Politique et réseaux. Logiques de la mobilisation politique populaire dans une vallée alpine 1839-1900

Résumé: Depuis plusieurs années, le thème des réseaux sociaux est au centre de l'intérêt des études historiques. Est-il possible de formaliser l'analyse de réseaux sociaux spécifiques - parenté, clientèle, solidarités locales, etc. - afin d'en analyser l'influence sur des événements historiques et des individus précis ? L'étude présentée prend en considération les luttes souvent violentes entre radicaux et conservateurs dans le Val de Bagnes, en Valais (Suisse), entre 1839 et 1900. La comparaison entre les généalogies des familles de la vallée et les informations sur la vie politique et sociale nous permet de relever l'influence de la parenté dans l'organisation des factions politiques. Les réseaux de parenté sont toutefois ouverts et souples, permettant des adaptations aux évolutions de la situation politique, économique et sociale. L'affaire autour du faux-monnayeur italien Joseph S. Farinet, dans les années 1870, nous permet par exemple de suivre l'évolution des réseaux de solidarité, à la suite d'une crise politique, ainsi que l'émergence de nouvelles activités économiques, notamment le tourisme, avec les hôteliers, les aubergistes et les guides de montagne souvent liés au milieu radical. L'analyse permet également de nuancer l'influence des réseaux de patronage : les collaborations horizontales, à l'intérieur des classes populaires, semblent mieux expliquer les solidarités politiques. Abstract: For several years, historians have been closely concerned with the question of social networks. Is it possible to conceptualize specific networks - like kinship, patronage or local solidarities - and to analyze their influence on concrete individuals or historical events? This paper considers the violent struggles between a radical political faction and a conservative one in a Swiss alpine valley, the Val de Bagnes (Valais) between 1839 and 1900. It compares information about political and social conflicts in the valley with genealogies of local families. By this way the eminent influence of kinship ties on political organizations becomes visible. But kinship networks are open and very supple, allowing adaptations to new political and social configurations. The trials against the Italian smuggler and counterfeiter Joseph S. Farinet in the Seventies allow to describe the evolution of local cooperation networks as a consequence of a political crisis in the canton of Valais and of new economic activities. The paper stresses the active role of a emerging group of hotel- or inn-owners and mountain guides, often closely tied with the radical milieu. The analysis of social transactions raises critical questions about the role of patronage in political mobilization: horizontal cooperation and kinship ties between peasants, small cattle owners and artisans seem to explain political solidarities better than patronage structures.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Spiritual Kinship, Political Mobilization and Social Cooperation: a Swiss Alpine valley in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

In this chapter I will present some observations and results about Ritual Kinship and political mobilization of popular groups in an Alpine valley: the Val de Bagnes, in the Swiss canton of Valais, - a mountain valley, well known today thanks to the tourist station of Verbier - where we can rely on excellent sources about local families. This region presents a particular political situation, because the 11 major villages of the valley form only one commune, which includes the whole valley.¦There are two major reasons to choose the Val de Bagnes for our inquiry on kinship and social networks in a rural society:¦A. The existence of sharp political and social conflicts during the 18th and the 19th centuries;¦B. The existence of almost systematic genealogical data between 1700 and 1900. (Casanova, Gard, Perrenoud 2005-08)¦The 18th century was characterized by the struggle of an important part of the community of Bagnes against the feudal lord, the abbot of St-Maurice. The culminating point was a local upheaval in 1745 in Le Châble, during which the abbot was forced to sign several documents in accordance with the wishes of the rebels (Guzzi-Heeb 2007). In the 19th century feudal lordship was abolished, but now the struggle confronted a liberal-radical faction and the conservative majority in the commune.¦The starting point of my presentation focuses on this question: which role did spiritual kinship play in the political mobilization of popular groups and in the organization of competing factions? This question allows us to shed light on some utilizations and meanings of spiritual kinship in the local society. Was spiritual kinship a significant instrument for economic cooperation? Or was it a channel for privileged social contacts and transactions?

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

Pleiotropy and the low cost of individual traits promote cooperation.

The evolution of cooperation is thought to be promoted by pleiotropy, whereby cooperative traits are coregulated with traits that are important for personal fitness. However, this hypothesis faces a key challenge: what happens if mutation targets a cooperative trait specifically rather than the pleiotropic regulator? Here, we explore this question with the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which cooperatively digests complex proteins using elastase. We empirically measure and theoretically model the fate of two mutants-one missing the whole regulatory circuit behind elastase production and the other with only the elastase gene mutated-relative to the wild-type (WT). We first show that, when elastase is needed, neither of the mutants can grow if the WT is absent. And, consistent with previous findings, we show that regulatory gene mutants can grow faster than the WT when there are no pleiotropic costs. However, we find that mutants only lacking elastase production do not outcompete the WT, because the individual cooperative trait has a low cost. We argue that the intrinsic architecture of molecular networks makes pleiotropy an effective way to stabilize cooperative evolution. Although individual cooperative traits experience loss-of-function mutations, these mutations may result in weak benefits, and need not undermine the protection from pleiotropy.

Properties of functional brain networks correlate with frequency of psychogenic non-epileptic seizures.

Abnormalities in the topology of brain networks may be an important feature and etiological factor for psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (PNES). To explore this possibility, we applied a graph theoretical approach to functional networks based on resting state EEGs from 13 PNES patients and 13 age- and gender-matched controls. The networks were extracted from Laplacian-transformed time-series by a cross-correlation method. PNES patients showed close to normal local and global connectivity and small-world structure, estimated with clustering coefficient, modularity, global efficiency, and small-worldness (SW) metrics, respectively. Yet the number of PNES attacks per month correlated with a weakness of local connectedness and a skewed balance between local and global connectedness quantified with SW, all in EEG alpha band. In beta band, patients demonstrated above-normal resiliency, measured with assortativity coefficient, which also correlated with the frequency of PNES attacks. This interictal EEG phenotype may help improve differentiation between PNES and epilepsy. The results also suggest that local connectivity could be a target for therapeutic interventions in PNES. Selective modulation (strengthening) of local connectivity might improve the skewed balance between local and global connectivity and so prevent PNES events.

Nuclear receptor Rev-erb alpha (Nr1d1) functions in concert with Nr2e3 to regulate transcriptional networks in the retina.

The majority of diseases in the retina are caused by genetic mutations affecting the development and function of photoreceptor cells. The transcriptional networks directing these processes are regulated by genes such as nuclear hormone receptors. The nuclear hormone receptor gene Rev-erb alpha/Nr1d1 has been widely studied for its role in the circadian cycle and cell metabolism, however its role in the retina is unknown. In order to understand the role of Rev-erb alpha/Nr1d1 in the retina, we evaluated the effects of loss of Nr1d1 to the developing retina and its co-regulation with the photoreceptor-specific nuclear receptor gene Nr2e3 in the developing and mature retina. Knock-down of Nr1d1 expression in the developing retina results in pan-retinal spotting and reduced retinal function by electroretinogram. Our studies show that NR1D1 protein is co-expressed with NR2E3 in the outer neuroblastic layer of the developing mouse retina. In the adult retina, NR1D1 is expressed in the ganglion cell layer and is co-expressed with NR2E3 in the outer nuclear layer, within rods and cones. Several genes co-targeted by NR2E3 and NR1D1 were identified that include: Nr2c1, Recoverin, Rgr, Rarres2, Pde8a, and Nupr1. We examined the cyclic expression of Nr1d1 and Nr2e3 over a twenty-four hour period and observed that both nuclear receptors cycle in a similar manner. Taken together, these studies reveal a novel role for Nr1d1, in conjunction with its cofactor Nr2e3, in regulating transcriptional networks critical for photoreceptor development and function.

Cooperation among selfish individuals in insect societies

Kin selection is the key to understanding the evolution of cooperation in insect societies. However, kin selection also predicts potential kin conflict, and understanding how these conflicts are resolved is a major goal of current research on social insects

Using active learning for monitoring networks design: The example of wind power plants sites evaluation

Locating new wind farms is of crucial importance for energy policies of the next decade. To select the new location, an accurate picture of the wind fields is necessary. However, characterizing wind fields is a difficult task, since the phenomenon is highly nonlinear and related to complex topographical features. In this paper, we propose both a nonparametric model to estimate wind speed at different time instants and a procedure to discover underrepresented topographic conditions, where new measuring stations could be added. Compared to space filling techniques, this last approach privileges optimization of the output space, thus locating new potential measuring sites through the uncertainty of the model itself.