Quand la peur des dépenses incite au gaspillage humain et financier [When the fear of spending incites a human and financial waste!]

Dans les années 80, la crainte de la pléthore médicale imposait des mesures radicales. En 2002, c'est l'angoisse de l'envahisseur européen qui a justifié un moratoire sur l'ouverture de nouveaux cabinets. Aujourd'hui, alors que la Suisse recrute de plus en plus de médecins étrangers pour ses besoins, le Conseiller fédéral Couchepin brandit la menace d'une augmentation des coûts de la santé de 300 millions par an pour justifier une troisième prolongation du moratoire. Ces mesures ont été dictées par la peur d'une explosion des coûts au point de faire perdre de vue la globalité de la situation. Aujourd'hui pourtant, une gestion rationnelle des ressources impose de tout faire pour qu'un maximum de médecins puissent travailler, car la population en a besoin et a déjà beaucoup investi dans leur formation ! Pour y parvenir, la création de postes d'assistanat à temps partiel, l'adaptation urgente des structures d'accueil en garderie et le respect de conditions de travail raisonnables sont des éléments incontournables mais trop souvent négligés par les politiques et les médecins eux-mêmes !

Financial protection of patients through compensation of providers: the impact of health equity funds in Cambodia

Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount by 29%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are poorer, mainly use public health care and live closer to a district hospital. HEFs are more effective in reducing OOP payments when they are operated by a NGO, rather than the government, and when they operate in conjunction with the contracting of public health services. HEFs reduce households' health-related debt by around 25%, on average. There is no significant impact on non-medical consumption and health care utilisation

The INTERNORM project : bridging two worlds of expert- and layknowledge in standardization

This paper presents a pilot project to reinforce participatory practices in standardization. The INTERNORM project is funded by the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. It aims to create an interactive knowledge center based on the sharing of academic skills and the experiences accumulated by the civil society, especially consumer associations, environmental associations and trade unions to strengthen the participatory process of standardization. The first objective of the project is action-oriented: INTERNORM provides a common knowledge pool supporting the participation of civil society actors to international standard-setting activities by bringing them together with academic experts in working groups and by providing logistic and financial support to their participation to meetings of national and international technical committees. The second objective of the project is analytical: the standardization action initiated through INTERNORM provides a research field for a better understanding of the participatory dynamics underpinning international standardization. The paper presents three incentives that explain civil society (non-)involvement in standardization that try to overcome conventional resource-based hypotheses: an operational incentive, related to the use of standards in the selective goods provided by associations to their membership; a thematic incentive, provided by the setting of priorities by strategic committees created in some standardization organization; a rhetorical incentive, related to the discursive resource that civil society concerns offers to the different stakeholders.

Do PES Improve the Governance of Forest Restoration?

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are praised as innovative policy instruments and they influence the governance of forest restoration efforts in two major ways. The first is the establishment of multi-stakeholder agencies as intermediary bodies between funders and planters to manage the funds and to distribute incentives to planters. The second implication is that specific contracts assign objectives to land users in the form of conditions for payments that are believed to increase the chances for sustained impacts on the ground. These implications are important in the assessment of the potential of PES to operate as new and effective funding schemes for forest restoration. They are analyzed by looking at two prominent payments for watershed service programs in Indonesia-Cidanau (Banten province in Java) and West Lombok (Eastern Indonesia)-with combined economic and political science approaches. We derive lessons for the governance of funding efforts (e.g., multi-stakeholder agencies are not a guarantee of success; mixed results are obtained from a reliance on mandatory funding with ad hoc regulations, as opposed to voluntary contributions by the service beneficiary) and for the governance of financial expenditure (e.g., absolute need for evaluation procedures for the internal governance of farmer groups). Furthermore, we observe that these governance features provide no guarantee that restoration plots with the highest relevance for ecosystem services are targeted by the PES

Three essays in financial economics: asset pricing, optimal portfolio selection and financial integration

Executive Summary The unifying theme of this thesis is the pursuit of a satisfactory ways to quantify the riskureward trade-off in financial economics. First in the context of a general asset pricing model, then across models and finally across country borders. The guiding principle in that pursuit was to seek innovative solutions by combining ideas from different fields in economics and broad scientific research. For example, in the first part of this thesis we sought a fruitful application of strong existence results in utility theory to topics in asset pricing. In the second part we implement an idea from the field of fuzzy set theory to the optimal portfolio selection problem, while the third part of this thesis is to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical application of some general results in asset pricing in incomplete markets to the important topic of measurement of financial integration. While the first two parts of this thesis effectively combine well-known ways to quantify the risk-reward trade-offs the third one can be viewed as an empirical verification of the usefulness of the so-called "good deal bounds" theory in designing risk-sensitive pricing bounds. Chapter 1 develops a discrete-time asset pricing model, based on a novel ordinally equivalent representation of recursive utility. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use a member of a novel class of recursive utility generators to construct a representative agent model to address some long-lasting issues in asset pricing. Applying strong representation results allows us to show that the model features countercyclical risk premia, for both consumption and financial risk, together with low and procyclical risk free rate. As the recursive utility used nests as a special case the well-known time-state separable utility, all results nest the corresponding ones from the standard model and thus shed light on its well-known shortcomings. The empirical investigation to support these theoretical results, however, showed that as long as one resorts to econometric methods based on approximating conditional moments with unconditional ones, it is not possible to distinguish the model we propose from the standard one. Chapter 2 is a join work with Sergei Sontchik. There we provide theoretical and empirical motivation for aggregation of performance measures. The main idea is that as it makes sense to apply several performance measures ex-post, it also makes sense to base optimal portfolio selection on ex-ante maximization of as many possible performance measures as desired. We thus offer a concrete algorithm for optimal portfolio selection via ex-ante optimization over different horizons of several risk-return trade-offs simultaneously. An empirical application of that algorithm, using seven popular performance measures, suggests that realized returns feature better distributional characteristics relative to those of realized returns from portfolio strategies optimal with respect to single performance measures. When comparing the distributions of realized returns we used two partial risk-reward orderings first and second order stochastic dominance. We first used the Kolmogorov Smirnov test to determine if the two distributions are indeed different, which combined with a visual inspection allowed us to demonstrate that the way we propose to aggregate performance measures leads to portfolio realized returns that first order stochastically dominate the ones that result from optimization only with respect to, for example, Treynor ratio and Jensen's alpha. We checked for second order stochastic dominance via point wise comparison of the so-called absolute Lorenz curve, or the sequence of expected shortfalls for a range of quantiles. As soon as the plot of the absolute Lorenz curve for the aggregated performance measures was above the one corresponding to each individual measure, we were tempted to conclude that the algorithm we propose leads to portfolio returns distribution that second order stochastically dominates virtually all performance measures considered. Chapter 3 proposes a measure of financial integration, based on recent advances in asset pricing in incomplete markets. Given a base market (a set of traded assets) and an index of another market, we propose to measure financial integration through time by the size of the spread between the pricing bounds of the market index, relative to the base market. The bigger the spread around country index A, viewed from market B, the less integrated markets A and B are. We investigate the presence of structural breaks in the size of the spread for EMU member country indices before and after the introduction of the Euro. We find evidence that both the level and the volatility of our financial integration measure increased after the introduction of the Euro. That counterintuitive result suggests the presence of an inherent weakness in the attempt to measure financial integration independently of economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, the results about the bounds on the risk free rate appear plausible from the view point of existing economic theory about the impact of integration on interest rates.

Three essays in risk management in financial institutions

The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for operational risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New Capital Accord This paper investigates the choice of the operational risk approach under Basel II requirements and whether the adoption of advanced risk measurement approaches allows banks to save capital. Among the three possible approaches for operational risk measurement, the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) is the most sophisticated and requires the use of historical loss data, the application of statistical tools, and the engagement of a highly qualified staff. Our results provide evidence that the adoption of AMA is contingent on the availability of bank resources and prior experience in risk-sensitive operational risk measurement practices. Moreover, banks that choose AMA exhibit low requirements for capital and, as a result might gain a competitive advantage compared to banks that opt for less sophisticated approaches. - Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank Solvency Recent cases in financial sector showed the importance of risk management controls on risk taking and firm performance. Despite advances in the design and implementation of risk management mechanisms, there is little research on their impact on behavior and performance of firms. Based on data from a sample of 88 banks covering the period between 2004 and 2010, we provide evidence that internal risk controls impact the solvency of banks. In addition, our results show that the level of internal risk controls leads to a higher degree of solvency in banks with a major shareholder in contrast to widely-held banks. However, the relationship between internal risk controls and bank solvency is negatively affected by BHC growth strategies and external restrictions on bank activities, while the higher regulatory requirements for bank capital moderates positively this relationship. - The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches under Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value Previous research showed the importance of external regulation on banks' behavior. Some inefficient standards may accentuate risk-taking in banks and provoke a financial crisis. Despite the growing literature on the potential effects of Basel II rules, there is little empirical research on the efficiency of risk-sensitive capital measurement approaches and their impact on bank profitability and market valuation. Based on data from a sample of 66 banks covering the period between 2008 and 2010, we provide evidence that prudential ratios computed under Basel II standards predict the value of banks. However, this relation is contingent on the degree of sophistication of risk measurement approaches that banks apply. Capital ratios are effective in predicting bank market valuation when banks adopt the advanced approaches to compute the value of their risk-weighted assets.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

The INTERNORM Project: Bridging Two Worlds of Expert- and Lay-Knowledge in Standardization

This paper presents a pilot project to reinforce participatory practices in standardization. The INTERNORM project creates an interactive knowledge center based on the sharing of academic skills and experiences accumulated by the civil society, especially consumer associations, environmental associations and trade unions to strengthen the participatory process of standardization. The first objective of the project is action-oriented: INTERNORM provides a common knowledge pool supporting the participation of civil society actors to international standard-setting activities by bringing them together with academic experts in working groups and providing logistic and financial support to their participation in meetings of national and international technical committees. The second objective is analytical: the standardization action provides a research field for a better understanding of the participatory dynamics underpinning international standardization. This paper presents three incentives that explain civil society (non-)involvement in standardization that overcome conventional resource-based hypotheses: an operational incentive related to the use of standards in the selective goods provided by associations to their membership; a thematic incentive provided by the setting of priorities by strategic committees created in some standardization organization; and a rhetorical incentive related to the discursive resource that civil society concerns offers to the different stakeholders.