Between Immunology And Tolerance: Controlling Immune Responses Employing Tolerogenic Dendritic Cells

Dendritic cells (DCs) are the most efficient antigen presenting cells, they provide co-stimulation, are able to secrete various proinflammatory cytokines and therefore play a pivotal role in shaping adaptive immune responses. Moreover, they are important for the promotion and maintenance of central and peripheral tolerance through several mechanisms like the induction of anergy or apoptosis in effector T cells or by promoting regulatory T cells. The murine CD8α+ (MuTu) dendritic cell line was previously derived and described in our laboratory. The MuTu cell line has been shown to maintain phenotypical and functional characteristics of endogenous CD8α+ DCs. They are able to cross-present exogenous antigens to CD8+ T cells and produce interleukin (IL-) 12 upon engagement of Toll like receptors. The cell line constitutes an infinite source of homogenous, phenotypically well-defined dendritic cells. This allows us to investigate the role and potential of specific molecules in the induction as well as regulation of immune responses by DCs in a rational and standardized way. In a first project the MuTu dendritic cell line was transduced in order to stably express the immunosuppressive molecules IL-10, IL-35 or the active form of TGF-β (termed IL-10+DC, IL-35+DC or actTGFβ+DC). We investigated the capability of these potentially suppressive or tolerogenic dendritic cell lines to induce immune tolerance and explore the mechanisms behind tolerance induction. The expression of TGF-β by the DC line did not affect the phenotype of the DCs itself. In contrast, IL-10+ and IL-35+DCs were found to exhibit lower expression of co-stimulatory molecules and MHC class I and II, as well as reduced secretion of pro-inflammatory cytokines upon activation. In vitro co-culture with IL-35+, IL10+ or active TGFβ+ DCs interfered with function and proliferation of CD4+ and CD8+ T cells. Furthermore, IL-35 and active TGF-β expressing DC lines induced regulatory phenotype on CD4+ T cells in vitro without or with expression of Foxp3, respectively. In different murine cancer models, vaccination with IL-35 or active TGF-β expressing DCs resulted in faster tumor growth. Interestingly, accelerated tumor growth could be observed when IL-35-expressing DCs were injected into T cell-deficient RAG-/- mice. IL-10expressing DCs however, were found to rather delay tumor growth. Besides the mentioned autocrine effects of IL-35 expression on the DC line itself, we surprisingly observed that the expression of IL-35 or the addition of IL-35 containing medium enhances neutrophil survival and induces proliferation of endothelial cells. Our findings indicate that the cytokine IL-35 might not only be a potent regulator of adaptive immune responses, but it also implies IL-35 to mediate diverse effects on an array of cellular targets. This abilities make IL-35 a promising target molecule not only for the treatment of auto-inflammatory disease but also to improve anti-cancer immunotherapies. Indeed, by applying active TGFβ+ in murine autoimmune encephalitis we were able to completely inhibit the development of the disease, whereas IL-35+DCs reduced disease incidence and severity. Furthermore, the preventive transfer of IL-35+DCs delayed rejection of transplanted skin to the same extend as the combination of IL-10/actTGF-β expressing DCs. Thus, the expression of a single tolerogenic molecule can be sufficient to interfere with the adequate activation and function of dendritic cells and of co-cultured T lymphocytes. The respective mechanisms of tolerance induction seem to be different for each of the investigated molecule. The application of a combination of multiple tolerogenic molecules might therefore evoke synergistic effects in order to overcome (auto-) immunity. In a second project we tried to improve the immunogenicity of dendritic cell-based cancer vaccines using two different approaches. First, the C57BL/6 derived MuTu dendritic cell line was genetically modified in order to express the MHC class I molecule H-2Kd. We hypothesized that the expression of BALB/c specific MHC class I haplotype (H-2Kd) should allow the priming of tumor-specific CD8+ T cells by the otherwise allogeneic dendritic cells. At the same time, the transfer of these H-2Kd+ DCs into BALB/c mice was thought to evoke a strong inflammatory environment that might act as an "adjuvant", helping to overcome tumor induced immune suppression. Using this so called "semi-allogeneic" vaccination approach, we could demonstrate that the delivery of tumor lysate pulsed H-2Kd+ DCs significantly delayed tumor growth when compared to autologous or allogeneic vaccination. However, we were not able to coherently elucidate the cellular mechanisms underlying the observed effect. Second, we generated MuTu DC lines which stably express the pro-inflammatory cytokines IL-2, IL-12 or IL-15. We investigated whether the combination of DC vaccination and local delivery of pro-inflammatory cytokines might enhance tumor specific T cell responses. Indeed, we observed an enhanced T cell proliferation and activation when they were cocultured in vitro with IL-12 or IL-2-expressing DCs. But unfortunately we could not observe a beneficial or even synergistic impact on tumor development when cytokine delivery was combined with semi-allogeneic DC vaccination.

Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.