Kermit interacts with gαo, vang, and motor proteins in Drosophila planar cell polarity.

In addition to the ubiquitous apical-basal polarity, epithelial cells are often polarized within the plane of the tissue - the phenomenon known as planar cell polarity (PCP). In Drosophila, manifestations of PCP are visible in the eye, wing, and cuticle. Several components of the PCP signaling have been characterized in flies and vertebrates, including the heterotrimeric Go protein. However, Go signaling partners in PCP remain largely unknown. Using a genetic screen we uncover Kermit, previously implicated in G protein and PCP signaling, as a novel binding partner of Go. Through pull-down and genetic interaction studies, we find that Kermit interacts with Go and another PCP component Vang, known to undergo intracellular relocalization during PCP establishment. We further demonstrate that the activity of Kermit in PCP differentially relies on the motor proteins: the microtubule-based dynein and kinesin motors and the actin-based myosin VI. Our results place Kermit as a potential transducer of Go, linking Vang with motor proteins for its delivery to dedicated cellular compartments during PCP establishment.

The sand rat, Psammomys obesus, develops type 2 diabetic retinopathy similar to humans.

PURPOSE: Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is a leading cause of blindness, yet pertinent animal models are uncommon. The sand rat (Psammomys obesus), exhibiting diet-induced metabolic syndrome, might constitute a relevant model. METHODS: Adult P. obesus (n = 39) were maintained in captivity for 4 to 7 months and fed either vegetation-based diets (n = 13) or standard rat chow (n = 26). Although plant-fed animals exhibited uniform body weight and blood glucose levels over time, nearly 60% of rat chow-raised animals developed diabetes-like symptoms (test group). Animals were killed, and their eyes and vitreous were processed for immunochemistry. RESULTS: Compared with plant-fed animals, diabetic animals showed many abnormal vascular features, including vasodilation, tortuosity, and pericyte loss within the blood vessels, hyperproteinemia and elevated ratios of proangiogenic and antiangiogenic growth factors in the vitreous, and blood-retinal barrier breakdown. Furthermore, there were statistically significant decreases in retinal cell layer thicknesses and densities, accompanied by profound alterations in glia (downregulation of glutamine synthetase, glutamate-aspartate transporter, upregulation of glial fibrillar acidic protein) and many neurons (reduced expression of protein kinase Cα and Cξ in bipolar cells, axonal degeneration in ganglion cells). Cone photoreceptors were particularly affected, with reduced expression of short- and mid-/long-wavelength opsins. Hypercaloric diet nondiabetic animals showed intermediate values. CONCLUSIONS: Simple dietary modulation of P. obesus induces a rapid and severe phenotype closely resembling human type 2 DR. This species presents a valuable novel experimental model for probing the neural (especially cone photoreceptor) pathogenic modifications that are difficult to study in humans and for screening therapeutic strategies.

Tissue transglutaminase (TG2) acting as G protein protects hepatocytes against Fas-mediated cell death in mice.

Tissue transglutaminase (TG2) is a protein cross-linking enzyme known to be expressed by hepatocytes and to be induced during the in vivo hepatic apoptosis program. TG2 is also a G protein that mediates intracellular signaling by the alpha-1b-adrenergic receptor (AR) in liver cells. Fas/Fas ligand interaction plays a crucial role in various liver diseases, and administration of agonistic anti-Fas antibodies to mice causes both disseminated endothelial cell apoptosis and fulminant hepatic failure. Here we report that an intraperitoneal dose of anti-Fas antibodies, which is sublethal for wild-type mice, kills all the TG2 knock-out mice within 20 hours. Although TG2-/- thymocytes exposed to anti-Fas antibodies die at the same rate as wild-type mice, TG2-/- hepatocytes show increased sensitivity toward anti-Fas treatment both in vivo and in vitro, with no change in their cell surface expression of Fas, levels of FLIP(L) (FLICE-inhibitory protein), or the rate of I-kappaBalpha degradation, but a decrease in the Bcl-xL expression. We provide evidence that this is the consequence of the impaired AR signaling that normally regulates the levels of Bcl-xL in the liver. In conclusion, our data suggest the involvement of adrenergic signaling pathways in the hepatic regeneration program, in which Fas ligand-induced hepatocyte proliferation with a simultaneous inhibition of the Fas-death pathway plays a determinant role.

The role of soil in vegetated gravelly river braid plains: more than just a passive response?

This paper reviews the role of alluvial soils in vegetated gravelly river braid plains. When considering decadal time scales of river evolution, we argue that it becomes vital to consider soil development as an emergent property of the developing ecosystem. Soil processes have been relatively overlooked in accounts of the interactions between braided river processes and vegetation, although soils have been observed on vegetated fluvial landforms. We hypothesise that soil development plays a major role in the transition (speed and pathway) from a fresh sediment deposit to a vegetated soil-covered landform. Disturbance (erosion and/or deposition), vertical sediment structure (process history), vegetation succession, biological activity and water table fluctuation are seen as the main controls on early alluvial soil evolution. Erosion and deposition processes may not only act as soil disturbing agents, but also as suppliers of ecosystem resources, because of their role in delivering and changing access (e.g. through avulsion) to fluxes of water, fine sediments and organic matter. In turn, the associated initial ecosystem may influence further fluvial landform development, such as through the trapping of fine-grained sediments (e.g. sand) by the engineering action of vegetation and the deposit stabilisation by the developing above and belowground biomass. This may create a strong feedback between geomorphological processes, vegetation succession and soil evolution which we summarise in a conceptual model. We illustrate this model by an example from the Allondon River (CH) and identify the research questions that follow.

Role of Go/i subgroup of G proteins in olfactory signaling of Drosophila melanogaster.

Intracellular signaling in insect olfactory receptor neurons remains unclear, with both metabotropic and ionotropic components being discussed. Here, we investigated the role of heterotrimeric Go and Gi proteins using a combined behavioral, in vivo and in vitro approach. Specifically, we show that inhibiting Go in sensory neurons by pertussis toxin leads to behavioral deficits. We heterologously expressed the olfactory receptor dOr22a in human embryonic kidney cells (HEK293T). Stimulation with an odor led to calcium influx, which was amplified via calcium release from intracellular stores. Subsequent experiments indicated that the signaling was mediated by the Gβγ subunits of the heterotrimeric Go/i proteins. Finally, using in vivo calcium imaging, we show that Go and Gi contribute to odor responses both for the fast (phasic) as for the slow (tonic) response component. We propose a transduction cascade model involving several parallel processes, in which the metabotropic component is activated by Go and Gi , and uses Gβγ.

Neurobiologia, coscienza e neuroetica. Ricerche filosofiche in margine al dialogo tra G.P. CHANGEUX e P. RICOEUR

Le neuroscienze occupano oggi un ruolo essenziale nel dibattito scientifico e filosofico, nonché in quello delle scienze umane. Esse costituiscono la sfida più seria al sapere fin qui elaborato intorno ai fondamenti dell'esperienza di coscienza, poiché si propongono come capaci di rispondere alla domanda di origine e funzionamento della coscienza. Le neuroscienze cognitive stanno, oggi, rivoluzionando la nostra concezione della mente e delle sue funzioni. Ci forniscono nuovi dati sulla natura delle sensazioni, della memoria, della percezione e dei processi di astrazione. L'epistemologia è rientrata così pienamente nell'ambito di una disciplina sperimentale, come diversi filosofi (da Hume a Quine) hanno auspicato. È, alla fine, evoluta nell'esperienza odierna della cosiddetta "epistemologia sperimentale", luogo che coniuga il rigore sperimentale della scienza con la profondità e la sofisticazione argomentativa della tradizione filosofica. Come arriviamo a conoscere? Quali vincoli poniamo a quello che deve essere conosciuto? Perché seguiamo certe vie invece di altre? Come arriviamo a formulare giudizi e a prendere decisioni? Che valore ha la conoscenza già acquisita nell'elaborazione di nuove esperienze? In particolare, che peso hanno le aspettative e i ricordi in questo processo? Qual è il rapporto fra esperienza, conoscenza e memoria? Come si fissano e come si richiamano i ricordi? Qual è il rapporto fra coscienza e memoria? Sono alcune delle domande che l'autore si pone in questa ottica e alle quali cerca di rispondere, a partire dall'analisi e valutazione del dialogo-dibattito fra J.-P. Changeux e P. Ricoeur, per apprenderne il linguaggio, capire i problemi sollevati, adattarsi alla complessità della materia. Nel contesto della filosofia della mente, la "lettura" della discussione ripercorre i relativi percorsi attraverso l'analisi delle loro opere, da un lato quelle dello scienziato (sulla struttura e dinamica del cervello, la teoria dell'epigenesi e stabilizzazione selettiva, le speculazioni sull'uomo neuronale e i rilievi antropologici, le teorie della conoscenza e della coscienza, oltre che sulla conoscenza matematica, gli argomenti di estetica ed etica); dall'altro lato quelle del filosofo (dal Cogito riflessivo alla scoperta dell'ermeneutica, dalle eterogenee riflessioni sul Conflitto delle interpretazioni alla grande teoria sulla creatività del linguaggio, le conclusioni teoriche sull'ermeneutica del sé e l'ontologia dell'agire). Il punto di arrivo è la determinazione delle relative posizioni: quella di Changeux tra i neuroscienziati che si occupano di questioni filosofiche, epistemologiche ed etiche, e quella di Ricoeur tra i filosofi che si occupano di neuroscienze. La conclusione della tesi si svolge in un approfondimento teoretico che dalla nozione di "traccia" porta all'esperienza della "memoria", al fine di intrecciare i fili della discussione ripercorsa ed offrire una sponda non forzata al dibattito più ampio. Il tema della memoria è privilegiato per ragioni intrinseche, poiché si tratta di uno dei temi precipui delle neuroscienze, della filosofia della mente e della fenomenologia. A un primo livello viene instaurato su questo punto un confronto epistemologico tra la proposta della neurofenomenologia (Varala, ad esempio) e la posizione tenuta in particolare da Ricoeur rispetto ad essa e al suo "progetto unificante", posizione defilata e, per certi aspetti, criticamente dubbiosa sul fatto che si possa davvero giungere a un "terzo discorso". Si riferisce poi del largo interesse e dei risultati più significativi della riflessione fenomenologica antica e moderna sulla memoria. A un secondo livello vengono illustrati i programmi di ricerca recenti della neurofenomenologia su questo argomento all'interno delle scienze cognitive e si dà conto dei risultati più significativi. Ad un terzo e conclusivo livello, si approfondisce il significato teologico della memoria. Les neurosciences ont aujourd'hui un rôle essentiel dans le débat scientifique et philosophique, ainsi que dans celui des sciences humaines. Elles constituent le défi le plus sérieux aux savoir qu'on a construit jusqu'ici sur les fondements de l'expérience de conscience, attendu qu'elles-mêmes se considèrent capables de répondre à la demande sur l'origine e le fonctionnement de la conscience. Les neurosciences cognitives sont aujourd'hui en train de révolutionner notre conception de l'esprit et des ses fonctions. Elles nous offrent des nouvelles données au sujet de la nature de nos sensations, mémoire, perception et procédés d'abstraction. Aussi l'épistémologie est rentrée pleinement dans le domaine d'une discipline expérimentale, comme plusieurs philosophes (de Hume à Quine) l'ont souhaité. Elle s'est enfin adressée, dans l'expérience actuelle, vers la soi-disant "épistémologie expérimentale", lieu qui met en accord la rigueur expérimentale de la science avec la profondeur et la sophistiquée finesse argumentative de la tradition philosophique. Comment en arrivons-nous à connaître? Quels liens mettons-nous à ce qu'on doit être connu? Pourquoi suivons-nous certaines vois au lieu d'autres? Comment en arrivons-nous à formuler des opinions et à prendre des décisions? Quelle valeur a la connaissance qu'on a déjà acquise par l'élaboration des nouvelles expériences? En particulier, quelle est l'importance des attentes et des souvenirs dans cette évolution? Quel est le rapport entre expérience, connaissance e mémoire? Comment fixons et rappelons-nous nos souvenirs? Quel est le rapport entre conscience et mémoire? Ces sont quelques-unes des questions que l'auteur se pose dans cette perspective et aux quelles essaie de répondre a partir de l'analyse et l'évaluation du dialogue-débat entre fra J.-P. Changeux et P. Ricoeur, pour en apprendre le langage, comprendre les problèmes soulevés, s'adapter à la complexité du sujet. Dans le contexte de la philosophie du cerveau, la "lecture" du dialogue reparcourt les parcours des deux interlocuteurs par l'analyse de leur ouvrages, d'une part celles du savant (sur la structure et la dynamique du cerveau, la théorie de l'épigenèse et stabilisation sélective; les spéculations sur l'homme neuronal et les commentaires anthropologiques; les théories de la connaissance et de la conscience, de même que sur la connaissance de la mathématique, les sujets d'esthétique et étique; d'autre part celles du philosophe (du Cogito réflexif à la découverte de l'herméneutique, de les hétérogènes réflexions sur le Conflit des interprétations à la grande théorie sur la créativité du langage, les conclusions théoriques sur l'herméneutique du soi et l'ontologie de l'agir). L'issue est la determination des relatives positions: celle de Changeux parmi les neuro-scientifiques qui s'occupent de questions philosophiques, épistémologiques et éthiques, et celle de Ricoeur parmi les philosophes qui s'occupent de neurosciences. La conclusion de la thèse se développe dans un approfondissement théorétique que de la notion de "trace" à l'expérience de la "mémoire", à l'effet de nouer les fils de la discussion passée en revue et d'assurer un appui pas forcé au débat plus vaste. Le thème de la mémoire a été choisi pour des raisons intrinsèques, puisqu'il est un des thèmes principaux des neurosciences, de la philosophie de l'esprit et de la phénoménologie. Sur un premier plan épistémologique il est établi une comparaison entre la proposition de la neurophénoménologie (Varala, par exemple) et la position soutenue en particulier par Ricoeur au sujet de ce courant phénoménologique et de son "projet unifiant", position défilée et, à certains égards, critiquement hésitante sur le fait qu'on puisse vraiment en venir à un "troisième discours". On rend compte du grand intérêt et des résultats les plus significatifs de la réflexion phénoménologique ancienne et moderne sur la mémoire. Sur un second plan neurophénoménologique on illustre des plans de recherche récents sur cet argument au-dedans des sciences cognitives et on rend compte des résultats les plus distinctives. Sur un troisième et conclusif plan on approfondit le sens théologique de la mémoire.