The normative dimension of social life from a second-person perspective

This thesis argues that insofar as we want to account for the normative dimension of social life, we must be careful to avoid construing that normative dimension in such a way as to exclude that which the second-person perspective reveals is important to social life and our ability to participate in it.¦The second-person perspective reveals that social life ought to be understood as a mix or balance of the regular and the irregular, where, in addition, those one interacts with are always to some extent experienced as other in a way that is neither immediately, nor perhaps ultimately, understandable. For persons to be able to participate in social life, conceived of in this way, they must have abilities that allow them to be, to some extent, hesitant and tentative in their relations with others, and thus tolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty and unpredictability, and responsive to and capable of learning from the otherness of others in the course of interacting with them.¦Incorporating the second-person perspective means we have to make some changes to the way we think about the normative in general, and the normative dimension of social life in particular. It does not mean giving up on the distinction between the normative and the regular - that continues to be fundamentally important but it does mean not excluding, as part of social life and as worthy of explanation, all that which is irregular. A radical way of putting it would be to say that there must be a sense in which the irregular is part of the normative. A less radical way, and the way adopted by this thesis, is to say that any account of the normative dimension of social life must not be such as to exclude the importance of irregularity from social life. This will mean 1) not characterising conventions, norms and rules as determinants of appropriateness and inappropriateness; 2) not thinking of them as necessary; 3) not thinking of them as necessarily governing minds; and 4) not thinking of them as necessarily shared.¦-¦L'argument principal de la thèse est que, pour rendre compte de la dimension normative de la vie sociale, il faut veiller à ne pas exclure la perspective de la deuxième personne - une perspective importante pour comprendre la vie sociale et la capacité requise pour y participer.¦Cette perspective nous permet d'imaginer la vie sociale comme un mélange ou un équilibre entre le régulier et l'irrégulier, l'interaction entre des individus pouvant être appréhendée comme l'expérience de chaque personne avec «l'autre» d'une manière qui n'est pas immédiatement compréhensible, et qui ne peut pas, peut-être, être ultimement comprise. Pour participer à la vie sociale, l'on doit avoir la capacité de rester hésitant et «réactif» dans ses relations avec les autres, de rester ouvert à leur altérité et de tolérer l'ambiguïté, l'incertitude et l'imprévisibilité des interactions sociales.¦Adopter une perspective «à la deuxième personne» conduit à une autre manière de penser la normativité en général, et la dimension normative de la vie sociale en particulier. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il faut abandonner la distinction entre le normatif et le régulier - une distinction qui garde une importance fondamentale - mais qu'il faut reconnaître l'irrégulier comme faisant partie de la vie sociale et comme étant digne, en tant que tel, d'être expliqué. Une conception radicale pourrait même concevoir l'irrégulier comme faisant partie intégrante de la normativité. Une approche moins radicale, qui est celle adoptée dans cette thèse, est de dire que tout compte-rendu de la dimension normative de la vie sociale doit prendre en considération l'importance de l'irrégularité dans la vie sociale. Une telle approche implique que les conventions, normes et règles (1) ne déterminent pas ce qui est approprié ou inapproprié; (2) ne sont pas toujours nécessaires ; (3) ne gouvernent pas le fonctionnement de l'esprit ; et (4) ne sont pas nécessairement partagées.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Théologie et bioéthique. Une perspective protestante

La contribution de l'éthique protestante au débat bioéthique est fortement dépendante de la situation confessionnelle des pays considérés. En Suisse, l'équilibre entre points de vue laïques, protestants et catholiques oblige à réfléchir à la condition pluraliste d'une éthique de la discussion de type démocratique. Les convictions protestantes y trouvent un terrain propice, dans le sens d'une éthique ouverte sur les représentations symboliques et religieuses dont la transcendance porte trace.