The limits of brain determinacy.

The genes do not control everything that happens in a cell or an organism, because thermally induced molecular movements and conformation changes are beyond genetic control. The importance of uncontrolled events has been argued from the differences between isogenic organisms reared in virtually identical environments, but these might alternatively be attributed to subtle, undetected differences in the environment. The present review focuses on the uncontrolled events themselves in the context of the developing brain. These are considered at cellular and circuit levels because even if cellular physiology was perfectly controlled by the genes (which it is not), the interactions between different cells might still be uncoordinated. A further complication is that the brain contains mechanisms that buffer noise and others that amplify it. The final resultant of the battle between these contrary mechanisms is that developmental stochasticity is sufficiently low to make neurobehavioural defects uncommon, but a chance component of neural development remains. Thus, our brains and behaviour are not entirely determined by a combination of genes-plus-environment.

"A Hard Battle to Fight": Natural Theology and the Dismal Science, 1820-1850

William Whewell's and Richard Jones's criticism of Jeremy Bentham's and David Ricardo's "dismal" views on the relation of theory and evidence in political economy was motivated by the former's views on the structuring role of natural theology for questions of method and evidence in the sciences, including political economy. In comparison, natural theology was for Richard Whately as structuring on these issues as it was for the Cambridge men. Whately's view on natural theology, however, conformed with the Ricardian predilection for theory over facts. The differences between the Cambridge men and Whately became manifest after (or better: during) the publication of Jones's book on rent in 1831 and led to a somewhat acerbic exchange of views on the role of definitions in science and the use of history for establishing scientific evidence. As far as political economy was concerned, Whately's stance carried the day in Victorian England.