Putting the Special Case in Its Place: Switzerland and Small-N Comparison in Policy Research

This research note presents a set of strategies to conduct small-N comparisons in policy research including the Swiss case. Even though every country can be considered "special" to some extent, the Swiss political system is often viewed as a particularly difficult case for comparison because of the impact of its idiosyncratic institutional features (most notably direct democracy). In order to deal with this problem, our note sets out two possible strategies - the use of functional equivalents and of counterfactual reasoning - and explains how to implement them empirically through process tracing and the establishment of causal chains. As an illustration, these strategies are used for a comparison of the process of electricity market liberalisation in Switzerland and Belgium.

Insight into oversight : how information commissioners contribute to the achievement of access-to-information policy objectives

This thesis examines how oversight bodies, as part of an ATI policy, contribute to the achievement of the policy's objectives. The aim of the thesis is to see how oversight bodies and the work they do affects the implementation of their respective ATI policies and thereby contributes to the objectives of those policies using a comparative case study approach. The thesis investigates how federal/central government level information commissioners in four jurisdictions - Germany, India, Scotland, and Switzerland - enforce their respective ATI policies, which tasks they carry out in addition to their enforcement duties, the challenges they face in their work and the ways they overcome these. Qualitative data were gathered from primary and secondary documents as well as in 37 semi-structured interviews with staff of the commissioners' offices, administrative officials whose job entails complying with ATI, people who have made ATI requests and appealed to their respective oversight body, and external experts who have studied ATI implementation in their particular jurisdiction. The thesis finds that while the aspect of an oversight body's formal independence that has the greatest impact on its work is resource control and that although the powers granted by law set the framework for ensuring that the administration is properly complying with the policy, the commissioner's leadership style - a component of informal independence - has more influence than formal attributes of independence in setting out how resources are obtained and used as well as how staff set priorities and utilize the powers they are granted by law. The conclusion, therefore, is that an ATI oversight body's ability to contribute to the achievement of the policy's objectives is a function of three main factors: a. commissioner's leadership style; b. adequacy of resources and degree of control the organization has over them; c. powers and the exercise of discretion in using them. In effect, the thesis argues that it is difficult to pinpoint the value of the formal powers set out for the oversight body in the ATI law, and that their decisions on whether and how to use them are more important than the presumed strength of the powers. It also claims that the choices made by the commissioners and their staff regarding priorities and use of powers are determined to a large extent by the adequacy of resources and the degree of control the organization has over those resources. In turn, how the head of the organization leads and manages the oversight body is crucial to both the adequacy of the organization's resources and the decisions made about the use of powers. Together, these three factors have a significant impact on the body's effectiveness in contributing to ATI objectives.

A two-level analysis of the determinants of direct democratic choices in European, immigration and foreign policy in Switzerland

This article employs a unique data set - covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration/asylum policy held between 1992 and 2006 in Switzerland - in order to examine the conditional impact of context upon utilitarian, cultural, political and cognitive determinants of individual attitudes toward international openness. Our results reveal clear patterns of cross-level interactions between individual determinants and the project-related context of the vote. Thus, although party cues and political competence have a strong impact on individuals' support for international openness, this impact is substantially mediated by the type of coalition that is operating within the party elite. Similarly, subjective utilitarian and cultural considerations influence the voters' decision in interaction with the content of the proposal submitted to the voters as well as with the framing of the voting campaign.

The Political Economy of Active Labor-Market Policy

Active labor-market policies (ALMPs) have developed significantly over the past two decades across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with substantial cross-national differences in terms of both extent and overall orientation. The objective of this article is to account for cross-national variation in this policy field. It starts by reviewing existing scholarship concerning political, institutional, and ideational determinants of ALMPs. It then argues that ALMP is too broad a category to be used without further specification, and it develops a typology of four different types of ALMPs: incentive reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment. These are discussed and examined through ALMP expenditure profiles in selected countries. The article uses this typology to analyze ALMP trajectories in six Western European countries and shows that the role of this instrument changes dramatically over time. It concludes that there is little regularity in the political determinants of ALMPs. In contrast, it finds strong institutional and ideational effects, nested in the interaction between the changing economic context and existing labor-market policies.

Organisational reforms in active welfare states: A comparative analysis of the turn to 'single gateways' in Western Europe

Based on the case of reforms aimed at integrating the provision of income protection and employment services for jobless people in Europe, this thesis seeks to understand the reasons which may prompt governments to engage in large-scale organisational reforms. Over the last 20 years, several European countries have indeed radically redesigned the organisational structure of their welfare state by merging or bundling existing front-line offices in charge of benefit payment and employment services together into 'one-stop' agencies. Whereas in academic and political debates, these reforms are generally presented as a necessary and rational response to the problems and inconsistencies induced by fragmentation in a context of the reorientation of welfare states towards labour market activation, this thesis shows that the agenda setting of these reforms is in fact the result of multidimensional political dynamics. More specifically, the main argument of this thesis is that these reforms are best understood not so such from the problems induced by organisational compartmentalism, whose political recognition is often controversial, but from the various goals that governments may simultaneously achieve by means of their adoption. This argument is tested by comparing agenda-setting processes of large-scale reforms of coordination in the United Kingdom (Jobcentre Plus), Germany (Hartz IV reform) and Denmark (2005 Jobcentre reform), and contrasting them with the Swiss case where the government has so far rejected any coordination initiative involving organisational redesign. This comparison brings to light the importance, for the rise of organisational reforms, of the possibility to couple them with the following three goals: first, goals related to the strengthening of activation policies; second, institutional goals seeking to redefine the balance of responsibilities between the central state and non-state actors, and finally electoral goals for governments eager to maintain political credibility. The decisive role of electoral goals in the three countries suggests that these reforms are less bound by partisan politics than by the particular pressures facing governments arrived in office after long periods in opposition.