Monnaie, citoyenneté et globalisation financière. Les citoyens entre protection sociale et promesses de la capitalisation boursière

La monnaie a été étudiée par des économistes hétérodoxes, des sociologues et des historiens qui ont souligné ses rapports à l'ordre collectif, mais elle n'est que rarement analysée sous l'angle de la citoyenneté. Notre thèse propose une réflexion théorique sur quatre types de fonctions (politique, symbolique, socioéconomique et psychoaffective) qui permettent à la monnaie de jouer un rôle de médiation de la citoyenneté. A partir d'une perspective qui combine les apports de l'économie politique internationale et de l'école de la régulation, nous montrons que cette médiation ne mobilise pas seulement des mécanismes sociopolitiques nationaux, mais aussi des mécanismes internationaux qui rétroagissent sur la sphère domestique des États et affectent leur capacité à définir leur régime de citoyenneté. Cette relation est analysée dans le contexte de l'institutionnalisation du système monétaire international de Bretton Woods (1944) et du développement de la globalisation financière depuis les années 1970. Si la monnaie a été mise au service d'un principe de protection des droits sociaux des citoyens contre les pressions financières extérieures après la Seconde guerre mondiale, elle contribue aujourd'hui à l'ouverture de la sphère domestique des Etats aux flux de capitaux transnationaux et à la création d'un ordre politique et juridique favorable aux droits des investisseurs. Cette dynamique est impulsée par l'essor de nouveaux intermédiaires financiers (notamment les agences de notation et les investisseurs institutionnels) et l'émergence concomitante d'une nouvelle forme d'Etat légitimée à partir d'un discours politique néolibéral insistant sur la quête de compétitivité, la réduction de la protection sociale et la responsabilisation individuelle. Elle se traduit par la privatisation des régimes de retraite et le développement des politiques d'éducation financière qui incitent les citoyens à se comporter en « preneurs de risques » actifs et responsables, assurant eux-mêmes leur sécurité économique à travers le placement de leur épargne retraite sur les marchés financiers. Nous soulignons toutefois les difficultés institutionnelles, cognitives et socioéconomiques qui rendent cette transformation de la citoyenneté contradictoire et problématique. Money has been studied by heterodox economists, sociologists and historians who stressed its relationship to collective order. However, it has hardly been analysed from the viewpoint of its relationship to citizenship. We propose a theoretical account of four types of functions (political, symbolic, socioeconomic and psychoaffective) enabling money to operate as a mediation of citizenship. From a perspective that combines the contributions of international political economy and the regulation school, we show that this mediation mobilises not only national sociopolitical mechanisms, but also international mechanisms which feed back on the domestic sphere of states and affect their capacity to define their regime of citizenship. This relationship is analysed in the context of the institutionalisation of the international monetary system of Bretton Woods (1944) and the development of financial globalization since the 1970s. If money has served to protect the social rights of citizens against external financial pressures after the Second World War, today it contributes to the opening of the domestic sphere of states to transnational capital flows and to the creation of a political and legal order favorable to the rights of investors. This dynamic is driven by the rise of new financial intermediaries (in particular rating agencies and institutional investisors) and the simultaneous emergence of a new form of state legitimized from a neoliberal political discourse emphasizing the quest for competitiveness, reduced social protection and individual responsibilization. It results in the privatization of pension systems and the development of policies of financial education that encourage citizens to behave as active and responsible « risk takers », ensuring their own economic security through the investment of their savings retirement on financial markets. However, we emphasize the institutional, cognitive and socioeconomic difficulties that make this transformation of citizenship contradictory and problematic. - Money has been studied by heterodox economists, sociologists and historians who stressed its relationship to collective order. However, it has hardly been analysed from the viewpoint of its relationship to citizenship. We propose a theoretical account of four types of functions (political, symbolic, socioeconomic and psychoaffective) enabling money to operate as a mediation of citizenship. From a perspective that combines the contributions of international political economy and the regulation school, we show that this mediation mobilises not only national sociopolitical mechanisms, but also international mechanisms which feed back on the domestic sphere of states and affect their capacity to define their regime of citizenship. This relationship is analysed in the context of the institutionalisation of the international monetary system of Bretton Woods (1944) and the development of financial globalization since the 1970s. If money has served to protect the social rights of citizens against external financial pressures after the Second World War, today it contributes to the opening of the domestic sphere of states to transnational capital flows and to the creation of a political and legal order favorable to the rights of investors. This dynamic is driven by the rise of new financial intermediaries (in particular rating agencies and institutional investisors) and the simultaneous emergence of a new form of state legitimized from a neoliberal political discourse emphasizing the quest for competitiveness, reduced social protection and individual responsibilization. It results in the privatization of pension systems and the development of policies of financial education that encourage citizens to behave as active and responsible « risk takers », ensuring their own economic security through the investment of their savings retirement on financial markets. However, we emphasize the institutional, cognitive and socioeconomic difficulties that make this transformation of citizenship problematic.

Behavioural queueing : cellular automata and a laboratory experiment

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions les aspects comportementaux d'agents qui interagissent dans des systèmes de files d'attente à l'aide de modèles de simulation et de méthodologies expérimentales. Chaque période les clients doivent choisir un prestataire de servivce. L'objectif est d'analyser l'impact des décisions des clients et des prestataires sur la formation des files d'attente. Dans un premier cas nous considérons des clients ayant un certain degré d'aversion au risque. Sur la base de leur perception de l'attente moyenne et de la variabilité de cette attente, ils forment une estimation de la limite supérieure de l'attente chez chacun des prestataires. Chaque période, ils choisissent le prestataire pour lequel cette estimation est la plus basse. Nos résultats indiquent qu'il n'y a pas de relation monotone entre le degré d'aversion au risque et la performance globale. En effet, une population de clients ayant un degré d'aversion au risque intermédiaire encoure généralement une attente moyenne plus élevée qu'une population d'agents indifférents au risque ou très averses au risque. Ensuite, nous incorporons les décisions des prestataires en leur permettant d'ajuster leur capacité de service sur la base de leur perception de la fréquence moyenne d'arrivées. Les résultats montrent que le comportement des clients et les décisions des prestataires présentent une forte "dépendance au sentier". En outre, nous montrons que les décisions des prestataires font converger l'attente moyenne pondérée vers l'attente de référence du marché. Finalement, une expérience de laboratoire dans laquelle des sujets jouent le rôle de prestataire de service nous a permis de conclure que les délais d'installation et de démantèlement de capacité affectent de manière significative la performance et les décisions des sujets. En particulier, les décisions du prestataire, sont influencées par ses commandes en carnet, sa capacité de service actuellement disponible et les décisions d'ajustement de capacité qu'il a prises, mais pas encore implémentées. - Queuing is a fact of life that we witness daily. We all have had the experience of waiting in line for some reason and we also know that it is an annoying situation. As the adage says "time is money"; this is perhaps the best way of stating what queuing problems mean for customers. Human beings are not very tolerant, but they are even less so when having to wait in line for service. Banks, roads, post offices and restaurants are just some examples where people must wait for service. Studies of queuing phenomena have typically addressed the optimisation of performance measures (e.g. average waiting time, queue length and server utilisation rates) and the analysis of equilibrium solutions. The individual behaviour of the agents involved in queueing systems and their decision making process have received little attention. Although this work has been useful to improve the efficiency of many queueing systems, or to design new processes in social and physical systems, it has only provided us with a limited ability to explain the behaviour observed in many real queues. In this dissertation we differ from this traditional research by analysing how the agents involved in the system make decisions instead of focusing on optimising performance measures or analysing an equilibrium solution. This dissertation builds on and extends the framework proposed by van Ackere and Larsen (2004) and van Ackere et al. (2010). We focus on studying behavioural aspects in queueing systems and incorporate this still underdeveloped framework into the operations management field. In the first chapter of this thesis we provide a general introduction to the area, as well as an overview of the results. In Chapters 2 and 3, we use Cellular Automata (CA) to model service systems where captive interacting customers must decide each period which facility to join for service. They base this decision on their expectations of sojourn times. Each period, customers use new information (their most recent experience and that of their best performing neighbour) to form expectations of sojourn time at the different facilities. Customers update their expectations using an adaptive expectations process to combine their memory and their new information. We label "conservative" those customers who give more weight to their memory than to the xiv Summary new information. In contrast, when they give more weight to new information, we call them "reactive". In Chapter 2, we consider customers with different degree of risk-aversion who take into account uncertainty. They choose which facility to join based on an estimated upper-bound of the sojourn time which they compute using their perceptions of the average sojourn time and the level of uncertainty. We assume the same exogenous service capacity for all facilities, which remains constant throughout. We first analyse the collective behaviour generated by the customers' decisions. We show that the system achieves low weighted average sojourn times when the collective behaviour results in neighbourhoods of customers loyal to a facility and the customers are approximately equally split among all facilities. The lowest weighted average sojourn time is achieved when exactly the same number of customers patronises each facility, implying that they do not wish to switch facility. In this case, the system has achieved the Nash equilibrium. We show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of risk-aversion and system performance. Customers with an intermediate degree of riskaversion typically achieve higher sojourn times; in particular they rarely achieve the Nash equilibrium. Risk-neutral customers have the highest probability of achieving the Nash Equilibrium. Chapter 3 considers a service system similar to the previous one but with risk-neutral customers, and relaxes the assumption of exogenous service rates. In this sense, we model a queueing system with endogenous service rates by enabling managers to adjust the service capacity of the facilities. We assume that managers do so based on their perceptions of the arrival rates and use the same principle of adaptive expectations to model these perceptions. We consider service systems in which the managers' decisions take time to be implemented. Managers are characterised by a profile which is determined by the speed at which they update their perceptions, the speed at which they take decisions, and how coherent they are when accounting for their previous decisions still to be implemented when taking their next decision. We find that the managers' decisions exhibit a strong path-dependence: owing to the initial conditions of the model, the facilities of managers with identical profiles can evolve completely differently. In some cases the system becomes "locked-in" into a monopoly or duopoly situation. The competition between managers causes the weighted average sojourn time of the system to converge to the exogenous benchmark value which they use to estimate their desired capacity. Concerning the managers' profile, we found that the more conservative Summary xv a manager is regarding new information, the larger the market share his facility achieves. Additionally, the faster he takes decisions, the higher the probability that he achieves a monopoly position. In Chapter 4 we consider a one-server queueing system with non-captive customers. We carry out an experiment aimed at analysing the way human subjects, taking on the role of the manager, take decisions in a laboratory regarding the capacity of a service facility. We adapt the model proposed by van Ackere et al (2010). This model relaxes the assumption of a captive market and allows current customers to decide whether or not to use the facility. Additionally the facility also has potential customers who currently do not patronise it, but might consider doing so in the future. We identify three groups of subjects whose decisions cause similar behavioural patterns. These groups are labelled: gradual investors, lumpy investors, and random investor. Using an autocorrelation analysis of the subjects' decisions, we illustrate that these decisions are positively correlated to the decisions taken one period early. Subsequently we formulate a heuristic to model the decision rule considered by subjects in the laboratory. We found that this decision rule fits very well for those subjects who gradually adjust capacity, but it does not capture the behaviour of the subjects of the other two groups. In Chapter 5 we summarise the results and provide suggestions for further work. Our main contribution is the use of simulation and experimental methodologies to explain the collective behaviour generated by customers' and managers' decisions in queueing systems as well as the analysis of the individual behaviour of these agents. In this way, we differ from the typical literature related to queueing systems which focuses on optimising performance measures and the analysis of equilibrium solutions. Our work can be seen as a first step towards understanding the interaction between customer behaviour and the capacity adjustment process in queueing systems. This framework is still in its early stages and accordingly there is a large potential for further work that spans several research topics. Interesting extensions to this work include incorporating other characteristics of queueing systems which affect the customers' experience (e.g. balking, reneging and jockeying); providing customers and managers with additional information to take their decisions (e.g. service price, quality, customers' profile); analysing different decision rules and studying other characteristics which determine the profile of customers and managers.

The enterprise face to the environmental challenge: straddling the fence between social responsibility and penal responsibility

This contribution aims to analyse how to incur companies' criminal liability when they violate environmental protection globally. In Switzerland, companies' criminal liability has already been provided for to fight against money launder- ing (Article 102 CP). Could a similar liability be incurred, in Switzerland, for companies that infringe environmental protection? This is what our contribution is all about. Since the company is at the heart of our subject, the point is to see to what extent criminal liability could be transposed to cases of violation by companies of the environmental principles promoted by the CSR concept.

Transactional sex and HIV risks - evidence from a cross-sectional national survey among young people in Uganda.

BACKGROUND: Transactional sex is associated with the HIV epidemic among young people in Uganda. Few quantitative studies based on nationally representative survey data explored the relationship between sexual behaviors, HIV infection, and transactional sex. OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to determine the associations between risky sexual behaviors, participation in transactional sex, and HIV sero-status among men and women aged 15-24 in Uganda. DESIGN: The study uses data from the Uganda AIDS Indicator Survey, a cross-sectional national HIV serological study conducted in 2011. We analyzed data on 1,516 men and 2,824 women aged 15-24 who had been sexually active in the 12 months preceding the survey. Private, face-to-face interviews were also conducted to record the sociodemographics, sexual history, and experiences of sexual coercion. Logistic regression analysis was performed to measure associations between sexual behaviors and transactional sex, and associations between HIV sero-status and transactional sex. RESULTS: Among young people who had been sexually active in the 12 months prior to the survey, 5.2% of young men reported paying for sex while 3.7% of young women reported receiving gifts, favors, or money for sex. Lower educational attainment (ORadjusted 3.25, CI 1.10-9.60) and experience of sexual coercion (ORadjusted 2.83, CI 1.07-7.47) were significantly associated with paying for sex among men. Multiple concurrent sexual relationships were significantly associated with paying for sex among young men (ORadjusted 5.60, CI 2.08-14.95) and receiving something for sex among young women (ORadjusted 8.04, CI 2.55-25.37). Paying for sex among young men and having three to five lifetime sexual partners among young women were associated with increased odds of testing positive for HIV. CONCLUSIONS: Transactional sex is associated with sexual coercion and HIV risk behaviors such as multiple concurrent sexual partnerships among young people in Uganda. In addition, transactional sex appears to place young men at increased risk for HIV in Uganda. Both sexes appear equally vulnerable to risks associated with transactional sex, and therefore should be targeted in intervention programs. In addition, strengthening universal education policy and improving school retention programs may be beneficial in reducing risky sexual behaviors and transactional sex.

Three essays in behavioral and experimental economics

The present PhD dissertation consists of three papers, organized in chapters, in the field of behavioral economics. This discipline studies economic behavior of individuals subject to limitations, such as bounded self-interest and bounded willpower. The behavior studied in the present thesis ranges from the complex decision to register as an organ donor, decision¬making in the presence of uncertainty and the decision to give money to a charitable organization. The first chapter aims at testing the effectiveness of an active-decision (AD) mechanism on the decision to become an organ donor in Switzerland, using field experiments. We found that stimulating participants' reflection on the topic of organ donation had a negative effect on the decision to become an organ donor. Moreover, a non-binding commitment nudge reduces putting off the decision, but does not lead to donation rates higher than in the control group. The results suggest that AD may be far more limited than previously thought and raise doubts about the efficacy of engaging potential donors to reflect on the topic of organ donation. Beyond carrying for others, behavioral economics also recognizes that individuals do not evaluate outcomes in absolute terms but rather by comparing them to some reference levels, called reference points. Above the reference points, economic outcomes are perceived as gains, while below these levels the same outcomes are felt as losses. The last two chapters analyze the importance of reference points in the evaluation of economic outcomes. Using a laboratory experiment where subjects played two consecutive lotteries, Chapter 2 studies the speed of adjustment of the reference point. We find that varying the probability of winning the first lottery has no effect on subjects' risk behavior regarding the second lottery. This result indicates a very fast adjustment of the reference point to the latest information. Chapter 3 investigates whether reference points are relevant for charitable preferences. Using actual donation decisions of participants in a laboratory experiment, the results suggest that reference points are not crucial for shaping charitable giving. -- Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en trois articles, organisés en chapitres, dans le domaine de l'économie comportementale. Cette discipline étudie le comportement d'agents économiques sujets à des limitations, telles qu'un égoïsme limité et une volonté limitée. Le comportement étudié dans cette thèse va de la décision complexe de devenir donneur d'organes, la prise de décision en présence d'incertitude à la décision de donner de l'argent à une oeuvre caritative. Le premier chapitre vise à tester l'efficacité d'un mécanisme de « décision active » (active decision, AD) sur la décision de devenir donneur d'organes en Suisse, et ce en recourant à deux expériences hors-laboratoire. Les résultats montrent que stimuler la réflexion des participants sur le don d'organes a un effet négatif sur la décision de devenir donneur. De plus, un mécanisme qui encourage les participants à prendre une décision sur le champ réduit la tendance à procrastiner, mais ne mène pas à un taux de donneurs plus élevé par rapport à un groupe de contrôle. Les résultats suggèrent que le mécanisme AD est bien plus limité que ce qui a été supposé jusqu'à maintenant. De plus, ils suscitent le doute quant à l'efficacité de stimuler la réflexion de potentiels donneurs sur le sujet du don d'organes. En plus de se soucier des autres, l'économie comportementale admet également que les individus n'évaluent pas les résultats de façon absolue, mais en comparant ceux-ci à des niveaux de références, souvent appelés points de référence. Au-dessus de ces points de référence, les résultats sont perçus en tant que gains, tandis qu'en-dessous ces mêmes résultats sont considérés comme des pertes. Les deux derniers chapitres analysent l'importance des points de référence dans diverses situations. A l'aide d'une expérience en laboratoire dans laquelle les participants participent à deux loteries consécutives, le chapitre 2 étudie la vitesse d'ajustement du point de référence. Le résultat montre que varier la probabilité de gagner la première loterie n'a aucun effet sur le comportement en matière de risques concernant la deuxième loterie. Cela indique un ajustement très rapide du point de référence. Le chapitre 3 vise à déterminer si les points de référence ont un rôle majeur concernant les préférences caritatives. Les données relatives aux décisions de don des participants d'une expérience en laboratoire montrent que les points de référence n'influencent pas significativement le don caritatif.

Financial integration, capital misallocation and global imbalances

This paper shows that in a stylized model with two countries, characterized by different levels of financial development, the following facts can be replicated: 1) persistent current account surpluses and 2) high TFP growth in China. Under autarky, entrepreneurs in the emerging country overinvest in short-term projects and underinvest in long-term projects because short-term assets help them secure long-term investments in the presence of credit constraints. This creates an aggregate misallocation of capital. When financial markets integrate, entrepreneurs with long-term projects can have access to cheaper short-term assets abroad, which leaves them more resources to invest in their projects. This both reduces capital misallocations and generates capital outflows.

Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the "Unlucky") lost some money, another one (the "Passer-by") could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a reputation that could be used by others in later interactions. The losses were either stable or stochastic, but the average loss over time and the average efficiency gains of helping were kept constant in both treatments. We found that players with a reputation of being generous were generally more likely to receive help by others, such that investing into a good reputation generated long-term benefits that compensated for the immediate costs of helping. Helping frequencies were similar in both treatments, but players with a reputation to be selfish lost more resources under stochastic conditions. Hence, returns on investment were steeper when losses varied than when they did not. We conclude that this type of stochasticity increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.