Are Voting Advice Applications (VVAs) more than Toys ? : First findings on Impact and Accountability of VAAs

To what extent do Voting Advice Applications (VAA) have an influence on voting behaviour and to what extent should providers be hold accountable for such tools? This paper puts forward some empirical evidence from the Swiss VAA smartvote. The enormous popularity of smartvote in the last national elections in 2007 and the feedback of users and candidates let us come to the conclusion that smartvote is more than a toy and likely to have an influence on the voting decisions. Since Swiss citizens not only vote for parties but also for candidates, and the voting recommendation of smartvote is based on the political positions of the candidates, smartvote turns out to be particularly helpful. Political scientists must not keep their hands off such tools. Scientific research is needed to understand their functioning and possibilities to manipulate elections. On the bases of a legal study we come to the conclusion, that a science driven way of setting up such tools is essential for their legitimacy. However, we do not believe that there is a single best way of setting up such a tool and rather support a market like solution with different competing tools, provided they meet minimal standards like transparency and equal access for all parties and candidates. Once the process of selecting candidates and parties are directly linked to the act of voting, all these questions will become even more salient.

Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?

Technological developments in the information society bring new challenges, both to the applicability and to the enforceability of the law. One major challenge is posed by new entities such as pseudonyms, avatars, and software agents that operate at an increasing distance from the physical persons "behind" them (the "principal"). In case of accidents or misbehavior, current laws require that the physical or legal principal behind the entity be found so that she can be held to account. This may be problematic if the linkability of the principal and the operating entity is questionable. In light of the ongoing developments in electronic agents, there is sufficient reason to conduct a review of the literature in order to more closely examine arguments for and against legal personhood for some nonhuman acting entities. This article also includes a discussion of alternative approaches to solving the "accountability gap."

Is accountability a double-edged sword? Experimental evidence on the effectiveness of internal controls to prevent fraud

Recent legislations oblige organizations to monitor the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms that are necessary to prevent fraud. However, little is known about the effectiveness of different internal controls. We investigate whether the duty to sign work results-one of the most prominent internal control mechanisms-is effective to prevent fraud under different superior instructions. We use a 2×2 between-subjects experimental design with accountability (duty to sign work results vs. no duty to sign) and superior instructions (with vs. without profit maximization cue) as independent variables. Both manipulations of superior instructions reminded people to respect accounting standards and principles but in one condition, an instruction to increase revenues was integrated as profit maximization cue. We expected this cue to trigger a profit maximization decision frame that increases the likelihood for fraudulent revenue recording. 58 managers from an executive MBA class participated in the experiment. We find that superior instructions interact with accountability. Fraudulent revenue recording was particularly observed when people received instructions to increase revenues and had to sign their work results. Consequently, fraudulent behavior can occur without pressure to commit fraud due to profit maximization cues that are communicated by a superior and despite implemented internal control mechanisms. We discuss possible implications of our results for the prevention of fraudulent behavior.

Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review

This article reviews the literature that deals with the problem of legitimizing regulatory governance, with a special attention to the question of the accountability of independent regulatory agencies. The discussion begins with the presentation of the traditional arguments concerning the democratic deficit of the regulatory state. The positive evaluation of regulatory performance by citizens is presented as an alternative source of legitimacy. It follows the discussion of the existing approaches to make agencies accountable, so as to ensure the procedural legitimacy of regulatory governance. Some insights concerning new forms of accountability are offered in the last section, namely with reference to the establishment and ongoing consolidation of formal and informal networks of regulators.

Towards better Olympic accountability

Ten years after the corruption scandal that shook the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1999, this article presents the current situation regarding accountability for this non-governmental organization based in Switzerland. The IOC is responsible for ensuring that the Olympic Games are held regularly, and since its foundation has endeavoured to promote sport without discrimination in service of sustainable human development and a better world. Olympic accountability is examined by means of four facets within a theoretical framework. The analysis of each of them shows that although considerable progress has been made by the IOC since 1999, improvements regarding accountability remain both possible and desirable. A mechanism for making improvements is proposed in the Conclusion.

The impact of authority advice and accountability on auditors' decision to recognise norm-violating transactions.

Auditors face the difficult responsibilty to approve companies' financial accounting information reliably. They are trained to work according to accounting standards that are designed to help them in their decision making. Yet, auditors do not work in a social vacuum and are thus subject to various influences. One important source of influence at work is authority figures (e.g., experts, supervisors). On this background, we examined within two studies the impact of (1) authority advice to comply with accounting standards or to additionally maximize profits and (2) of participants' accountability for their decision. In Study 1, (n = 184 accounting students), participants who were advised by an authority to comply with accounting standards had a lower probability to recognise transactions that violated those standards than participants who were advised to comply but also to maximise profit. However, holding participants accountable for their decision reduced the difference between the two groups. In Study 2, (n = 58 managers), we again found an interaction between authority advice and accountability. But unlike the first study, participants only showed a lower probability to recognise transactions that violated accounting standards when they were held accountable and when the authority only advised them to comply with the standards. We discuss our results in light of unethical decision making and different norms or pressures to which managers may be exposed but students may not.