Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.

Cytokine-induced sleep: Neurons respond to TNF with production of chemokines and increased expression of Homer1a in vitro.

Interactions of neurons with microglia may play a dominant role in sleep regulation. TNF may exert its somnogeneic effects by promoting attraction of microglia and their processes to the vicinity of dendrites and synapses. We found TNF to stimulate neurons (i) to produce CCL2, CCL7 and CXCL10, chemokines acting on mononuclear phagocytes and (ii) to stimulate the expression of the macrophage colony stimulating factor (M-CSF/Csf1), which leads to elongation of microglia processes. TNF may also act on neurons by affecting the expression of genes essential in sleep-wake behavior. The neuronal expression of Homer1a mRNA, increases during spontaneous and enforced periods of wakefulness. Mice with a deletion of Homer1a show a reduced wakefulness with increased non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep during the dark period. Recently the TNF-dependent increase of NREM sleep in the dark period of mice with CD40-induced immune activation was found to be associated with decreased expression of Homer1a. In the present study we investigated the effects of TNF and IL-1β on gene expression in cultures of the neuronal cell line HT22 and cortical neurons. TNF slightly increased the expression of Homer1a and IL-1β profoundly enhanced the expression of Early growth response 2 (Egr2). The data presented here indicate that the decreased expression of Homer1a, which was found in the dark period of mice with CD40-induced increase of NREM sleep is not due to inhibitory effects of TNF and IL-1β on the expression of Homer1a in neurons.

Design and Validation of a Novel Generic Platform for the Production of Tetravalent IgG1-like Bispecific Antibodies.

We have designed and validated a novel generic platform for production of tetravalent IgG1-like chimeric bispecific Abs. The VH-CH1-hinge domains of mAb2 are fused through a peptidic linker to the N terminus of mAb1 H chain, and paired mutations at the CH1-CL interface mAb1 are introduced that force the correct pairing of the two different free L chains. Two different sets of these CH1-CL interface mutations, called CR3 and MUT4, were designed and tested, and prototypic bispecific Abs directed against CD5 and HLA-DR were produced (CD5xDR). Two different hinge sequences between mAb1 and mAb2 were also tested in the CD5xDR-CR3 or -MUT4 background, leading to bispecific Ab (BsAbs) with a more rigid or flexible structure. All four Abs produced bound with good specificity and affinity to CD5 and HLA-DR present either on the same target or on different cells. Indeed, the BsAbs were able to efficiently redirect killing of HLA-DR(+) leukemic cells by human CD5(+) cytokine-induced killer T cells. Finally, all BsAbs had a functional Fc, as shown by their capacity to activate human complement and NK cells and to mediate phagocytosis. CD5xDR-CR3 was chosen as the best format because it had overall the highest functional activity and was very stable in vitro in both neutral buffer and in serum. In vivo, CD5xDR-CR3 was shown to have significant therapeutic activity in a xenograft model of human leukemia.