174 resultados para Bureaucracy, institutions, redistributive politics, electoral competition
Resumo:
Adoption is frequent in colonial animals where opportunities for dependent young to receive care from nonbiological parents are high. The departure of dependent young from their original family to seek adoption in neighbouring families is thought to be induced by sibling competition for access to limited resources provided by poor-quality parents. We tested this hypothesis in the colonial Alpine swift by manipulating the number of young reared per brood, with the prediction that offspring from enlarged broods switch nests more frequently than those from reduced broods. Although nestling swifts hatch with little locomotor activity, from 20 days until their first flight at 50-70 days they frequently move out of their nests to seek adoption in neighbouring families. Although nestlings reared in experimentally enlarged broods were lighter and their body mass at day 20 after hatching was more variable than in nestlings reared in reduced broods, there was no difference between the two treatments in the frequency of nests switching and in the age when nestlings switched nests for the first time. However, consistent with other evidence that nest switching by nestling swifts evolved as a strategy to reduce ectoparasite load, young from broods with naturally high numbers of the ectoparasitic louse fly Crataerina melbae were more prone to switch nests. This shows that ectoparasitism rather than sibling competition is a key proximate factor promoting the evolution of nest switching in the colonial Alpine swift. (c) 2006 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
Starting from theories of secularization and of religious individualization, we propose a two-dimensional typology of religiosity and test its impact on political attitudes. Unlike classic conceptions of religiosity used in political studies, our typology simultaneously accounts for an individual's sense of belonging to the church (institutional dimension) and his/her personal religious beliefs (spiritual dimension). Our analysis, based on data from the World Values Survey in Switzerland (1989-2007), shows two main results. First, next to evidence of religious decline, we also find evidence of religious change with an increase in the number of people who "believe without belonging." Second, non-religious individuals and individuals who believe without belonging are significantly more permissive on issues of cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.
Resumo:
This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.
Resumo:
The conflict between siblings over how parental resources are divided has promoted the evolution of specific behaviour to outcompete each other. Young animals look out for parents' arrival in order to start begging as quickly as possible, since a rapid begging reaction increases the likelihood of being fed before nestmates. If the young can physically intercept the parents, selection might be operating on the offspring ability to monitor parent arrival (vigilance towards parents) and any sudden modifications in siblings' behaviour (vigilance towards siblings). To investigate the adaptive value of nestling vigilance in the context of family interactions, we recorded which direction barn owl Tyto alba siblings were facing in 89 two-chick broods before the first parental feeding visit of the night. Nestlings were more vigilant towards nest entrance than expected by chance suggesting that vigilance towards parents is an important component of sibling competition. When positioned near the nest-box entrance where parents predictably deliver food, the younger individual (i.e. junior) looked more towards the entrance than its older sibling. Thus, when the likelihood of obtaining a food item is relatively high, juniors are more vigilant than seniors to detect the incoming parent. When positioned at the back of the nest, the senior looked relatively more frequently towards its sibling than the junior did in the same situation. This suggests that when the likelihood of obtaining a food item is relatively low, seniors are more vigilant than juniors to observe their sibling. Because vigilance was not related to hunger level and prey obtaining, we propose the hypothesis that vigilance towards parents and siblings only indirectly influences the outcome of sibling competition.