Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Treatment and outcomes of acute basilar artery occlusion in the Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS): a prospective registry study.

BACKGROUND: Treatment strategies for acute basilar artery occlusion (BAO) are based on case series and data that have been extrapolated from stroke intervention trials in other cerebrovascular territories, and information on the efficacy of different treatments in unselected patients with BAO is scarce. We therefore assessed outcomes and differences in treatment response after BAO. METHODS: The Basilar Artery International Cooperation Study (BASICS) is a prospective, observational registry of consecutive patients who presented with an acute symptomatic and radiologically confirmed BAO between November 1, 2002, and October 1, 2007. Stroke severity at time of treatment was dichotomised as severe (coma, locked-in state, or tetraplegia) or mild to moderate (any deficit that was less than severe). Outcome was assessed at 1 month. Poor outcome was defined as a modified Rankin scale score of 4 or 5, or death. Patients were divided into three groups according to the treatment they received: antithrombotic treatment only (AT), which comprised antiplatelet drugs or systemic anticoagulation; primary intravenous thrombolysis (IVT), including subsequent intra-arterial thrombolysis; or intra-arterial therapy (IAT), which comprised thrombolysis, mechanical thrombectomy, stenting, or a combination of these approaches. Risk ratios (RR) for treatment effects were adjusted for age, the severity of neurological deficits at the time of treatment, time to treatment, prodromal minor stroke, location of the occlusion, and diabetes. FINDINGS: 619 patients were entered in the registry. 27 patients were excluded from the analyses because they did not receive AT, IVT, or IAT, and all had a poor outcome. Of the 592 patients who were analysed, 183 were treated with only AT, 121 with IVT, and 288 with IAT. Overall, 402 (68%) of the analysed patients had a poor outcome. No statistically significant superiority was found for any treatment strategy. Compared with outcome after AT, patients with a mild-to-moderate deficit (n=245) had about the same risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.60-1.45) or after IAT (adjusted RR 1.29, 0.97-1.72) but had a worse outcome after IAT compared with IVT (adjusted RR 1.49, 1.00-2.23). Compared with AT, patients with a severe deficit (n=347) had a lower risk of poor outcome after IVT (adjusted RR 0.88, 0.76-1.01) or IAT (adjusted RR 0.94, 0.86-1.02), whereas outcomes were similar after treatment with IAT or IVT (adjusted RR 1.06, 0.91-1.22). INTERPRETATION: Most patients in the BASICS registry received IAT. Our results do not support unequivocal superiority of IAT over IVT, and the efficacy of IAT versus IVT in patients with an acute BAO needs to be assessed in a randomised controlled trial. FUNDING: Department of Neurology, University Medical Center Utrecht.

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Genetic team composition and level of selection in the evolution of cooperation

In cooperative multiagent systems, agents interac to solve tasks. Global dynamics of multiagent teams result from local agent interactions, and are complex and difficult to predict. Evolutionary computation has proven a promising approach to the design of such teams. The majority of current studies use teams composed of agents with identical control rules ("geneti- cally homogeneous teams") and select behavior at the team level ("team-level selection"). Here we extend current approaches to include four combinations of genetic team composition and level of selection. We compare the performance of genetically homo- geneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, genetically homogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection, genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with individual-level selection, and genetically heterogeneous teams evolved with team-level selection. We use a simulated foraging task to show that the optimal combination depends on the amount of cooperation required by the task. Accordingly, we distinguish between three types of cooperative tasks and suggest guidelines for the optimal choice of genetic team composition and level of selection

Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.

Homologous DNA pairing domain peptides of RecA protein: intrinsic propensity to form beta-structures and filaments.

The 20 amino acid residue peptides derived from RecA loop L2 have been shown to be the pairing domain of RecA. The peptides bind to ss- and dsDNA, unstack ssDNA, and pair the ssDNA to its homologous target in a duplex DNA. As shown by circular dichroism, upon binding to DNA the disordered peptides adopt a beta-structure conformation. Here we show that the conformational change of the peptide from random coil to beta-structure is important in binding ss- and dsDNA. The beta-structure in the DNA pairing peptides can be induced by many environmental conditions such as high pH, high concentration, and non-micellar sodium dodecyl sulfate (6 mM). This behavior indicates an intrinsic property of these peptides to form a beta-structure. A beta-structure model for the loop L2 of RecA protein when bound to DNA is thus proposed. The fact that aromatic residues at the central position 203 strongly modulate the peptide binding to DNA and subsequent biochemical activities can be accounted for by the direct effect of the aromatic amino acids on the peptide conformational change. The DNA-pairing domain of RecA visualized by electron microscopy self-assembles into a filamentous structure like RecA. The relevance of such a peptide filamentous structure to the structure of RecA when bound to DNA is discussed.

Selection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution.

A key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary models is the 'selection method' which assigns fitness (number of offspring) to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods (proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A cooperator pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation affects the populations' average level of cooperation only under the proportionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.

Cooperation between the transcription factors p63 and IRF6 is essential to prevent cleft palate in mice.

Cleft palate is a common congenital disorder that affects up to 1 in 2,500 live human births and results in considerable morbidity to affected individuals and their families. The etiology of cleft palate is complex, with both genetic and environmental factors implicated. Mutations in the transcription factor-encoding genes p63 and interferon regulatory factor 6 (IRF6) have individually been identified as causes of cleft palate; however, a relationship between the key transcription factors p63 and IRF6 has not been determined. Here, we used both mouse models and human primary keratinocytes from patients with cleft palate to demonstrate that IRF6 and p63 interact epistatically during development of the secondary palate. Mice simultaneously carrying a heterozygous deletion of p63 and the Irf6 knockin mutation R84C, which causes cleft palate in humans, displayed ectodermal abnormalities that led to cleft palate. Furthermore, we showed that p63 transactivated IRF6 by binding to an upstream enhancer element; genetic variation within this enhancer element is associated with increased susceptibility to cleft lip. Our findings therefore identify p63 as a key regulatory molecule during palate development and provide a mechanism for the cooperative role of p63 and IRF6 in orofacial development in mice and humans.

Helical repeat of DNA in the region of homologous pairing.

The process of DNA strand exchange during general genetic recombination is initiated within protein-stabilized synaptic filaments containing homologous regions of interacting DNA molecules. The RecA protein in bacteria and its analogs in eukaryotic organisms start this process by forming helical filamentous complexes on single-stranded or partially single-stranded DNA molecules. These complexes then progressively bind homologous double-stranded DNA molecules so that homologous regions of single- and double-stranded DNA molecules become aligned in register while presumably winding around common axis. The topological assay presented herein allows us to conclude that in synaptic complexes containing homologous single- and double-stranded DNA molecules, all three DNA strands have a helicity of approximately 19 nt per turn.

Trans-SNARE pairing can precede a hemifusion intermediate in intracellular membrane fusion.

The question concerning whether all membranes fuse according to the same mechanism has yet to be answered satisfactorily. During fusion of model membranes or viruses, membranes dock, the outer membrane leaflets mix (termed hemifusion), and finally the fusion pore opens and the contents mix. Viral fusion proteins consist of a membrane-disturbing 'fusion peptide' and a helical bundle that pin the membranes together. Although SNARE (soluble N-ethylmaleimide-sensitive factor attachment protein receptor) complexes form helical bundles with similar topology, it is unknown whether SNARE-dependent fusion events on intracellular membranes proceed through a hemifusion state. Here we identify the first hemifusion state for SNARE-dependent fusion of native membranes, and place it into a sequence of molecular events: formation of helical bundles by SNAREs precedes hemifusion; further progression to pore opening requires additional peptides. Thus, SNARE-dependent fusion may proceed along the same pathway as viral fusion: both use a docking mechanism via helical bundles and additional peptides to destabilize the membrane and efficiently induce lipid mixing. Our results suggest that a common lipidic intermediate may underlie all fusion reactions of lipid bilayers.

Pairing of Vbeta6 with certain Valpha2 family members prevents T cell deletion by Mtv-7 superantigen.

Superantigens (SAg) are proteins of bacterial or viral origin able to activate T cells by forming a trimolecular complex with both MHC class II molecules and the T cell receptor (TCR), leading to clonal deletion of reactive T cells in the thymus. SAg interact with the TCR through the beta chain variable region (Vbeta), but the TCR alpha chain has been shown to have an influence on the T cell reactivity. We have investigated here the role of the TCR alpha chain in the modulation of T cell reactivity to Mtv-7 SAg by comparing the peripheral usage of Valpha2 in Vbeta6(+) (SAg-reactive) and Vbeta8.2(+) (SAg non-reactive) T cells, in either BALB/D2 (Mtv-7(+)) or BALB/c (Mtv-7(-)) mice. The results show, first, that pairing of Vbeta6 with certain Valpha2 family members prevents T cell deletion by Mtv-7 SAg. Second, there is a strikingly different distribution of the Valpha2 family members in CD4 and CD8 populations of Vbeta6 but not of Vbeta8.2 T cells, irrespective of the presence of Mtv-7 SAg. Third, the alpha chain may play a role in the overall stability of the TCR/SAg/MHC complex. Taken together, these results suggest that the Valpha domain contributes to the selective process by its role in the TCR reactivity to SAg/MHC class II complexes, most likely by influencing the orientation of the Vbeta domain in the TCR alphabeta heterodimer.

Eusociality and cooperation.

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.