Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Causal explanations and scientific realism in particle physics

Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This dissertation defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. I start by introducing the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism (chapter 1), with a special focus on an important presupposition of the debate, namely common sense realism. Chapter 2 then discusses entity realism, which introduces a crucial element into the debate by emphasizing the importance of experiments in defending scientific realism. Most of the chapter is concerned with Ian Hacking's position, but I also argue that Nancy Cartwright's version of entity realism is ultimately preferable as a basis for further development. In chapter 3,1 take a step back and consider the question whether the realism debate is worth pursuing at all. Arthur Fine has given a negative answer to that question, proposing his natural ontologica! attitude as an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the debate (in particular the realist side of it) is in fact less vicious than Fine presents it. The second part of my work (chapters 4-6) develops, illustrates and defends causal realism. The key idea is that inference to the best explanation is reliable in some cases, but not in others. Chapter 4 characterizes the difference between these two kinds of cases in terms of three criteria which distinguish causal from theoretical warrant. In order to flesh out this distinction, chapter 5 then applies it to a concrete case from the history of particle physics, the discovery of the neutrino. This case study shows that the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant is crucial for understanding what it means to "directly detect" a new particle. But the distinction is also an effective tool against what I take to be the presently most powerful objection to scientific realism: Kyle Stanford's argument from unconceived alternatives. I respond to this argument in chapter 6, and I illustrate my response with a discussion of Jean Perrin's experimental work concerning the atomic hypothesis. In the final part of the dissertation, I turn to the specific challenges posed to realism by quantum theories. One of these challenges comes from the experimental violations of Bell's inequalities, which indicate a failure of locality in the quantum domain. I show in chapter 7 how causal realism can further our understanding of quantum non-locality by taking account of some recent experimental results. Another challenge to realism in quantum mechanics comes from delayed-choice experiments, which seem to imply that certain aspects of what happens in an experiment can be influenced by later choices of the experimenter. Chapter 8 analyzes these experiments and argues that they do not warrant the antirealist conclusions which some commentators draw from them. It pays particular attention to the case of delayed-choice entanglement swapping and the corresponding question whether entanglement is a real physical relation. In chapter 9,1 finally address relativistic quantum theories. It is often claimed that these theories are incompatible with a particle ontology, and this calls into question causal realism's commitment to localizable and countable entities. I defend the commitments of causal realism against these objections, and I conclude with some remarks connecting the interpretation of quantum field theory to more general metaphysical issues confronting causal realism.

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Pierre Bourdieu's field theory is a strong account of how human action can be understood based on the principle that negotiates between structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions within the social world. With his central notion of fields, Bourdieu provides social scientists and economists, a way to transcend the dichotomies that shape theoretical thinking about human conduct and its innovative potentials. This chapter is dedicated to locate the position of the notion of field with respect to major schools of thought, and in particular to the embeddedness tradition that addresses similar questions on the social structuring of human behavior.

Muscle moment-arms: a key element in muscle-force estimation.

A clear and rigorous definition of muscle moment-arms in the context of musculoskeletal systems modelling is presented, using classical mechanics and screw theory. The definition provides an alternative to the tendon excursion method, which can lead to incorrect moment-arms if used inappropriately due to its dependency on the choice of joint coordinates. The definition of moment-arms, and the presented construction method, apply to musculoskeletal models in which the bones are modelled as rigid bodies, the joints are modelled as ideal mechanical joints and the muscles are modelled as massless, frictionless cables wrapping over the bony protrusions, approximated using geometric surfaces. In this context, the definition is independent of any coordinate choice. It is then used to solve a muscle-force estimation problem for a simple 2D conceptual model and compared with an incorrect application of the tendon excursion method. The relative errors between the two solutions vary between 0% and 100%.

Advances in Sequence Analysis: Theory, Methods, Applications

This book gives a general view of sequence analysis, the statistical study of successions of states or events. It includes innovative contributions on life course studies, transitions into and out of employment, contemporaneous and historical careers, and political trajectories. The approach presented in this book is now central to the life-course perspective and the study of social processes more generally. This volume promotes the dialogue between approaches to sequence analysis that developed separately, within traditions contrasted in space and disciplines. It includes the latest developments in sequential concepts, coding, atypical datasets and time patterns, optimal matching and alternative algorithms, survey optimization, and visualization. Field studies include original sequential material related to parenting in 19th-century Belgium, higher education and work in Finland and Italy, family formation before and after German reunification, French Jews persecuted in occupied France, long-term trends in electoral participation, and regime democratization. Overall the book reassesses the classical uses of sequences and it promotes new ways of collecting, formatting, representing and processing them. The introduction provides basic sequential concepts and tools, as well as a history of the method. Chapters are presented in a way that is both accessible to the beginner and informative to the expert.

Debating the centre : the theory of principal qualificand (mukhyavisesya) in classical Indian philosophy

The theory of language has occupied a special place in the history of Indian thought. Indian philosophers give particular attention to the analysis of the cognition obtained from language, known under the generic name of śābdabodha. This term is used to denote, among other things, the cognition episode of the hearer, the content of which is described in the form of a paraphrase of a sentence represented as a hierarchical structure. Philosophers submit the meaning of the component items of a sentence and their relationship to a thorough examination, and represent the content of the resulting cognition as a paraphrase centred on a meaning element, that is taken as principal qualificand (mukhyaviśesya) which is qualified by the other meaning elements. This analysis is the object of continuous debate over a period of more than a thousand years between the philosophers of the schools of Mimāmsā, Nyāya (mainly in its Navya form) and Vyākarana. While these philosophers are in complete agreement on the idea that the cognition of sentence meaning has a hierarchical structure and share the concept of a single principal qualificand (qualified by other meaning elements), they strongly disagree on the question which meaning element has this role and by which morphological item it is expressed. This disagreement is the central point of their debate and gives rise to competing versions of this theory. The Mïmāmsakas argue that the principal qualificand is what they call bhāvanā ̒bringing into being̒, ̒efficient force̒ or ̒productive operation̒, expressed by the verbal affix, and distinct from the specific procedures signified by the verbal root; the Naiyāyikas generally take it to be the meaning of the word with the first case ending, while the Vaiyākaranas take it to be the operation expressed by the verbal root. All the participants rely on the Pāninian grammar, insofar as the Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas do not compose a new grammar of Sanskrit, but use different interpretive strategies in order to justify their views, that are often in overt contradiction with the interpretation of the Pāninian rules accepted by the Vaiyākaranas. In each of the three positions, weakness in one area is compensated by strength in another, and the cumulative force of the total argumentation shows that no position can be declared as correct or overall superior to the others. This book is an attempt to understand this debate, and to show that, to make full sense of the irreconcilable positions of the three schools, one must go beyond linguistic factors and consider the very beginnings of each school's concern with the issue under scrutiny. The texts, and particularly the late texts of each school present very complex versions of the theory, yet the key to understanding why these positions remain irreconcilable seems to lie elsewhere, this in spite of extensive argumentation involving a great deal of linguistic and logical technicalities. Historically, this theory arises in Mimāmsā (with Sabara and Kumārila), then in Nyāya (with Udayana), in a doctrinal and theological context, as a byproduct of the debate over Vedic authority. The Navya-Vaiyākaranas enter this debate last (with Bhattoji Dïksita and Kaunda Bhatta), with the declared aim of refuting the arguments of the Mïmāmsakas and Naiyāyikas by bringing to light the shortcomings in their understanding of Pāninian grammar. The central argument has focused on the capacity of the initial contexts, with the network of issues to which the principal qualificand theory is connected, to render intelligible the presuppositions and aims behind the complex linguistic justification of the classical and late stages of this debate. Reading the debate in this light not only reveals the rationality and internal coherence of each position beyond the linguistic arguments, but makes it possible to understand why the thinkers of the three schools have continued to hold on to three mutually exclusive positions. They are defending not only their version of the principal qualificand theory, but (though not openly acknowledged) the entire network of arguments, linguistic and/or extra-linguistic, to which this theory is connected, as well as the presuppositions and aims underlying these arguments.