Altruism - a philosophical analysis

Altruism is a malleable notion that is understood differently in various disciplines. The common denominator of most definitions of altruism is the idea of unidirectional helping behaviour. However, a closer examination reveals that the term altruism sometimes refers to the outcomes of a helping behaviour for the agent and its neighbours - i.e. reproductive altruism - and sometimes to what motivates the agent to help others - i.e. psychological altruism. Since these perspectives on altruism are crucially different, it is important to use a clear terminology to avoid confusion. In particular, we show that the notion of altruism used by biologists profoundly differs from the ones used by philosophers, psychologists and economists in cross-disciplinary debates about human altruism.

Altruism across disciplines: one word, multiple meanings

Altruism is a deep and complex phenomenon that is analysed by scholars of various disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, biology, evolutionary anthropology and experimental economics. Much confusion arises in current literature because the term altruism covers variable concepts and processes across disciplines. Here we investigate the sense given to altruism when used in different fields and argumentative contexts. We argue that four distinct but related concepts need to be distinguished: (a) psychological altruism, the genuine motivation to improve others' interests and welfare; (b) reproductive altruism, which involves increasing others' chances of survival and reproduction at the actor's expense; (c) behavioural altruism, which involves bearing some cost in the interest of others; and (d) preference altruism, which is a preference for others' interests. We show how this conceptual clarification permits the identification of overstated claims that stem from an imprecise use of terminology. Distinguishing these four types of altruism will help to solve rhetorical conflicts that currently undermine the interdisciplinary debate about human altruism.

The robustness of the weak selection approximation for the evolution of altruism against strong selection.

The weak selection approximation of population genetics has made possible the analysis of social evolution under a considerable variety of biological scenarios. Despite its extensive usage, the accuracy of weak selection in predicting the emergence of altruism under limited dispersal when selection intensity increases remains unclear. Here, we derive the condition for the spread of an altruistic mutant in the infinite island model of dispersal under a Moran reproductive process and arbitrary strength of selection. The simplicity of the model allows us to compare weak and strong selection regimes analytically. Our results demonstrate that the weak selection approximation is robust to moderate increases in selection intensity and therefore provides a good approximation to understand the invasion of altruism in spatially structured population. In particular, we find that the weak selection approximation is excellent even if selection is very strong, when either migration is much stronger than selection or when patches are large. Importantly, we emphasize that the weak selection approximation provides the ideal condition for the invasion of altruism, and increasing selection intensity will impede the emergence of altruism. We discuss that this should also hold for more complicated life cycles and for culturally transmitted altruism. Using the weak selection approximation is therefore unlikely to miss out on any demographic scenario that lead to the evolution of altruism under limited dispersal.

Eager for fairness or revenge: psychological altruism in economics

To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove less relevant than originally expected because the data obtained admit competing interpretations such as people seeking fairness versus people seeking revenge. However, this mitigated conclusion does not preclude the possibility of more fruitful research in the area in the future. Throughout our analysis, we provide hints for the direction of future research on the question.

Altruism, dispersal, and phenotype-matching kin recognition.

We investigate the coevolution between philopatry and altruism in island-model populations when kin recognition occurs through phenotype matching. In saturated environments, a good discrimination ability is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of sociality. Discrimination decreases not only with the average phenotypic similarity between immigrants and residents (i.e., with environmental homogeneity and past gene flow) but also with the sampling variance of similarity distributions (a negative function of the number of traits sampled). Whether discrimination should rely on genetically or environmentally determined traits depends on the apportionment of phenotypic variance and, in particular, on the relative values of e (the among-group component of environmental variance) and r (the among-group component of genetic variance, which also measures relatedness among group members). If r exceeds e, highly heritable cues do better. Discrimination and altruism, however, remain low unless philopatry is enforced by ecological constraints. If e exceeds r, by contrast, nonheritable traits do better. High e values improve discrimination drastically and thus have the potential to drive sociality, even in the absence of ecological constraints. The emergence of sociality thus can be facilitated by enhancing e, which we argue is the main purpose of cue standardization within groups, as observed in many social insects, birds, and mammals, including humans.

A quantitative test of Hamilton's rule for the evolution of altruism.

The evolution of altruism is a fundamental and enduring puzzle in biology. In a seminal paper Hamilton showed that altruism can be selected for when rb - c > 0, where c is the fitness cost to the altruist, b is the fitness benefit to the beneficiary, and r is their genetic relatedness. While many studies have provided qualitative support for Hamilton's rule, quantitative tests have not yet been possible due to the difficulty of quantifying the costs and benefits of helping acts. Here we use a simulated system of foraging robots to experimentally manipulate the costs and benefits of helping and determine the conditions under which altruism evolves. By conducting experimental evolution over hundreds of generations of selection in populations with different c/b ratios, we show that Hamilton's rule always accurately predicts the minimum relatedness necessary for altruism to evolve. This high accuracy is remarkable given the presence of pleiotropic and epistatic effects as well as mutations with strong effects on behavior and fitness (effects not directly taken into account in Hamilton's original 1964 rule). In addition to providing the first quantitative test of Hamilton's rule in a system with a complex mapping between genotype and phenotype, these experiments demonstrate the wide applicability of kin selection theory.

An evolutionary analysis of the relationship between spite and altruism.

We investigate the selective pressures on a social trait when evolution occurs in a population of constant size. We show that any social trait that is spiteful simultaneously qualifies as altruistic. In other words, any trait that reduces the fitness of less related individuals necessarily increases that of related ones. Our analysis demonstrates that the distinction between "Hamiltonian spite" and "Wilsonian spite" is not justified on the basis of fitness effects. We illustrate this general result with an explicit model for the evolution of a social act that reduces the recipient's survival ("harming trait"). This model shows that the evolution of harming is favoured if local demes are of small size and migration is low (philopatry). Further, deme size and migration rate determine whether harming evolves as a selfish strategy by increasing the fitness of the actor, or as a spiteful/altruistic strategy through its positive effect on the fitness of close kin.

The evolution of trans-generational altruism: kin selection meets niche construction.

A cornerstone result of sociobiology states that limited dispersal can induce kin competition to offset the kin selected benefits of altruism. Several mechanisms have been proposed to circumvent this dilemma but all assume that actors and recipients of altruism interact during the same time period. Here, this assumption is relaxed and a model is developed where individuals express an altruistic act, which results in posthumously helping relatives living in the future. The analysis of this model suggests that kin selected benefits can then feedback on the evolution of the trait in a way that promotes altruistic helping at high rates under limited dispersal. The decoupling of kin competition and kin selected benefits results from the fact that by helping relatives living in the future, an actor is helping individuals that are not in direct competition with itself. A direct consequence is that behaviours which actors gain by reducing the common good of present and future generations can be opposed by kin selection. The present model integrates niche-constructing traits with kin selection theory and delineates demographic and ecological conditions under which altruism can be selected for; and conditions where the 'tragedy of the commons' can be reduced.