Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Mefloquine at the crossroads? Implications for malaria chemoprophylaxis in Europe.

Since its introduction to the market in 1985, mefloquine has been used for malaria chemoprophylaxis by more than 35 million travellers. In Europe, in 2014, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) issued recommendations on strengthened warnings, prescribing checklists and updates to the product information of mefloquine. Some malaria prevention advisors question the scientific basis for the restrictions and suggest that this cost-effective, anti-malarial drug will be displaced as a first-line anti-malaria medication with the result that vulnerable groups such as VFR and long-term travellers, pregnant travellers and young children are left without a suitable alternative chemoprophylaxis. This commentary looks at the current position of mefloquine prescribing and the rationale of the new EMA recommendations and restrictions. It also describes the new recommendations for malaria prophylaxis that have been adapted by Switzerland, Germany, Austria and Italy where chemoprophylaxis use is restricted to high-risk malaria-endemic areas.

Economic Methodology: A Historical Introduction.

Ever since the inception of economics over two hundred years ago, the tools at the discipline's disposal have grown more and more more sophisticated. This book provides a historical introduction to the methodology of economics through the eyes of economists. The story begins with John Stuart Mill's seminal essay from 1836 on the definition and method of political economy, which is then followed by an examination of how the actual practices of economists changed over time to such an extent that they not only altered their methods of enquiry, but also their self-perception as economists. Beginning as intellectuals and journalists operating to a large extent in the public sphere, they then transformed into experts who developed their tools of research increasingly behind the scenes. No longer did they try to influence policy agendas through public discourse; rather they targeted policymakers directly and with instruments that showed them as independent and objective policy advisors, the tools of the trade changing all the while. In order to shed light on this evolution of economic methodology, this book takes carefully selected snapshots from the discipline's history. It tracks the process of development through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, analysing the growth of empirical and mathematical modelling. It also looks at the emergence of the experiment in economics, in addition to the similarities and differences between modelling and experimentation. This book will be relevant reading for students and academics in the fields of economic methodology, history of economics, and history and philosophy of the social sciences.