Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Readiness to participate in psychiatric research.

BACKGROUND: The feasibility of clinical trials depends, among other factors, on the number of eligible patients, the recruitment process, and the readiness of patients to participate in research. Seeking patients' views about their experience in research projects may allow investigators to develop more effective recruitment and retention strategies. METHODS: A total of 100 patients consecutively admitted to a psychiatric university hospital were interviewed with respect to their willingness to participate in a study. For a different study scenario, patients were asked whether they would be ready to participate if such a study were organized in the service and to indicate their reasons for refusing or for participating. RESULTS: The general readiness to participate in a study ranged between 70% and 96%. The prospect of remuneration did not notably augment the potential consent rate. The most common and spontaneous motivation for agreeing to take part in a study was to help science progress and to allow future patients to benefit from improved diagnosis and treatment (87%). The presence or lack of a financial incentive was rarely chosen as an argument to agree (23%) or to refuse (7%) to participate. Patients relied mainly on their treating physicians when contemplating possible participation in a study (family physician [65%] and hospital physician [54%]). CONCLUSIONS: Clinicians and, in particular, treating doctors can play an important role in facilitating the recruitment process.