The Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks : The conventions-programs as a new partnership model for vertical cooperation ?

This research examines the impacts of the Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks which was accepted in 2004 and implemented in 2008 to "re-assign" the responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons. The public tasks were redistributed, according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Seven tasks came under exclusive federal responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two "common tasks" were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common tasks it wasn't possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order to deal with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the conventions-programs (CPs), which are public law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton. These CPs are generally valid for periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently being prepared. By using the principal-agent theory I examine how contracts can improve political relations between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (canton). I also provide a first qualitative analysis by examining the impacts of these contracts on the vertical cooperation and on the implication of different actors by focusing my study on five CPs - protection of cultural heritage and conservation of historic monuments, encouragement of the integration of foreigners, economic development, protection against noise and protection of the nature and landscape - applied in five cantons, which represents twenty-five cases studies.

A Reappraisal of the Allocation Puzzle through the Portfolio Approach

Paradoxically, high-growth, high-investment developing countries tend to experience capital outflows. This paper shows that this allocation puzzle can be explained simply by introducing uninsurable idiosyncratic investment risk in the neoclassical growth model with international trade in bonds, and by taking into account not only TFP catch-up, but also the capital wedge, that is, the distortions on the return to capital. The model fits the two following facts, documented on a sample of 67 countries between 1980 and 2003: (i) TFP growth is positively correlated with capital outflows in a sample including creditor countries; (ii) the long-run level of capital per efficient unit of labor is positively correlated with capital outflows. Consistently, we show that the capital flows predicted by the model are positively correlated with the actual ones in this sample once the capital wedge is accounted for. The fact that Asia dominates global imbalances can be explained by its relatively low capital wedge.