Entrepreneurial Initiative Selling Within Organizations: Towards a More Comprehensive Motivational Framework

We develop and test a motivational framework to explain the intensity with which individuals sell entrepreneurial initiatives within their organizations. Initiative selling efforts may be driven by several factors that hitherto have not been given full consideration: initiative characteristics, individuals' anticipation of rewards, and their level of dissatisfaction. On the basis of a survey in a mail service firm of 192 managers who proposed an entrepreneurial initiative, we find that individuals' reported intensity of their selling efforts with respect to that initiative is greater when they (1) believe that the organizational benefits of the initiative are high, (2) perceive that the initiative is consistent with current organizational practices (although this effect is weak), (3) believe that their immediate organizational environment provides extrinsic rewards for initiatives, and (4) are satisfied with the current organizational situation. These findings extend previous expectancy theory-based explanations of initiative selling (by considering the roles of initiative characteristics and that of initiative valence for the proponent) and show the role of satisfaction as an important motivational driver for initiative selling.

A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game

We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861-898, 2004)-where players have different levels of reasoning-to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240-264, 2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29-46, 1990) action commitment game-a duopoly with endogenous timing of entry. We show that, for an empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. We show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain the most important features of the experimental data on the action commitment game in (2002). In order to gauge the success of the model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model.