Social and medical vulnerability factors of emergency department frequent users in a universal health insurance system

Objectifs - Identifier les facteurs de vulnérabilité sociaux et médicaux associés au recours multiple aux consultations des urgences. - Déterminer si les patients à recours multiple sont plus à même de combiner ces facteurs dans un système d'assurance universelle. Méthode Il s'agit d'une étude cas-contrôle rétrospective basée sur l'étude de dossiers médico-administratifs comparant des échantillons randomisés de patients à recours multiple à des patients n'appartenant pas à cette catégorie, au sein des urgences du Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois et de la Policlinique Médicale Universitaire de Lausanne. Les auteurs ont défini les patients à recours multiple comme comptabilisant au moins quatre consultations aux urgences durant les douze mois précédents. Les patients adultes (>18 ans) ayant consulté les urgences entre avril 2008 et mars 2009 (période d'étude) étaient inclus ; ceux quittant les urgences sans décharge médicale étaient exclus. Pour chaque patient, le premier dossier d'urgence informatisé inclus dans la période d'étude était sélectionné pour l'extraction des données. Outre les variables démographiques de base, les variables d'intérêt comprennent des caractéristiques sociales (emploi, type de résidence) et médicales (diagnostic principal aux urgences). Les facteurs sociaux et médicaux significatifs ont été utilisés dans la construction d'un modèle de régression logistique, afin de déterminer les facteurs associés avec le recours multiple aux urgences. De plus, la combinaison des facteurs sociaux et médicaux a été étudiée. Résultats Au total, 359/Γ591 patients à recours multiple et 360/34'263 contrôles ont été sélectionnés. Les patients à recours multiple représentaient moins d'un vingtième de tous les patients des urgences (4.4%), mais engendraient 12.1% de toutes les consultations (5'813/48'117), avec un record de 73 consultations. Aucune différence en termes d'âge ou de genre n'est apparue, mais davantage de patients à recours multiples étaient d'une nationalité autre que suisse ou européenne (n=117 [32.6%] vs n=83 [23.1%], p=0.003). L'analyse multivariée a montré que les facteurs de vulnérabilité sociaux et médicaux les plus fortement associés au recours multiple aux urgences étaient : être sous tutelle (Odds ratio [OR] ajusté = 15.8; intervalle de confiance [IC] à 95% = 1.7 à 147.3), habiter plus proche des urgences (OR ajusté = 4.6; IC95% = 2.8 à 7.6), être non assuré (OR ajusté = 2.5; IC95% = 1.1 à 5.8), être sans emploi ou dépendant de l'aide sociale (OR ajusté = 2.1; IC95% = 1.3 à 3.4), le nombre d'hospitalisations psychiatriques (OR ajusté = 4.6; IC95% = 1.5 à 14.1), ainsi que le recours à au moins cinq départements cliniques différents durant une période de douze mois (OR ajusté = 4.5; IC95% = 2.5 à 8.1). Le fait de comptabiliser deux sur quatre facteurs sociaux augmente la vraisemblance du recours multiple aux urgences (OR ajusté = 5.4; IC95% = 2.9 à 9.9) ; des résultats similaires ont été trouvés pour les facteurs médicaux (OR ajusté = 7.9; IC95% = 4.6 à 13.4). La combinaison de facteurs sociaux et médicaux est fortement associée au recours multiple aux urgences, puisque les patients à recours multiple étaient dix fois plus à même d'en comptabiliser trois d'entre eux (sur un total de huit facteurs, IC95% = 5.1 à 19.6). Conclusion Les patients à recours multiple aux urgences représentent une proportion modérée des consultations aux urgences du Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois et de la Policlinique Médicale Universitaire de Lausanne. Les facteurs de vulnérabilité sociaux et médicaux sont associés au recours multiple aux urgences. En outre, les patients à recours multiple sont plus à même de combiner les vulnérabilités sociale et médicale que les autres. Des stratégies basées sur le case management pourraient améliorer la prise en charge des patients à recours multiple avec leurs vulnérabilités afin de prévenir les inégalités dans le système de soins ainsi que les coûts relatifs.

Micro-insurance through corporate-NGO partnerships in West Bengal : opportunities and constraints

This Practical Note examines the nascent micro-insurance sector in West Bengal, paying particular attention to the corporate- NGO partnership model for micro-insurance distribution,which has been enabled by India's unique regulatory framework. We challenge the popularconstruction of this model as a 'win - win' for all parties by analysing conflicting understandings of micro-insurance schemes and their purposes by insurance companies, NGOs, and poorvillagers. The article also considers the role of the specific political context of West Bengal inconstricting corporate- NGO micro-insurance

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data.

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated.Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as 'very good'. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves 'bad risks' also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

On the problematic of reserving and stochastic loss models

Abstract Traditionally, the common reserving methods used by the non-life actuaries are based on the assumption that future claims are going to behave in the same way as they did in the past. There are two main sources of variability in the processus of development of the claims: the variability of the speed with which the claims are settled and the variability between the severity of the claims from different accident years. High changes in these processes will generate distortions in the estimation of the claims reserves. The main objective of this thesis is to provide an indicator which firstly identifies and quantifies these two influences and secondly to determine which model is adequate for a specific situation. Two stochastic models were analysed and the predictive distributions of the future claims were obtained. The main advantage of the stochastic models is that they provide measures of variability of the reserves estimates. The first model (PDM) combines one conjugate family Dirichlet - Multinomial with the Poisson distribution. The second model (NBDM) improves the first one by combining two conjugate families Poisson -Gamma (for distribution of the ultimate amounts) and Dirichlet Multinomial (for distribution of the incremental claims payments). It was found that the second model allows to find the speed variability in the reporting process and development of the claims severity as function of two above mentioned distributions' parameters. These are the shape parameter of the Gamma distribution and the Dirichlet parameter. Depending on the relation between them we can decide on the adequacy of the claims reserve estimation method. The parameters have been estimated by the Methods of Moments and Maximum Likelihood. The results were tested using chosen simulation data and then using real data originating from the three lines of business: Property/Casualty, General Liability, and Accident Insurance. These data include different developments and specificities. The outcome of the thesis shows that when the Dirichlet parameter is greater than the shape parameter of the Gamma, resulting in a model with positive correlation between the past and future claims payments, suggests the Chain-Ladder method as appropriate for the claims reserve estimation. In terms of claims reserves, if the cumulated payments are high the positive correlation will imply high expectations for the future payments resulting in high claims reserves estimates. The negative correlation appears when the Dirichlet parameter is lower than the shape parameter of the Gamma, meaning low expected future payments for the same high observed cumulated payments. This corresponds to the situation when claims are reported rapidly and fewer claims remain expected subsequently. The extreme case appears in the situation when all claims are reported at the same time leading to expectations for the future payments of zero or equal to the aggregated amount of the ultimate paid claims. For this latter case, the Chain-Ladder is not recommended.

Employment risk, unemployment insurance and search strategies: a disaggregated equilibrium approach with application to the Swiss labour market in the 1990-ies

The Organization of the Thesis The remainder of the thesis comprises five chapters and a conclusion. The next chapter formalizes the envisioned theory into a tractable model. Section 2.2 presents a formal description of the model economy: the individual heterogeneity, the individual objective, the UI setting, the population dynamics and the equilibrium. The welfare and efficiency criteria for qualifying various equilibrium outcomes are proposed in section 2.3. The fourth section shows how the model-generated information can be computed. Chapter 3 transposes the model from chapter 2 in conditions that enable its use in the analysis of individual labor market strategies and their implications for the labor market equilibrium. In section 3.2 the Swiss labor market data sets, stylized facts, and the UI system are presented. The third section outlines and motivates the parameterization method. In section 3.4 the model's replication ability is evaluated and some aspects of the parameter choice are discussed. Numerical solution issues can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of search-strategic behavior in the model economy and its implications for the labor market aggregates. In section 4.2, the unemployment duration distribution is examined and related to search strategies. Section 4.3 shows how the search- strategic behavior is influenced by the UI eligibility and section 4.4 how it is determined by individual heterogeneity. The composition effects generated by search strategies in labor market aggregates are examined in section 4.5. The last section evaluates the model's replication of empirical unemployment escape frequencies reported in Sheldon [67]. Chapter 5 applies the model economy to examine the effects on the labor market equilibrium of shocks to the labor market risk structure, to the deep underlying labor market structure and to the UI setting. Section 5.2 examines the effects of the labor market risk structure on the labor market equilibrium and the labor market strategic behavior. The effects of alterations in the labor market deep economic structural parameters, i.e. individual preferences and production technology, are shown in Section 5.3. Finally, the UI setting impacts on the labor market are studied in Section 5.4. This section also evaluates the role of the UI authority monitoring and the differences in the Way changes in the replacement rate and the UI benefit duration affect the labor market. In chapter 6 the model economy is applied in counterfactual experiments to assess several aspects of the Swiss labor market movements in the nineties. Section 6.2 examines the two equilibria characterizing the Swiss labor market in the nineties, the " growth" equilibrium with a "moderate" UI regime and the "recession" equilibrium with a more "generous" UI. Section 6.3 evaluates the isolated effects of the structural shocks, while the isolated effects of the UI reforms are analyzed in section 6.4. Particular dimensions of the UI reforms, the duration, replacement rate and the tax rate effects, are studied in section 6.5, while labor market equilibria without benefits are evaluated in section 6.6. In section 6.7 the structural and institutional interactions that may act as unemployment amplifiers are discussed in view of the obtained results. A welfare analysis based on individual welfare in different structural and UI settings is presented in the eighth section. Finally, the results are related to more favorable unemployment trends after 1997. The conclusion evaluates the features embodied in the model economy with respect to the resulting model dynamics to derive lessons from the model design." The thesis ends by proposing guidelines for future improvements of the model and directions for further research.