Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter?

This article analyzes if, and to what extent, the public service motivation (PSM) construct has an added value to explain work motivation in the public sector. In order to address the specificity of PSM when studying work motivation, the theoretical model underlying this empirical study compares PSM with two other explanatory factors: material incentives, such as performance-related pay, and team relations and support, such as recognition by superiors. This theoretical model is then tested with data collected in a national survey of 3,754 civil servants at the Swiss municipal level. Results of a structural equations model clearly show the relevance of PSM. They also provide evidence for the importance of socio-relational motivating factors, whereas material incentives play an anecdotal role.

Comment faire de la surveillance sanitaire? L'exemple de l'Observatoire Valaisan de la Santé en Suisse [How to conduct public health surveillance? The example of the Observatoire Valaisan de la Santé in Switzerland].

OBJECTIVE: To describe the goals and methods of contemporary public health surveillance and to present the activities of the Observatoire Valaisan de la Santé (OVS), a tool unique in Switzerland to conduct health surveillance for the population of a canton. METHODS: Narrative review and presentation of the OVS. RESULTS: Public health surveillance consists of systematic and continuous collection, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of health data necessary for public health planning. Surveillance is organized according to contemporary public health issues. Switzerland is currently in an era dominated by chronic diseases due to ageing of the population. This "new public health" era is also characterized by the growing importance of health technology, rational risk management, preventive medicine and health promotion, and the central role of the citizen/patient. Information technologies provide access to new health data, but public health surveillance methods need to be adapted. In Switzerland, health surveillance activities are conducted by several public and private bodies, at federal and cantonal levels. The Valais canton has set up the OVS, an integrative, regional, and reactive system to conduct surveillance. CONCLUSION: Public health surveillance provides information useful for public health decisions and actions. It constitutes a key element for public health planning.

Convention-cadre pour la lutte antitabac: un instrument puissant de santé publique. [The Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC): a powerful public health instrument].

The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) isa global and comprehensive legal framework for reducing demand for tobacco (e.g. price measures; ban on smoking in enclosed places; contents of tobacco products; packaging and labeling; advertising, promotion and sponsorship; liability, tobacco cessation, etc.) and supply (e.g. illicit trade; sales to/by minors, etc.). Adopted in 2003, the FCTC has been ratified by 174 countries so far. Switzerland has signed the treaty in 2004 but ratification will necessitate the implementation of stronger tobacco control measures at the national level. The FCTC is a priority of any strategy to reduce noncommunicable diseases in populations. Broad implementation of the FCTC has the potential to prevent a substantial proportion of the billion of tobacco-related deaths expected in the 21st

Optimal public rationing and price response

We study optimal public rationing of an indivisible good and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and costs of provisions. Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Public rationing determines the characteristics of consumers who seek supply from the private sector, where a firm sets prices based on consumers' cost information and in response to the rationing rule. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information. In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Supplying all poor consumers would leave only rich consumers in the private market, and the firm would react by setting a high price. Rationing some poor consumers is optimal, and implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold. Wealth information is not used. Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium total consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth. [Authors]