Molecular interactions involved in the transactivation of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter mediated by Tax and CREB-2 (ATF-4).

The human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) Tax protein activates viral transcription through three 21-bp repeats located in the U3 region of the HTLV-1 long terminal repeat and called Tax-responsive elements (TxREs). Each TxRE contains nucleotide sequences corresponding to imperfect cyclic AMP response elements (CRE). In this study, we demonstrate that the bZIP transcriptional factor CREB-2 is able to bind in vitro to the TxREs and that CREB-2 binding to each of the 21-bp motifs is enhanced by Tax. We also demonstrate that Tax can weakly interact with CREB-2 bound to a cellular palindromic CRE motif such as that found in the somatostatin promoter. Mutagenesis of Tax and CREB-2 demonstrates that both N- and C-terminal domains of Tax and the C-terminal region of CREB-2 are required for direct interaction between the two proteins. In addition, the Tax mutant M47, defective for HTLV-1 activation, is unable to form in vitro a ternary complex with CREB-2 and TxRE. In agreement with recent results suggesting that Tax can recruit the coactivator CREB-binding protein (CBP) on the HTLV-1 promoter, we provide evidence that Tax, CREB-2, and CBP are capable of cooperating to stimulate viral transcription. Taken together, our data highlight the major role played by CREB-2 in Tax-mediated transactivation.

The double-edged sword of social capital: Three essays on entrepreneurship in developing nations

ABSTRACT My study seeks to answer the main question: "how does entrepreneurs' social capital positively and negatively affect their resource mobilization efforts, and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity?" To answer this question, I develop a model for examining positive and negative effects of social capital on resource accumulation by entrepreneurs, and the subsequent effect of resource accumulation on the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity, and utilize data from Africa to ëmpirically test the relationships in this model. Developing nations are a suitable context because: a) They require entrepreneurship for economic development, b) They have received less attention in management and entrepreneurship research, c) Because of inadequately-developed institutions, entrepreneurs from developing nations face major resource mobilization challenges hence they often turn to their social ties for resources, and d) The communalistic and collectivistic nature of most developing nations -encouraging support and sharing of resources- may help us better understand how society's values and structures may contribute and also deduct firm resources. My study reveals that social capital contributes resources to entrepreneurs in developing nations at a cost that takes away resources, and that more resources but lower costs facilitate entrepreneurial opportunity exploitation. For entrepreneurs in developing nations, large networks, greater shared identity, and more trust are beneficial. To increase chances of raising more resources, entrepreneurs from communalistic societies should include network members from outside their communities. Besides providing financial support, policy-makers should develop training programs and advisory services on configuration of entrepreneurs' networks so as to achieve more resources at a low cost. My study insights can help improve entrepreneurs' resource accumulation efforts and the subsequent growth of their firms, leading to the overall economic growth of developing nations.

Alleged Tax Competition: The Mysterious Death of Inheritance Taxes in Switzerland

Interjurisdictional competition over mobile tax bases is an easily understood mechanism, but actual tax-base elasticities are difficult to estimate. Political pressure for reducing tax rates could therefore be based on erroneous estimates of the mobility of tax bases. We show that tax competition provided the overwhelmingly dominant argument in the policy debates leading to a succession of reforms of bequest taxation by Swiss cantons. Yet, we find only very weak statistical evidence of a relationship between tax burdens on bequests and the concerned tax base of wealthy elderly individuals. Moreover, inheritance tax revenues are found to increase in inheritance tax rates even in the long run, and actual tax rates lie well below the revenue-maximising levels throughout. The alleged pressures of tax competition did not seem in reality to exist.

The Effect of Tax Revenue Budgeting Errors on Fiscal Balance : Evidence from Swiss cantons

This study is an empirical analysis of the impact of direct tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal deficits. Using panel data from 26 Swiss cantons between 1980 and 2002, we estimate a single equation model on the fiscal balance, as well as a simultaneous equation model on revenue and expenditure. We use new data on budgeted and actual tax revenue to show that underestimating tax revenue significantly reduces fiscal deficits. Furthermore, we show that this effect is channeled through decreased expenditure. The effects of over and underestimation turn out to be symmetric.

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms' financing decisions. The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms' cash holdings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market competition on firms' cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover unexpected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model's predictions. In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.

Financial integration, capital misallocation and global imbalances

This paper shows that in a stylized model with two countries, characterized by different levels of financial development, the following facts can be replicated: 1) persistent current account surpluses and 2) high TFP growth in China. Under autarky, entrepreneurs in the emerging country overinvest in short-term projects and underinvest in long-term projects because short-term assets help them secure long-term investments in the presence of credit constraints. This creates an aggregate misallocation of capital. When financial markets integrate, entrepreneurs with long-term projects can have access to cheaper short-term assets abroad, which leaves them more resources to invest in their projects. This both reduces capital misallocations and generates capital outflows.