Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

A Legislator under Surveillance: The Creation and Implementation of Swiss Banking Legislation 1910-1934

This paper analyses how banking regulation was introduced in Switzerland - one of the world's most prominent financial centres - which remained in place until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It shows that the law adopted on 8 November 1934 is a perfect example of capture of the regulator by the regulated. Essentially a political response in the context of the economic crisis of the 1930s, it largely reflected the interests of banking circles by limiting the intervention of the State as much as possible. The introduction of the new legislation was facilitated by the temporary weakness of Swiss banking circles, as they depended on the State to delay or prevent the collapse of many major credit institutions. They did not manage to derail the law as they had two decades earlier when they scuppered the federal bill on banks drawn up between 1914 and 1916. But this time they were better organized and more united, and intervened all the more effectively in the legislative process itself. The 1934 law is thus distinctive in that it made no structural changes to the architecture of the financial centre but merely codified its practices through flexible legislation meant to reassure the public. The law was aimed less at controlling banking activity than at keeping - thanks to skilfully calibrated political concessions - the State from having to intervene more directly in the internal management of banks or in the fixing of interest rates and the export of capital.

Liberal alcohol legislation: does it amplify the effects among Swiss men of person-related risk factors on heavy alcohol use?

AIM: To estimate the statistical interactions between alcohol policy strength and the person-related risk factors of sensation-seeking, antisocial personality disorder and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder related to heavy alcohol use. DESIGN: Cross-sectional survey. SETTING: Young Swiss men living within 21 jurisdictions across Switzerland. PARTICIPANTS: A total of 5701 Swiss men (mean age 20 years) participating in the Cohort Study on Substance Use Risk Factors (C-SURF). MEASUREMENTS: Outcome measures were alcohol use disorder (AUD) as defined in the DSM-5 and risky single-occasion drinking (RSOD). Independent variables were sensation-seeking, antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and an index of alcohol policy strength. FINDINGS: Alcohol policy strength was protective against RSOD [odds ratio (OR) = 0.91 (0.84-0.99)], while sensation-seeking and ASPD were risk factors for both RSOD [OR = 1.90 (1.77-2.04); OR = 1.69 (1.44-1.97)] and AUD [OR = 1.58 (1.47-1.71); OR = 2.69 (2.30-3.14)] and ADHD was a risk factor for AUD [OR = 1.08 (1.06-1.10)]. Significant interactions between alcohol policy strength and sensation-seeking were identified for RSOD [OR = 1.06 (1.01-1.12)] and AUD [OR = 1.06 (1.01-1.12)], as well as between alcohol policy strength and ASPD for both RSOD [OR = 1.17 (1.03-1.31)] and AUD [OR = 1.15 (1.02-1.29)]. These interactions indicated that the protective effects of alcohol policy strength on RSOD and AUD were lost in men with high levels of sensation-seeking or an ASPD. No interactions were detected between alcohol policy strength and ADHD. CONCLUSION: Stronger alcohol legislation protects against heavy alcohol use in young Swiss men, but this protective effect is lost in individuals with high levels of sensation-seeking or having an antisocial personality disorder.