War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

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After decades of stability, Switzerland's unions entered a period of turbulence in the early 1990s: their status as junior partner in the corporatist growth pact was challenged by the economic crisis, business organizations' neoliberal turn and an abrupt decline in membership. These challenges put unions under pressure to initiate revitalization efforts. They first responded by investing more resources into political action, using direct democratic instruments to block neoliberal reforms. In parallel, they adopted new means of recruitment, affiliating white-collar unions, targeting private services and resorting more frequently to strikes. Finally, they rationalized their organizational structure through a series of union mergers.

An alternative socio-ecological strategy? International Trade Unions' engagement with climate change

In the context of a global ecological crisis, it is an important move when trade unions turn to environmentalism. Yet, the form that this environmentalism takes is often overlooked. This is especially the case with international trade unions. Based on an empirical study of international trade unions' engagement with the climate change issue, this article argues that international trade unions follow three different (and partially conflicting) strategies. I label these strategies as 'deliberative', 'collaborative growth' and 'socialist', and I examine each in turn. I argue that such analysis is important if we want to identify the potential for transforming the social relations of production that are at the root of the current climate crisis, and for identifying an alternative socio-ecological strategy.