34 resultados para tax incentives


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This study is an empirical analysis of the impact of direct tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal deficits. Using panel data from 26 Swiss cantons between 1980 and 2002, we estimate a single equation model on the fiscal balance, as well as a simultaneous equation model on revenue and expenditure. We use new data on budgeted and actual tax revenue to show that underestimating tax revenue significantly reduces fiscal deficits. Furthermore, we show that this effect is channeled through decreased expenditure. The effects of over and underestimation turn out to be symmetric.

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The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms' financing decisions. The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms' cash holdings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market competition on firms' cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover unexpected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model's predictions. In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.

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Over the last years, in a context of international tax competition, international and regional institutions such as the G20, the OECD, and the European Union are redefining what is acceptable in terms of corporate fiscal policy. Certain Swiss preferential tax treatments are considered by the above-mentioned institutions as harmful tax practices. As a consequence, the Swiss government has planned a third corporate tax reform (CTR III). The objective of this reform is to ensure international acceptability of the corporate tax system without prejudicing local public finances and Swiss corporate tax attractiveness. Therefore, we can posit that the CTR III is an internationalized object influenced by both regulation trends and tax competition framework. The main purpose of this paper is to provide elements of answer on how the currently discussed CTR III is influenced by the international environment, by focusing on its content as well as the reactions and positions of local stakeholders. With the help of internationalization literature, two distinct internationalization processes have been identified through the propositions of compliance measures with internationally-defined standards and competitiveness-enhancing measures. With regard to the configuration of local actors, the degree of conflict seems to be rather high. The current content of the reform is supported by the business community and right-wing parties and rejected by the unions and the Socialist Party.