Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.

What role do just-world beliefs play in harmful responses to injustice?

Research suggests that employees sometimes retaliate and sometimes refrain from retaliation for the same reason, namely because they care about justice. In two studies, we seek to solve this apparent inconsistency. Drawing on just world theory, we argue that retaliatory, harmful behavioral strategies to deal with injustice are associated to individual differences in personal belief in a just world (personal BJW). In contrast, individual differences in believing that the world is just in general (general BJW) are linked to the inhibition of these reactions. As a consequence, the relation between injustice and harmful behaviors is stronger for people with a high personal BJW than for those with a low one. General BJW is associated with their inhibition such that the relation between injustice and harmful reactions is weaker for people with a high general BJW than for those with a low one. We found evidence for our hypotheses in a cross-sectional field study and an experiment. We discuss our findings in light of their implications for just-world theory and suggest avenues for future research integrating organizational justice literature.

The Aspergillus fumigatus septins play pleiotropic roles in septation, conidiation, and cell wall stress, but are dispensable for virulence.

Septins are a conserved family of GTPases that regulate important cellular processes such as cell wall integrity, and septation in fungi. The requirement of septins for virulence has been demonstrated in the human pathogenic yeasts Candida albicans and Cryptococcus neoformans, as well as the plant pathogen Magnaporthe oryzae. Aspergillus spp. contains five genes encoding for septins (aspA-E). While the importance of septins AspA, AspB, AspC, and AspE for growth and conidiation has been elucidated in the filamentous fungal model Aspergillus nidulans, nothing is known on the role of septins in growth and virulence in the human pathogen Aspergillus fumigatus. Here we deleted all five A. fumigatus septins, and generated certain double and triple septin deletion strains. Phenotypic analyses revealed that while all the septins are dispensable in normal growth conditions, AspA, AspB, AspC and AspE are required for regular septation. Furthermore, deletion of only the core septin genes significantly reduced conidiation. Concomitant with the absence of an electron-dense outer conidial wall, the ΔaspB strain was also sensitive to anti-cell wall agents. Infection with the ΔaspB strain in a Galleria mellonella model of invasive aspergillosis showed hypervirulence, but no virulence difference was noted when compared to the wild-type strain in a murine model of invasive aspergillosis. Although the deletion of aspB resulted in increased release of TNF-α from the macrophages, no significant inflammation differences in lung histology was noted between the ΔaspB strain and the wild-type strain. Taken together, these results point to the importance of septins in A. fumigatus growth, but not virulence in a murine model.

What Role Does Sleep Play in Weight Gain in the First Semester of University?

We hypothesized that shorter sleep durations and greater variability in sleep patterns are associated with weight gain in the first semester of university. Students (N = 132) completed daily sleep diaries for 9 weeks, completed the MEQ (chronotype) and CES-D (depressed mood) at week 9, and self-reported weight/height (weeks 1 & 9). Mean and variability scores were calculated for sleep duration (TST, TSTv), bedtime (BT, BTv), and wake time (WT, WTv). An initial hierarchical regression evaluated (block 1) sex, ethnicity; (block 2) depressed mood, chronotype; (block 3) TST; (block 4) BT, WT; and (block 5; R(2) change = 0.09, p = 0.005) TSTv, BTv, WTv with weight change. A sex-by-TSTv interaction was found. A final model showed that ethnicity, TST, TSTv, and BTv accounted for 31% of the variance in weight change for males; TSTv was the most significant contributor (R(2) change = 0.21, p < 0.001). Daily variability in sleep duration contributes to males' weight gain. Further investigation needs to examine sex-specific outcomes for sleep and weight.

Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?

A long-standing question in biology and economics is whether individual organisms evolve to behave as if they were striving to maximize some goal function. We here formalize this "as if" question in a patch-structured population in which individuals obtain material payoffs from (perhaps very complex multimove) social interactions. These material payoffs determine personal fitness and, ultimately, invasion fitness. We ask whether individuals in uninvadable population states will appear to be maximizing conventional goal functions (with population-structure coefficients exogenous to the individual's behavior), when what is really being maximized is invasion fitness at the genetic level. We reach two broad conclusions. First, no simple and general individual-centered goal function emerges from the analysis. This stems from the fact that invasion fitness is a gene-centered multigenerational measure of evolutionary success. Second, when selection is weak, all multigenerational effects of selection can be summarized in a neutral type-distribution quantifying identity-by-descent between individuals within patches. Individuals then behave as if they were striving to maximize a weighted sum of material payoffs (own and others). At an uninvadable state it is as if individuals would freely choose their actions and play a Nash equilibrium of a game with a goal function that combines self-interest (own material payoff), group interest (group material payoff if everyone does the same), and local rivalry (material payoff differences).

Reframing video gaming and internet use addiction : empirical cross-national comparison of heavy use over time and addiction scales among young users

BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Evidence-based and reliable measures of addictive disorders are needed in general population-based assessments. One study suggested that heavy use over time (UOT) should be used instead of self-reported addiction scales (AS). This study compared UOT and AS regarding video gaming and internet use empirically, using associations with comorbid factors. DESIGN: Cross-sectional data from the 2011 French Survey on Health and Consumption on Call-up and Preparation for Defence-Day (ESCAPAD), cross-sectional data from the 2012 Swiss ado@internet.ch study and two waves of longitudinal data (2010-13) of the Swiss Longitudinal Cohort Study on Substance Use Risk Factors (C-SURF). SETTING: Three representative samples from the general population of French and Swiss adolescents and young Swiss men, aged approximately 17, 14 and 20 years, respectively. PARTICIPANTS: ESCAPAD: n =22 945 (47.4% men); ado@internet.ch: n =3049 (50% men); C-SURF: n =4813 (baseline + follow-up, 100% men). MEASUREMENTS: We assessed video gaming/internet UOT ESCAPAD and ado@internet.ch: number of hours spent online per week, C-SURF: latent score of time spent gaming/using internet] and AS (ESCAPAD: Problematic Internet Use Questionnaire, ado@internet.ch: Internet Addiction Test, C-SURF: Gaming AS). Comorbidities were assessed with health outcomes (ESCAPAD: physical health evaluation with a single item, suicidal thoughts, and appointment with a psychiatrist; ado@internet.ch: WHO-5 and somatic health problems; C-SURF: Short Form 12 (SF-12 Health Survey) and Major Depression Inventory (MDI). FINDINGS: UOT and AS were correlated moderately (ESCAPAD: r = 0.40, ado@internet.ch: r = 0.53 and C-SURF: r = 0.51). Associations of AS with comorbidity factors were higher than those of UOT in cross-sectional (AS: .005 ≤ |b| ≤ 2.500, UOT: 0.001 ≤ |b| ≤ 1.000) and longitudinal analyses (AS: 0.093 ≤ |b| ≤ 1.079, UOT: 0.020 ≤ |b| ≤ 0.329). The results were similar across gender in ESCAPAD and ado@internet.ch (men: AS: 0.006 ≤ |b| ≤ 0.211, UOT: 0.001 ≤ |b| ≤ 0.061; women: AS: 0.004 ≤ |b| ≤ 0.155, UOT: 0.001 ≤ |b| ≤ 0.094). CONCLUSIONS: The measurement of heavy use over time captures part of addictive video gaming/internet use without overlapping to a large extent with the results of measuring by self-reported addiction scales (AS). Measuring addictive video gaming/internet use via self-reported addiction scales relates more strongly to comorbidity factors than heavy use over time.

Simple Heuristics in a Social Game

Simple Heuristics in a Social World invites readers to discover the simple heuristics that people use to navigate the complexities and surprises of environments populated with others. The social world is a terrain where humans and other animals compete with conspecifics for myriad resources, including food, mates, and status, and where rivals grant the decision maker little time for deep thought, protracted information search, or complex calculations. Yet, the social world also encompasses domains where social animals such as humans can learn from one another and can forge alliances with one another to boost their chances of success. According to the book's thesis, the undeniable complexity of the social world does not dictate cognitive complexity as many scholars of rationality argue. Rather, it entails circumstances that render optimization impossible or computationally arduous: intractability, the existence of incommensurable considerations, and competing goals. With optimization beyond reach, less can be more. That is, heuristics--simple strategies for making decisions when time is pressing and careful deliberation an unaffordable luxury--become indispensible mental tools. As accurate as or even more accurate than complex methods when used in the appropriate social environments, these heuristics are good descriptive models of how people make many decisions and inferences, but their impressive performance also poses a normative challenge for optimization models. In short, the Homo socialis may prove to be a Homo heuristicus whose intelligence reflects ecological rather than logical rationality.

A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game

We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861-898, 2004)-where players have different levels of reasoning-to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240-264, 2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29-46, 1990) action commitment game-a duopoly with endogenous timing of entry. We show that, for an empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. We show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain the most important features of the experimental data on the action commitment game in (2002). In order to gauge the success of the model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model.