Stage managing bipolar disorder.

OBJECTIVES: Clinical staging is widespread in medicine - it informs prognosis, clinical course, and treatment, and assists individualized care. Staging places an individual on a probabilistic continuum of increasing potential disease severity, ranging from clinically at-risk or latency stage through first threshold episode of illness or recurrence, and, finally, to late or end-stage disease. The aim of the present paper was to examine and update the evidence regarding staging in bipolar disorder, and how this might inform targeted and individualized intervention approaches. METHODS: We provide a narrative review of the relevant information. RESULTS: In bipolar disorder, the validity of staging is informed by a range of findings that accompany illness progression, including neuroimaging data suggesting incremental volume loss, cognitive changes, and a declining likelihood of response to pharmacological and psychosocial treatments. Staging informs the adoption of a number of approaches, including the active promotion of both indicated prevention for at-risk individuals and early intervention strategies for newly diagnosed individuals, and the tailored implementation of treatments according to the stage of illness. CONCLUSIONS: The nature of bipolar disorder implies the presence of an active process of neuroprogression that is considered to be at least partly mediated by inflammation, oxidative stress, apoptosis, and changes in neurogenesis. It further supports the concept of neuroprotection, in that a diversity of agents have putative effects against these molecular targets. Clinically, staging suggests that the at-risk state or first episode is a period that requires particularly active and broad-based treatment, consistent with the hope that the temporal trajectory of the illness can be altered. Prompt treatment may be potentially neuroprotective and attenuate the neurostructural and neurocognitive changes that emerge with chronicity. Staging highlights the need for interventions at a service delivery level and implementing treatments at the earliest stage of illness possible.

Measuring discrepancies between knowledge, preoccupation and fear of aids in populations.

A simple tool to quantify discrepancies between knowledge, preoccupation and fear regarding hiv and aids is presented. This tool is based on standard questions available in health surveys. Some results using recent Swiss data are presented, and the method is discussed.

Epistemological tensions between linguistic description and ordinary speakers' intuitive knowledge: examples from French verb morphology

In this article, I address epistemological questions regarding the status of linguistic rules and the pervasive--though seldom discussed--tension that arises between theory-driven object perception by linguists on the one hand, and ordinary speakers' possible intuitive knowledge on the other hand. Several issues will be discussed using examples from French verb morphology, based on the 6500 verbs from Le Petit Robert dictionary (2013).

Assessing the sociology of sport: On sport organizations and critical knowledge

The purpose of this contribution is to analyse the trajectory, the challenges and the future of the sociology of sport on three levels: the internal dynamic within the specific sub-field of the sociology of sport, its interactions with sociology and sport sciences, and its relation with sport organizations. The paper notes that the changes of the trajectory of the sociology of sport, first leaning on the profession of physical education teacher and then to sport sciences, as important consequences. Because most of the sociologists specialized in sport are working in sport sciences departments, the most important consequence is the dependency on sport sciences rather than on sociology. Compared to other fields of sociology, it means challenging other sciences for recognition. The paper argues that to face the threat of a marginalization within the field of sport science, the future of sociology of sport could be to fight for an external recognition. Applying sociology could spread critical views that are necessary to sport organizations. It could also give sociologists access to very interesting data, which can help producing good research, and give it a greater legitimacy within sport sciences. However, it is a risky strategy because of the necessity for the sociologists to stay critical both on sporting organization and on their own work.

New Algorithm for Managing Childhood Illness Using Mobile Technology (ALMANACH): A Controlled Non-Inferiority Study on Clinical Outcome and Antibiotic Use in Tanzania.

INTRODUCTION: The decline of malaria and scale-up of rapid diagnostic tests calls for a revision of IMCI. A new algorithm (ALMANACH) running on mobile technology was developed based on the latest evidence. The objective was to ensure that ALMANACH was safe, while keeping a low rate of antibiotic prescription. METHODS: Consecutive children aged 2-59 months with acute illness were managed using ALMANACH (2 intervention facilities), or standard practice (2 control facilities) in Tanzania. Primary outcomes were proportion of children cured at day 7 and who received antibiotics on day 0. RESULTS: 130/842 (15∙4%) in ALMANACH and 241/623 (38∙7%) in control arm were diagnosed with an infection in need for antibiotic, while 3∙8% and 9∙6% had malaria. 815/838 (97∙3%;96∙1-98.4%) were cured at D7 using ALMANACH versus 573/623 (92∙0%;89∙8-94∙1%) using standard practice (p<0∙001). Of 23 children not cured at D7 using ALMANACH, 44% had skin problems, 30% pneumonia, 26% upper respiratory infection and 13% likely viral infection at D0. Secondary hospitalization occurred for one child using ALMANACH and one who eventually died using standard practice. At D0, antibiotics were prescribed to 15∙4% (12∙9-17∙9%) using ALMANACH versus 84∙3% (81∙4-87∙1%) using standard practice (p<0∙001). 2∙3% (1∙3-3.3) versus 3∙2% (1∙8-4∙6%) received an antibiotic secondarily. CONCLUSION: Management of children using ALMANACH improve clinical outcome and reduce antibiotic prescription by 80%. This was achieved through more accurate diagnoses and hence better identification of children in need of antibiotic treatment or not. The building on mobile technology allows easy access and rapid update of the decision chart. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Pan African Clinical Trials Registry PACTR201011000262218.

Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.