Governance by Contract? The impact of the International Finance Corporation's Social Conditionality on Worker Organization and Social Dialogue

This study considers the question of the relationship between private labour regulation and workers' capacity to take collective action through the lens of an empirical study of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) 'performance standards' system of social and environmental conditionality. The study covered some 150 IFC client businesses in four world regions, drawing on data made public by the IFC as well as the results of a dedicated field survey that gathered information directly from workers, managers and union representatives. The study found that the application of the performance standards system has had remarkably little impact on union membership and social dialogue. In those few cases where change could be causally linked to the standards, the effect depended on the presence of workers' organizations that already had the capacity to take effective action on behalf of their members. The study also uncovered some prima facie evidence of breaches of freedom of association rights occurring with no reaction from IFC. The study concludes that the lack of impact is largely due to the private contractual structure that supposedly guarantees standards compliance.

The challenges of building theory by combining lenses

The article presents a discussion of foundational issues in the field of management science, focusing on advances in management theory and research. The metaphor of explanatory lenses is used as a rubric to illustrate the theoretical challenges involved in elucidating the interrelationships of various factors in organizational behavior. The importance of clarifying such interrelationships is emphasized, from the standpoint of editing scholarly papers on such topics for publication. Topics discussed include communication and psychology in management, economics, and behavioral finance.

Three essays in behavioral and experimental economics

The present PhD dissertation consists of three papers, organized in chapters, in the field of behavioral economics. This discipline studies economic behavior of individuals subject to limitations, such as bounded self-interest and bounded willpower. The behavior studied in the present thesis ranges from the complex decision to register as an organ donor, decision¬making in the presence of uncertainty and the decision to give money to a charitable organization. The first chapter aims at testing the effectiveness of an active-decision (AD) mechanism on the decision to become an organ donor in Switzerland, using field experiments. We found that stimulating participants' reflection on the topic of organ donation had a negative effect on the decision to become an organ donor. Moreover, a non-binding commitment nudge reduces putting off the decision, but does not lead to donation rates higher than in the control group. The results suggest that AD may be far more limited than previously thought and raise doubts about the efficacy of engaging potential donors to reflect on the topic of organ donation. Beyond carrying for others, behavioral economics also recognizes that individuals do not evaluate outcomes in absolute terms but rather by comparing them to some reference levels, called reference points. Above the reference points, economic outcomes are perceived as gains, while below these levels the same outcomes are felt as losses. The last two chapters analyze the importance of reference points in the evaluation of economic outcomes. Using a laboratory experiment where subjects played two consecutive lotteries, Chapter 2 studies the speed of adjustment of the reference point. We find that varying the probability of winning the first lottery has no effect on subjects' risk behavior regarding the second lottery. This result indicates a very fast adjustment of the reference point to the latest information. Chapter 3 investigates whether reference points are relevant for charitable preferences. Using actual donation decisions of participants in a laboratory experiment, the results suggest that reference points are not crucial for shaping charitable giving. -- Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en trois articles, organisés en chapitres, dans le domaine de l'économie comportementale. Cette discipline étudie le comportement d'agents économiques sujets à des limitations, telles qu'un égoïsme limité et une volonté limitée. Le comportement étudié dans cette thèse va de la décision complexe de devenir donneur d'organes, la prise de décision en présence d'incertitude à la décision de donner de l'argent à une oeuvre caritative. Le premier chapitre vise à tester l'efficacité d'un mécanisme de « décision active » (active decision, AD) sur la décision de devenir donneur d'organes en Suisse, et ce en recourant à deux expériences hors-laboratoire. Les résultats montrent que stimuler la réflexion des participants sur le don d'organes a un effet négatif sur la décision de devenir donneur. De plus, un mécanisme qui encourage les participants à prendre une décision sur le champ réduit la tendance à procrastiner, mais ne mène pas à un taux de donneurs plus élevé par rapport à un groupe de contrôle. Les résultats suggèrent que le mécanisme AD est bien plus limité que ce qui a été supposé jusqu'à maintenant. De plus, ils suscitent le doute quant à l'efficacité de stimuler la réflexion de potentiels donneurs sur le sujet du don d'organes. En plus de se soucier des autres, l'économie comportementale admet également que les individus n'évaluent pas les résultats de façon absolue, mais en comparant ceux-ci à des niveaux de références, souvent appelés points de référence. Au-dessus de ces points de référence, les résultats sont perçus en tant que gains, tandis qu'en-dessous ces mêmes résultats sont considérés comme des pertes. Les deux derniers chapitres analysent l'importance des points de référence dans diverses situations. A l'aide d'une expérience en laboratoire dans laquelle les participants participent à deux loteries consécutives, le chapitre 2 étudie la vitesse d'ajustement du point de référence. Le résultat montre que varier la probabilité de gagner la première loterie n'a aucun effet sur le comportement en matière de risques concernant la deuxième loterie. Cela indique un ajustement très rapide du point de référence. Le chapitre 3 vise à déterminer si les points de référence ont un rôle majeur concernant les préférences caritatives. Les données relatives aux décisions de don des participants d'une expérience en laboratoire montrent que les points de référence n'influencent pas significativement le don caritatif.

The Making of Experimental Economics: Witness Seminar on the Emergence of a Field

This book is the transcript of a witness seminar on the history of experimental economics, in which eleven high-profile experimental economists participated, including Nobel Laureates Vernon Smith, Reinhard Selten and Alvin Roth. The witness seminar was constructed along four different topics: skills, community, laboratory, and funding. The transcript is preceded by an introduction explaining the method of the witness seminar and its specific set-up and resuming its results. The participants' contribution and their lively discussion provide a wealth of insights into the emergence of experimental economics as a field of research.

Observation and Observing in Economics

Two themes are generative for revealing and understanding the history of observation in economics. First, we argue for the importance of noting that observation is an activity as well as a result, and second that observation is no more identical with quantification than observing is with measuring. These two themes enable us to discuss different historical dimensions of the ways in which economists have observed their economies and so enlarge our understanding of their observational practices. These problematics especially help in delineating the intricate, multilayered, and active interactions between the observer and the observed that take place in all social science observation, and from which our pictures of the economic world emerge.