The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Travailler dans l'urgence au quotidien : quels impacts sur les employés et sur l'organisation ? Etude qualitative au siège d'une ONG humanitaire

A l'occasion d'une intervention en santé au travail au siège d'une ONG humanitaire, nous avons constaté la présence d'une souffrance au travail importante parmi le personnel. Nous avons alors effectué une recherche sur l'organisation du travail et l'activité des employés dans le but de proposer des pistes de compréhension de cette souffrance. Nous avons collecté des données à l'aide d'un questionnaire, de 20 entretiens semi-directifs et de 26 jours d'observation non-participante. Nous avons mis en évidence un type de fonctionnement spécifique s'articulant en permanence autour de l'urgence. Celui-ci se nourrit de la nature des interventions de cette ONG ainsi que de la très forte valorisation des activités liées aux missions sur les terrains : tout se passe comme si le mode d'intervention " en situation d'urgence ", propre aux activités du terrain, contaminait l'organisation du travail au niveau du siège. Les employés sont pris dans un rythme effréné, ce qui les empêche de rester attentif à l'importance des tâches et de discriminer entre ce qui relève de " vraies " urgences et d'urgences " fantasmées ". Ceci génère un environnement potentiellement pathogène, où il est d'une part peu légitime de se préoccuper de sa propre santé et où d'autre part la charge de travail et le rythme ne laissent pas le temps à l'employé de mettre en place des stratégies de préservation de sa santé. [Auteures]

Neither Bad Apple nor Bad Barrel: How the Societal Context Impacts Unethical Behavior in Organizations

Every time another corporate scandal captures media headlines, the 'bad apple vs. bad barrel' discussion starts anew. Yet this debate overlooks the influence of the broader societal context on organizational behavior. In this article, we argue that misbehaviors of organizations (the 'barrels') and their members (the 'apples') cannot be addressed properly without a clear understanding of their broader context (the 'larder'). Whereas previously, a strong societal framework dampened the practical application of the Homo economicus concept (business actors as perfectly rational and egocentric utility-maximizing agents without any moral concern), specialization, individualization and globalization led to a business world disembedded from broader societal norms. This emancipated business world promotes a literal interpretation of Homo economicus among business organizations and their members. Consequently, we argue that the first step toward 'healthier' apples and barrels is to sanitize the larder, that is, adapt the framework in which organizations and their members evolve.Chaque fois qu'un nouveau scandale fait la une des médias, la question de savoir si le problème se situe au niveau des individus (des 'pommes isolées') ou au niveau des organisations (les 'caisses de pommes') refait surface. Ce débat tend néanmoins à sous-estimer l'influence du contexte sociétal plus large sur le comportement dans les organisations. Dans cet article, nous soutenons l'idée que les scandales éthiques dans les organisations ou parmi leurs membres ne peuvent être compris correctement sans une vision plus précise de leur contexte plus large (la 'cave à pommes'). Si dans le passé un contexte sociétal fort permettait d'adoucir les applications pratiques de l'Homo economicus (qui considère l'acteur économique comme un agent parfaitement rationnel et égocentrique cherchant à maximiser son utilité sans réflexion morale), l'individualisation et la globalisation ont conduit à un monde économique désencastré et déconnecté des normes sociales plus larges. Ce monde économique autonome promouvoit une interprétation littérale de l'Homo economicus parmi les entreprises et leurs employés. Il en résulte que le premier pas vers des pommes moins pourries passe par un assainissement de la cave, c'est-à-dire l'adoption d'un cadre socio-normatif qui permet un recadrage du contexte dans lequel les organisations économiques et leurs acteurs agissent.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

Pour une politique active contre l'érosion des bonnes volontés [For an active policy against the erosion of goodwill].

Maintaining a regular physical activity practice throughout lifetime is a challenge for most of us. This often means "resisting" against a physical environment and a social organization that promotes physical inactivity and discourage those who, fiercely, walk or try to commute by bike. So there's a little hero behind every doctor that distills the subtle potion of motivational interviewing against sedentary habits. Any hope of change in our living conditions, taking into account our natural need to move, is however not lost. This article illustrates the paths that are traced by collectivities in order that the advices we provide to our patients continue to make sense once the practice door is crossed.