The empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent, yet accountable. This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability 'regimes' in which they are embedded. It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors (accountability fora) to which agencies are formally accountable (parliamentary committees, auditing bodies, courts, and so on) and to consider possible relationships between them. It argues that formal accountability 'on paper', as defined in official documents, does not fully account for de facto accountability, which depends on the resources possessed by the fora (mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities) and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities. The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.

The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability revisited through four Swiss cases

Accountability and transparency are of growing importance in contemporary governance. The academic literature have broadly studied the two concepts separately, defining and redefining them, and including them into various framework, sometimes mistakenly using them as synonyms. The relationship between the two concepts has, curiously, only been studied by a few scholars with preliminary approaches. This theoretical paper will focus on both concepts, trying first to describe them taking into account the various evolutions in the literature and the recent evolutions as well as the first attempts to link the two concepts. In order to show a new approach linking the concepts, four cases from the Swiss context will be portrayed and will demonstrate the necessity to reconsider the relationship between transparency and accountability. Consequently, a new framework, based on Fox's framework (2007) will be presented and theoretically delimited.

The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability revisited through four Swiss cases

Accountability and transparency are of growing importance in contemporary governance. The academic literature have broadly studied the two concepts separately, defining and redefining them, and including them into various framework, sometimes mistakenly using them as synonyms. The relationship between the two concepts has, curiously, only been studied by a few scholars with preliminary approaches. This theoretical paper will focus on both concepts, trying first to describe them taking into account the various evolutions in the literature and the recent evolutions as well as the first attempts to link the two concepts. In order to show a new approach linking the concepts, four cases from the Swiss context will be portrayed and will demonstrate the necessity to reconsider the relationship between transparency and accountability. Consequently, a new framework, based on Fox's framework (2007) will be presented and theoretically delimited.

The Impact of Supervisor's Advice, Codes of Conduct, Accountability and Moral Attentiveness of Individuals on Discriminatory Behaviour Against Immigrants.

Past studies on the personnel selection demonstrated that a supervisor's advice to discriminate can lead to compliant behaviours. This study had the aim to extend past findings by examining what can overcome the powerful influence of the hierarchy. 50 Swiss managers participated to an in-basket exercise. The main task was to evaluate Swiss candidates (in-group) and foreigners (out-groups: Spanish and Kosovo Albanians) and to select two applicants for a job interview. Main results were the effect of codes of conduct to prevent discrimination against out-group applicants in the presence of a supervisor's advice to prefer in-group members. But, when participants were accountable to an audience, this beneficial effect disappears because participants followed the supervisor's advice. The second aim was to assess if the difference in responses between participants was related to their difference in moral attentiveness. Results showed some significant relationships but not always in the direction expected.