Information sharing and social network dynamics : a coevolutionary approach

The capacity to interact socially and share information underlies the success of many animal species, humans included. Researchers of many fields have emphasized the evo¬lutionary significance of how patterns of connections between individuals, or the social networks, and learning abilities affect the information obtained by animal societies. To date, studies have focused on the dynamics either of social networks, or of the spread of information. The present work aims to study them together. We make use of mathematical and computational models to study the dynamics of networks, where social learning and information sharing affect the structure of the population the individuals belong to. The number and strength of the relationships between individuals, in turn, impact the accessibility and the diffusion of the shared information. Moreover, we inves¬tigate how different strategies in the evaluation and choice of interacting partners impact the processes of knowledge acquisition and social structure rearrangement. First, we look at how different evaluations of social interactions affect the availability of the information and the network topology. We compare a first case, where individuals evaluate social exchanges by the amount of information that can be shared by the partner, with a second case, where they evaluate interactions by considering their partners' social status. We show that, even if both strategies take into account the knowledge endowments of the partners, they have very different effects on the system. In particular, we find that the first case generally enables individuals to accumulate higher amounts of information, thanks to the more efficient patterns of social connections they are able to build. Then, we study the effects that homophily, or the tendency to interact with similar partners, has on knowledge accumulation and social structure. We compare the case where individuals who know the same information are more likely to learn socially from each other, to the opposite case, where individuals who know different information are instead more likely to learn socially from each other. We find that it is not trivial to claim which strategy is better than the other. Depending on the possibility of forgetting information, the way new social partners can be chosen, and the population size, we delineate the conditions for which each strategy allows accumulating more information, or in a faster way For these conditions, we also discuss the topological characteristics of the resulting social structure, relating them to the information dynamics outcome. In conclusion, this work paves the road for modeling the joint dynamics of the spread of information among individuals and their social interactions. It also provides a formal framework to study jointly the effects of different strategies in the choice of partners on social structure, and how they favor the accumulation of knowledge in the population. - La capacité d'interagir socialement et de partager des informations est à la base de la réussite de nombreuses espèces animales, y compris les humains. Les chercheurs de nombreux domaines ont souligné l'importance évolutive de la façon dont les modes de connexions entre individus, ou réseaux sociaux et les capacités d'apprentissage affectent les informations obtenues par les sociétés animales. À ce jour, les études se sont concentrées sur la dynamique soit des réseaux sociaux, soit de la diffusion de l'information. Le présent travail a pour but de les étudier ensemble. Nous utilisons des modèles mathématiques et informatiques pour étudier la dynamique des réseaux, où l'apprentissage social et le partage d'information affectent la structure de la population à laquelle les individus appartiennent. Le nombre et la solidité des relations entre les individus ont à leurs tours un impact sur l'accessibilité et la diffusion de l'informa¬tion partagée. Par ailleurs, nous étudions comment les différentes stratégies d'évaluation et de choix des partenaires d'interaction ont une incidence sur les processus d'acquisition des connaissances ainsi que le réarrangement de la structure sociale. Tout d'abord, nous examinons comment des évaluations différentes des interactions sociales influent sur la disponibilité de l'information ainsi que sur la topologie du réseau. Nous comparons un premier cas, où les individus évaluent les échanges sociaux par la quantité d'information qui peut être partagée par le partenaire, avec un second cas, où ils évaluent les interactions en tenant compte du statut social de leurs partenaires. Nous montrons que, même si les deux stratégies prennent en compte le montant de connaissances des partenaires, elles ont des effets très différents sur le système. En particulier, nous constatons que le premier cas permet généralement aux individus d'accumuler de plus grandes quantités d'information, grâce à des modèles de connexions sociales plus efficaces qu'ils sont capables de construire. Ensuite, nous étudions les effets que l'homophilie, ou la tendance à interagir avec des partenaires similaires, a sur l'accumulation des connaissances et la structure sociale. Nous comparons le cas où des personnes qui connaissent les mêmes informations sont plus sus¬ceptibles d'apprendre socialement l'une de l'autre, au cas où les individus qui connaissent des informations différentes sont au contraire plus susceptibles d'apprendre socialement l'un de l'autre. Nous constatons qu'il n'est pas trivial de déterminer quelle stratégie est meilleure que l'autre. En fonction de la possibilité d'oublier l'information, la façon dont les nouveaux partenaires sociaux peuvent être choisis, et la taille de la population, nous déterminons les conditions pour lesquelles chaque stratégie permet d'accumuler plus d'in¬formations, ou d'une manière plus rapide. Pour ces conditions, nous discutons également les caractéristiques topologiques de la structure sociale qui en résulte, les reliant au résultat de la dynamique de l'information. En conclusion, ce travail ouvre la route pour la modélisation de la dynamique conjointe de la diffusion de l'information entre les individus et leurs interactions sociales. Il fournit également un cadre formel pour étudier conjointement les effets de différentes stratégies de choix des partenaires sur la structure sociale et comment elles favorisent l'accumulation de connaissances dans la population.

Coordination on Networks: Does Topology Matter?

Effective coordination is key to many situations that affect the well-being of two or more humans. Social coordination can be studied in coordination games between individuals located on networks of contacts. We study the behavior of humans in the laboratory when they play the Stag Hunt game - a game that has a risky but socially efficient equilibrium and an inefficient but safe equilibrium. We contrast behavior on a cliquish network to behavior on a random network. The cliquish network is highly clustered and resembles more closely to actual social networks than the random network. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in the cliquish network than in the random network. Subjects do not use pure myopic best-reply as an individual update rule. Numerical simulations agree with laboratory results once we implement the actual individual updating rule that human subjects use in our laboratory experiments.

Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.

Webdatanet : Innovation and quality in web-based data collection

The article discusses the development of WEBDATANET established in 2011 which aims to create a multidisciplinary network of web-based data collection experts in Europe. Topics include the presence of 190 experts in 30 European countries and abroad, the establishment of web-based teaching and discussion platforms and working groups and task forces. Also discussed is the scope of the research carried by WEBDATANET. In light of the growing importance of web-based data in the social and behavioral sciences, WEBDATANET was established in 2011 as a COST Action (IS 1004) to create a multidisciplinary network of web-based data collection experts: (web) survey methodologists, psychologists, sociologists, linguists, economists, Internet scientists, media and public opinion researchers. The aim was to accumulate and synthesize knowledge regarding methodological issues of web-based data collection (surveys, experiments, tests, non-reactive data, and mobile Internet research), and foster its scientific usage in a broader community.