaces frontaliers sahéliens, en s'interrogeant sur leur concurrence ou leur complémentarité éventuelle à l'intérieur d'un régime de spatialité particulier. En s'appuyant sur l'exemple du carrefour économique de Gaya-Malanville-Kamba situé à la frontière entre le Niger, le Bénin et le Nigeria, il questionne le rôle de la ville-frontière ainsi que le jeu des acteurs marchands localement dominants, à partir de quatre grandes interrogations : Quelles sont les spécificités de l'Afrique sahélienne qui obligent à renouveler les approches géographiques de l'espace marchand? Quels sont les facteurs déterminants de l'activité économique frontalière? Les formes d'organisation de l'espace qui concourent à la structuration de l'économie sont-elles concurrentes ou coopératives? Les logiques économiques frontalières sont-elles compatibles avec l'orientation des programmes de développement adoptés par les pays sahéliens et leurs partenaires bi- ou multilatéraux? Dans une première partie, un modèle territorial de l'Afrique sahélienne permet de rendre compte de la prédominance des logiques circulatoires sur les logiques productives, une propriété essentielle de toute organisation économique confrontée à l'instabilité climatique. Dans une seconde partie, l'étude considère les facteurs déterminants de l'activité économique frontalière que sont le degré d'enclavement des territoires, la libre circulation des biens et des personnes, les relations concurrentielles ou coopératives qui lient les marchés ainsi que les liens clientélistes qui unissent patron et obligés. Une troisième partie est consacrée aux productions agricoles de tente organisées sous forme de coopératives paysannes ou d'initiatives privées. Une quatrième partie s'intéresse aux réseaux de l'import-export et du commerce de détail qui bénéficient de l'augmentation des besoins engendrée par l'urbanisation sahélienne. L'économie spatiale qui résulte de ces flux est organisée selon deux logiques distinctes : d'une part, les opportunités relatives à la production agricole conduisent certains investisseurs à intensifier l'irrigation pour satisfaire la demande des marchés urbains, d'autre part, les acteurs du capitalisme marchand, actifs dans l'import-export et la vente de détail, développent des réseaux informels et mobiles qui se jouent des différentiels nationaux. Les activités commerciales des villes-marchés connaissent alors des fluctuations liées aux entreprises productives et circulatoires de ces patrons, lesquelles concourent à l'organisation territoriale générale de l>Afrique sahélienne. Ces logiques évoluent dans un contexte fortement marqué par les politiques des institutions financières internationales, des agences bilatérales de coopération et des ONGs. Celles-ci se donnent pour ambition de transformer les économies, les systèmes politiques et les organisations sociales sahéliennes, en faisant la promotion du libéralisme, de la bonne gouvernance et de la société civile. Ces axes directeurs, qui constituent le champ de bataille contemporain du développement, forment un ensemble dans lequel la spécificité sahélienne notamment frontalière est rarement prise en compte. C'est pourquoi l'étude conclut en faveur d'un renouvellement des politiques de développement appliquées aux espaces frontaliers. Trois grands axes d'intervention peuvent alors être dégagés, lesquels permettent de réconcilier des acteurs et des logiques longtemps dissociés: ceux des espaces séparés par une limite administrative, ceux de la sphère urbaine et rurale et ceux du capitalisme marchand et de l'investissement agricole, en renforçant la coopération économique transfrontalière, en prenant en considération les interactions croissantes entre villes et campagnes et en appuyant les activités marchandes. Abstract: Urbanisation in West Africa is recent and fast. If only 10 % of the total population was living in urban areas in 1950, this proportion reached 40 % in 2000 and will be estimated to 60 % in 2025. Small and intermediate cities, located between the countryside and large metropolis, are particularly concerned with this process. They are nowadays considered as efficient vectors of local economic development because of fiscal or monetary disparities between states, which enable businessmen to develop particular skills based on local urban networks. The majority of theses networks are informal and extremely flexible, like in the Gaya - Malanville - Kamba region, located between Niger, Benin and Nigeria. Evidence show that this economic space is characterised by high potentialities (climatic and hydrological conditions, location on main economic West African axis) and few constraints (remoteness of some potentially high productive areas). In this context, this PhD deals with the economic relationships between the three market cities. Focusing on the links that unite the businessmen of the local markets - called patron; - it reveals the extreme flexibility of their strategies as well as the deeply informal nature of their activities. Through the analysis of examples taken from the commerce of agricultural products, import and export flows and detail activities, it studies the changes that have taken place in the city centres of Gaya, Malanville and Kamba. Meanwhile, this research shows how these cities represent a border economical area based on rival and complementary connections. In the first Part, it was necessary to reconsider the usual spatial analysis devoted to the question of economic centrality. As a matter of fact, the organisation of West African economic spaces is very flexible and mobile. Centrality is always precarious because of seasonal or temporary reasons. This is why the first chapters are devoted to the study of the specificity of the Sahelian territoriality. Two main elements are relevant: first the population diversity and second, the urban-rural linkages. In the second part, the study considers three main factors on which the cross-border economic networks are dependent: enclosure that prevents goods to reach the markets, administrative constraints that limit free trade between states and cities and the concurrent or complementary relationships between markets. A third part deals with the clientelist ties engaged between the patrons and their clients with the hypothesis that these relationships are based on reciprocity and inequality. A fourth part is devoted to' the study of the spatial organisation of commercial goods across the borders, as far as the agriculture commercial products, the import-export merchandises and the retail products are concerned. This leads to the conclusion that the economic activity is directly linked to urban growth. However, the study notices that there is a lack of efficient policies dealing with strengthening the business sector and improving the cross-border cooperation. This particularity allows us to favour new local development approaches, which would take into account the important potential of private economical actors. In the same time, the commercial flows should be regulated with the help of public policies, as long as they are specifically adapted to the problems that these areas have to deal with.

Evidence-Based Recommendations for Optimal Dietary Protein Intake in Older People: A Position Paper From the PROT-AGE Study Group.

New evidence shows that older adults need more dietary protein than do younger adults to support good health, promote recovery from illness, and maintain functionality. Older people need to make up for age-related changes in protein metabolism, such as high splanchnic extraction and declining anabolic responses to ingested protein. They also need more protein to offset inflammatory and catabolic conditions associated with chronic and acute diseases that occur commonly with aging. With the goal of developing updated, evidence-based recommendations for optimal protein intake by older people, the European Union Geriatric Medicine Society (EUGMS), in cooperation with other scientific organizations, appointed an international study group to review dietary protein needs with aging (PROT-AGE Study Group). To help older people (>65 years) maintain and regain lean body mass and function, the PROT-AGE study group recommends average daily intake at least in the range of 1.0 to 1.2 g protein per kilogram of body weight per day. Both endurance- and resistance-type exercises are recommended at individualized levels that are safe and tolerated, and higher protein intake (ie, ≥1.2 g/kg body weight/d) is advised for those who are exercising and otherwise active. Most older adults who have acute or chronic diseases need even more dietary protein (ie, 1.2-1.5 g/kg body weight/d). Older people with severe kidney disease (ie, estimated GFR <30 mL/min/1.73m(2)), but who are not on dialysis, are an exception to this rule; these individuals may need to limit protein intake. Protein quality, timing of ingestion, and intake of other nutritional supplements may be relevant, but evidence is not yet sufficient to support specific recommendations. Older people are vulnerable to losses in physical function capacity, and such losses predict loss of independence, falls, and even mortality. Thus, future studies aimed at pinpointing optimal protein intake in specific populations of older people need to include measures of physical function.

The role of reputation, punishment and their interplay in human cooperation

The problem of how cooperation can evolve between individuals or entities with conflicting interests is central to biology as many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the first replicating molecules to human societies, have required solving this problem. There are many routes to cooperation but humans seem to be distinct from other species as they have more complex and diverse mechanisms, often due to their higher cognitive skills, allowing them to reap the benefits from living in groups. Among those mechanisms, the use of reputation or past experience with others as well as sanctioning mechanisms both seem to be of major importance. They have often been considered separately but the interaction between the two might provide new insights as to how punishment could have appeared as a means to enforce cooperation in early humans. In this thesis, I firstly use theoretical approaches from evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolution of punishment and cooperation through a reputation system based on punitive actions, and compare the efficacy of this system, in terms of cooperation achieved, with one based on cooperative actions. On the other hand, I use empirical approaches from economics to test, in real life, predictions from theoretical models but also to explore further conditions such as environmental variation, constrained memory, or even the scale of competition between individuals. Both approaches have allowed contributing to the understanding of how these factors affect reputation and punishment use, and ultimately how cooperation is achieved.

Beyond Conditionality versus Cooperation: Power and Resistance in the Case of EU Mobility Partnerships and Swiss Migration Partnerships

Migration partnerships (MPs) have become a key instrument in global migration governance. In contrast to traditional unilateral approaches, MPs emphasize a more comprehensive and inclusive tackling of migration issues between countries of origin, transit, and destination. Due to this cooperation-oriented concept, most of the existing studies on MPs neglect power questions within partnerships in line with the official discourse, reflecting a broader trend in the international migration governance literature. Others take an instrumentalist view in analysing the power of partnerships or focus on soft power. Illustrated with the examples of the European Mobility Partnerships (EU MPs) and the Swiss Migration Partnerships (CH MPs), we conduct an analysis based on a concept of productive power drawing on post-structural and post-colonial insights. Our main argument is that in contrast to their seemingly consent-oriented and technical character, MPs are sites of intense (discursive) struggles, and (re-)produce meanings, subjects, and resistances. A productive power analysis allows us to move beyond the dichotomy in the literature between coercion and cooperation, as well as between power and resistance more broadly.