The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.

A role for the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif in mediating TCR-CD8 cooperation.

To generate peripheral T cells that are both self-MHC restricted and self-MHC tolerant, thymocytes are subjected to positive and negative selection. How the TCR discriminates between positive and negative selection ligands is not well understood, although there is substantial evidence that the CD4 and CD8 coreceptors play an important role in this cell fate decision. We have previously identified an evolutionarily conserved motif in the TCR, the alpha-chain connecting peptide motif (alpha-CPM), which allows the TCR to deliver positive selection signals. Thymocytes expressing alpha-CPM-deficient receptors do not undergo positive selection, whereas their negative selection is not impaired. In this work we studied the ligand binding and receptor function of alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs by generating T cell hybridomas expressing wild-type or alpha-CPM-deficient forms of the T1 TCR. This K(d)-restricted TCR is specific for a photoreactive derivative of the Plasmodium berghei circumsporozoite peptide(252-260) IASA-YIPSAEK(ABA)I and is therefore amenable to TCR photoaffinity labeling. The experiments presented in this work show that alpha-CPM-deficient TCRs fail to cooperate with CD8 to enhance ligand binding and functional responses.

The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation.

Human cooperation is typically coordinated by institutions, which determine the outcome structure of the social interactions individuals engage in. Explaining the Neolithic transition from small- to large-scale societies involves understanding how these institutions co-evolve with demography. We study this using a demographically explicit model of institution formation in a patch-structured population. Each patch supports both social and asocial niches. Social individuals create an institution, at a cost to themselves, by negotiating how much of the costly public good provided by cooperators is invested into sanctioning defectors. The remainder of their public good is invested in technology that increases carrying capacity, such as irrigation systems. We show that social individuals can invade a population of asocials, and form institutions that support high levels of cooperation. We then demonstrate conditions where the co-evolution of cooperation, institutions, and demographic carrying capacity creates a transition from small- to large-scale social groups.

The role of reputation, punishment and their interplay in human cooperation

The problem of how cooperation can evolve between individuals or entities with conflicting interests is central to biology as many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the first replicating molecules to human societies, have required solving this problem. There are many routes to cooperation but humans seem to be distinct from other species as they have more complex and diverse mechanisms, often due to their higher cognitive skills, allowing them to reap the benefits from living in groups. Among those mechanisms, the use of reputation or past experience with others as well as sanctioning mechanisms both seem to be of major importance. They have often been considered separately but the interaction between the two might provide new insights as to how punishment could have appeared as a means to enforce cooperation in early humans. In this thesis, I firstly use theoretical approaches from evolutionary game theory to investigate the evolution of punishment and cooperation through a reputation system based on punitive actions, and compare the efficacy of this system, in terms of cooperation achieved, with one based on cooperative actions. On the other hand, I use empirical approaches from economics to test, in real life, predictions from theoretical models but also to explore further conditions such as environmental variation, constrained memory, or even the scale of competition between individuals. Both approaches have allowed contributing to the understanding of how these factors affect reputation and punishment use, and ultimately how cooperation is achieved.

Digital forensic osteology--possibilities in cooperation with the Virtopsy project.

The present study was carried out to check whether classic osteometric parameters can be determined from the 3D reconstructions of MSCT (multislice computed tomography) scans acquired in the context of the Virtopsy project. To this end, four isolated and macerated skulls were examined by six examiners. First the skulls were conventionally (manually) measured using 32 internationally accepted linear measurements. Then the skulls were scanned by the use of MSCT with slice thicknesses of 1.25 mm and 0.63 mm, and the 33 measurements were virtually determined on the digital 3D reconstructions of the skulls. The results of the traditional and the digital measurements were compared for each examiner to figure out variations. Furthermore, several parameters were measured on the cranium and postcranium during an autopsy and compared to the values that had been measured on a 3D reconstruction from a previously acquired postmortem MSCT scan. The results indicate that equivalent osteometric values can be obtained from digital 3D reconstructions from MSCT scans using a slice thickness of 1.25 mm, and from conventional manual examinations. The measurements taken from a corpse during an autopsy could also be validated with the methods used for the digital 3D reconstructions in the context of the Virtopsy project. Future aims are the assessment and biostatistical evaluation in respect to sex, age and stature of all data sets stored in the Virtopsy project so far, as well as of future data sets. Furthermore, a definition of new parameters, only measurable with the aid of MSCT data would be conceivable.

Conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity: secondary mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature: genes cooperate in genomes, cells in muti- cellular organims, and individuals in societies. In humans, division of labor and trade are key elements of most known societies, where social life is regulated by- moral systems specifying rights and duties often enforced by third party punish¬ment. Over the last decades, several primary mechanisms, such as kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, have been advanced to explain the evolution of cooperation from a naturalistic approach. In this thesis, I focus on the study of three secondary mechanisms which, although insufficient to allow for the evo¬lution of cooperation, have been hypothesized to further promote it when they are linked to proper primary mechanisms: conformity (the tendency to imitate common behaviors), upstream reciprocity (the tendency to help somebody once help has been received from somebody else) and social diversity (heterogeneous social contexts). I make use of mathematical and computational models in the formal framework of evolutionary game theory in order to investigate the theoret¬ical conditions under which conformity, upstream reciprocity and social diversity are able to raise the levels of cooperation attained in evolving populations. - La coopération est ubiquitaire dans la nature: les gènes coopèrent dans les génomes, les cellules dans les organismes muticellulaires, et les organismes dans les sociétés. Chez les humains, la division du travail et le commerce sont des éléments centraux de la plupart des sociétés connues, où la vie sociale est régie par des systèmes moraux établissant des droits et des devoirs, souvent renforcés par la punition. Au cours des dernières décennies, plusieurs mécanismes pri¬maires, tels que la sélection de parentèle et les réciprocités directe et indirecte, ont été avancés pour expliquer l'évolution de la coopération d'un point de vue nat¬uraliste. Dans cette thèse, nous nous concentrons sur l'étude de trois mécanismes secondaires qui, bien qu'insuffisants pour permettre l'évolution de la coopération, sont capables de la promouvoir davantage s'ils sont liés aux mécanismes primaires appropriés: la conformité (tendance à imiter des comportements en commun), la 'réciprocité en amont' (tendance à aider quelqu'un après avoir reçu l'aide de quelqu'un d'autre) et la diversité sociale (contextes sociaux hétérogènes). Nous faisons usage de modèles mathématiques et informatiques dans le cadre formel de la théorie des jeux évolutionnaires afin d'examiner les conditions théoriques dans lesquelles la conformité, la 'réciprocité en amont' et la diversité sociale sont capables d'élever le niveau de coopération des populations en évolution.

Cooperation of human tumor-reactive CD4+ and CD8+ T cells after redirection of their specificity by a high-affinity p53A2.1-specific TCR.

Efficient immune attack of malignant disease requires the concerted action of both CD8+ CTL and CD4+ Th cells. We used human leukocyte antigen (HLA)-A*0201 (A2.1) transgenic mice, in which the mouse CD8 molecule cannot efficiently interact with the alpha3 domain of A2.1, to generate a high-affinity, CD8-independent T cell receptor (TCR) specific for a commonly expressed, tumor-associated cytotoxic T lymphocyte (CTL) epitope derived from the human p53 tumor suppressor protein. Retroviral expression of this CD8-independent, p53-specific TCR into human T cells imparted the CD8+ T lymphocytes with broad tumor-specific CTL activity and turned CD4+ T cells into potent tumor-reactive, p53A2.1-specific Th cells. Both T cell subsets were cooperative and interacted synergistically with dendritic cell intermediates and tumor targets. The intentional redirection of both CD4+ Th cells and CD8+ CTL by the same high-affinity, CD8-independent, tumor-specific TCR could provide the basis for novel broad-spectrum cancer immunotherapeutics.

Beyond Conditionality versus Cooperation: Power and Resistance in the Case of EU Mobility Partnerships and Swiss Migration Partnerships

Migration partnerships (MPs) have become a key instrument in global migration governance. In contrast to traditional unilateral approaches, MPs emphasize a more comprehensive and inclusive tackling of migration issues between countries of origin, transit, and destination. Due to this cooperation-oriented concept, most of the existing studies on MPs neglect power questions within partnerships in line with the official discourse, reflecting a broader trend in the international migration governance literature. Others take an instrumentalist view in analysing the power of partnerships or focus on soft power. Illustrated with the examples of the European Mobility Partnerships (EU MPs) and the Swiss Migration Partnerships (CH MPs), we conduct an analysis based on a concept of productive power drawing on post-structural and post-colonial insights. Our main argument is that in contrast to their seemingly consent-oriented and technical character, MPs are sites of intense (discursive) struggles, and (re-)produce meanings, subjects, and resistances. A productive power analysis allows us to move beyond the dichotomy in the literature between coercion and cooperation, as well as between power and resistance more broadly.

Selective cooperation between fatty acid binding proteins and peroxisome proliferator-activated receptors in regulating transcription.

Lipophilic compounds such as retinoic acid and long-chain fatty acids regulate gene transcription by activating nuclear receptors such as retinoic acid receptors (RARs) and peroxisome proliferator-activated receptors (PPARs). These compounds also bind in cells to members of the family of intracellular lipid binding proteins, which includes cellular retinoic acid-binding proteins (CRABPs) and fatty acid binding proteins (FABPs). We previously reported that CRABP-II enhances the transcriptional activity of RAR by directly targeting retinoic acid to the receptor. Here, potential functional cooperation between FABPs and PPARs in regulating the transcriptional activities of their common ligands was investigated. We show that adipocyte FABP and keratinocyte FABP (A-FABP and K-FABP, respectively) selectively enhance the activities of PPARgamma and PPARbeta, respectively, and that these FABPs massively relocate to the nucleus in response to selective ligands for the PPAR isotype which they activate. We show further that A-FABP and K-FABP interact directly with PPARgamma and PPARbeta and that they do so in a receptor- and ligand-selective manner. Finally, the data demonstrate that the presence of high levels of K-FABP in keratinocytes is essential for PPARbeta-mediated induction of differentiation of these cells. Taken together, the data establish that A-FABP and K-FABP govern the transcriptional activities of their ligands by targeting them to cognate PPARs in the nucleus, thereby enabling PPARs to exert their biological functions.