Prostate Cancer Unit Initiative in Europe: A position paper by the European School of Oncology.

The Prostate Cancer Programme of the European School of Oncology developed the concept of specialised interdisciplinary and multiprofessional prostate cancer care to be formalized in Prostate Cancer Units (PCU). After the publication in 2011 of the collaborative article "The Requirements of a Specialist Prostate Cancer Unit: A Discussion Paper from the European School of Oncology", in 2012 the PCU Initiative in Europe was launched. A multiprofessional Task Force of internationally recognized opinion leaders, among whom representatives of scientific societies, and patient advocates gathered to set standards for quality comprehensive prostate cancer care and designate care pathways in PCUs. The result was a consensus on 40 mandatory and recommended standards and items, covering several macro-areas, from general requirements to personnel to organization and case management. This position paper describes the relevant, feasible and applicable core criteria for defining PCUs in most European countries delivered by PCU Initiative in Europe Task Force.

Transnational private authority, regulatory space and workers' collective competences: Bringing local contexts and worker agency back in

The impact of transnational private regulation on labour standards remains in dispute. While studies have provided some limited evidence of positive effects on 'outcome standards' such as wages or occupational health and safety, the literature gives little reason to believe that there has been any significant effect on 'process rights' relating primarily to collective workers' voice and social dialogue. This paper probes this assumption by bringing local contexts and worker agency more fully into the picture. It outlines an analytical framework that emphasizes workers' potential to act collectively for change in the regulatory space surrounding the employment relationship. It argues that while transnational private regulation on labour standards may marginally improve workers access to regulatory spaces and their capacity to require the inclusion of enterprises in them, it does little to increase union leverage. The findings are based on empirical research work conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Jevons, Mill and the Private Laboratory of the Mind

In this paper the rift between Jevons and Mill over the method of political economy serves as a prehistory to recent attempts of behavioural economists to once again explain economic behaviour by taking recourse to mankind's physiology. While Mill relied on the association psychology and its introspective method to establish indubitable first principles, Jevons scorned all recourse to introspection. As exemplified for Jevons's theory of labour, psychophysiology gave Jevons the means to think about economic behaviour in terms of functional form, and promised its assessment by means of experiments. Thus levelling down the Victorian distinction between mind and matter, Jevons turned political economy into social physics.

Are Public Private Partnerships that Rigid ? And Why ? : Evidence from Toll Road Concession Contracts

Transport concession contracts are commonly said to be standardized and too rigid. They would not allow public authorities to adapt them to evolving context and circumstances. This paper aims at challenging this view and, more particularly, the view that contractual rigidity for transport concessions is exogenous. Using a transaction cost framework, we disentangle between three main determinants of contractual rigidity: traffic uncertainty; connivance between contracting parties; quality of the institutional environment. Using an original database of toll road concession contracts, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment. We find that these exogenous determinants significantly influence contractual choices.

Entrepreneurial Initiative Selling Within Organizations: Towards a More Comprehensive Motivational Framework

We develop and test a motivational framework to explain the intensity with which individuals sell entrepreneurial initiatives within their organizations. Initiative selling efforts may be driven by several factors that hitherto have not been given full consideration: initiative characteristics, individuals' anticipation of rewards, and their level of dissatisfaction. On the basis of a survey in a mail service firm of 192 managers who proposed an entrepreneurial initiative, we find that individuals' reported intensity of their selling efforts with respect to that initiative is greater when they (1) believe that the organizational benefits of the initiative are high, (2) perceive that the initiative is consistent with current organizational practices (although this effect is weak), (3) believe that their immediate organizational environment provides extrinsic rewards for initiatives, and (4) are satisfied with the current organizational situation. These findings extend previous expectancy theory-based explanations of initiative selling (by considering the roles of initiative characteristics and that of initiative valence for the proponent) and show the role of satisfaction as an important motivational driver for initiative selling.

Is Transnational Private Regulation Potentially an Effective Means of Promoting Collective Industrial Relations?

This paper asks whether collective industrial relations can be promoted by means other than seeking change in public policy. Recent research points to the increasing significance of transnational private regulation (TPR) in developing economies. There is an emerging consensus that market incentives to improve wages and conditions of work can have a modest positive effect on measurable outcomes like hours of work, and health and safety. However, it appears that TPR has little impact on the capacity of workers to pursue such improvements for themselves via collective action. The paper takes a closer look at the potential of TPR to enhance worker voice and participation. It argues that this potential cannot be properly evaluated without understanding how local actors mobilise the social and political resources that TPR provides. The case studies presented show how different TPR schemes have been used by unions in Africa as a means to pursue the interests of members. The authors found that the scale of the impact of TPR in all of the contexts studied depended almost entirely on the existing capacities and resources of the unions involved. TPR led to the creation of collective industrial relations processes, or helped unions to ensure that certain enterprises participated in existing industrial relations processes, but did virtually nothing to enhance the political and organisational capacity of the unions to influence the outcomes of those processes in terms of wages and conditions of employment. The paper concludes that the potential of TPR to promote the emergence of collective industrial relations systems is very low.