Adaptation au codage CIM-10 de 15 indicateurs de la sécurité des patients proposés par l'Agence étasunienne pour la recherche et la qualité des soins de santé (AHRQ) [ICD-10 adaptation of 15 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality patient safety indicators].

BACKGROUND: In the United States, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has developed 20 Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) to measure the occurrence of hospital adverse events from medico-administrative data coded according to the ninth revision of the international classification of disease (ICD-9-CM). The adaptation of these PSIs to the WHO version of ICD-10 was carried out by an international consortium. METHODS: Two independent teams transcoded ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes proposed by the AHRQ into ICD-10-WHO. Using a Delphi process, experts from six countries evaluated each code independently, stating whether it was "included", "excluded" or "uncertain". During a two-day meeting, the experts then discussed the codes that had not obtained a consensus, and the additional codes proposed. RESULTS: Fifteen PSIs were adapted. Among the 2569 proposed diagnosis codes, 1775 were unanimously adopted straightaway. The 794 remaining codes and 2541 additional codes were discussed. Three documents were prepared: (1) a list of ICD-10-WHO codes for the 15 adapted PSIs; (2) recommendations to the AHRQ for the improvement of the nosological frame and the coding of PSI with ICD-9-CM; (3) recommendations to the WHO to improve ICD-10. CONCLUSIONS: This work allows international comparisons of PSIs among the countries using ICD-10. Nevertheless, these PSIs must still be evaluated further before being broadly used.

Do PES Improve the Governance of Forest Restoration?

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are praised as innovative policy instruments and they influence the governance of forest restoration efforts in two major ways. The first is the establishment of multi-stakeholder agencies as intermediary bodies between funders and planters to manage the funds and to distribute incentives to planters. The second implication is that specific contracts assign objectives to land users in the form of conditions for payments that are believed to increase the chances for sustained impacts on the ground. These implications are important in the assessment of the potential of PES to operate as new and effective funding schemes for forest restoration. They are analyzed by looking at two prominent payments for watershed service programs in Indonesia-Cidanau (Banten province in Java) and West Lombok (Eastern Indonesia)-with combined economic and political science approaches. We derive lessons for the governance of funding efforts (e.g., multi-stakeholder agencies are not a guarantee of success; mixed results are obtained from a reliance on mandatory funding with ad hoc regulations, as opposed to voluntary contributions by the service beneficiary) and for the governance of financial expenditure (e.g., absolute need for evaluation procedures for the internal governance of farmer groups). Furthermore, we observe that these governance features provide no guarantee that restoration plots with the highest relevance for ecosystem services are targeted by the PES

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Analytical progresses of the International Olympic Committee and World Anti-Doping Agency Olympic laboratories.

The Summer Olympic Games constitute the biggest concentration of human sports and activities in a particular place and time since 776 BCE, when the written history of the Olympic Games in Olympia began. Summer and Winter Olympic anti-doping laboratories, accredited by the International Olympic Committee in the past and the World Anti-Doping Agency in the present times, acquire worldwide interest to apply all new analytical advancements in the fight against doping in sports, hoping that this major human event will not become dirty by association with this negative phenomenon. This article summarizes the new analytical progresses, technologies and knowledge used by the Olympic laboratories, which for the vast majority of them are, eventually, incorporated into routine anti-doping analysis.