Partitioning of reproduction in mother-daughter versus sibling associations : a test of optimal skew theory

A critical feature of cooperative animal societies is the reproductive skew, a shorthand term for the degree to which a dominant individual monopolizes overall reproduction in the group. Our theoretical analysis of the evolutionarily stable skew in matrifilial (i.e., mother-daughter) societies, in which relatednesses to offspring are asymmetrical, predicts that reproductive skews in such societies should tend to be greater than those of semisocial societies (i.e., societies composed of individuals of the same generation, such as siblings), in which relatednesses to offspring are symmetrical. Quantitative data on reproductive skews in semisocial and matrifilial associations within the same species for 17 eusocial Hymenoptera support this prediction. Likewise, a survey of reproductive partitioning within 20 vertebrate societies demonstrates that complete reproductive monopoly is more likely to occur in matrifilial than in semisocial societies, also as predicted by the optimal skew model.

The Swiss Business Elite (1980-2000): How the Changing Composition of the Elite Explains the Decline of the Swiss Company Network

In this paper we analyse the decline of the Swiss corporate network between 1980 and 2000. We address the theoretical and methodological challenge of this transformation by the use of a combination of network analysis and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). Based on a sample of top managers of the 110 largest Swiss companies in 1980 and 2000 we show that, beyond an adjustment to structural pressure, an explanation of the decline of the network has to include the strategies of the fractions of the business elites. We reveal that three factors contribute crucially to the decline of the Swiss corporate network: the managerialization of industrial leaders, the marginalization of law degree holders and the influx of hardly connected foreign managers.

Normalisation informatique et marchés de services : le cas du XML

Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a generic computing language that provides an outstanding case study of commodification of service standards. The development of this language in the late 1990s marked a shift in computer science as its extensibility let store and share any kind of data. Many office suites software rely on it. The chapter highlights how the largest multinational firms pay special attention to gain a recognised international standard for such a major technological innovation. It argues that standardisation processes affects market structures and can lead to market capture. By examining how a strategic use of standardisation arenas can generate profits, it shows that Microsoft succeeded in making its own technical solution a recognised ISO standard in 2008, while the same arena already adopted two years earlier the open source standard set by IBM and Sun Microsystems. Yet XML standardisation also helped to establish a distinct model of information technology services at the expense of Microsoft monopoly on proprietary software

Behavioural queueing : cellular automata and a laboratory experiment

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions les aspects comportementaux d'agents qui interagissent dans des systèmes de files d'attente à l'aide de modèles de simulation et de méthodologies expérimentales. Chaque période les clients doivent choisir un prestataire de servivce. L'objectif est d'analyser l'impact des décisions des clients et des prestataires sur la formation des files d'attente. Dans un premier cas nous considérons des clients ayant un certain degré d'aversion au risque. Sur la base de leur perception de l'attente moyenne et de la variabilité de cette attente, ils forment une estimation de la limite supérieure de l'attente chez chacun des prestataires. Chaque période, ils choisissent le prestataire pour lequel cette estimation est la plus basse. Nos résultats indiquent qu'il n'y a pas de relation monotone entre le degré d'aversion au risque et la performance globale. En effet, une population de clients ayant un degré d'aversion au risque intermédiaire encoure généralement une attente moyenne plus élevée qu'une population d'agents indifférents au risque ou très averses au risque. Ensuite, nous incorporons les décisions des prestataires en leur permettant d'ajuster leur capacité de service sur la base de leur perception de la fréquence moyenne d'arrivées. Les résultats montrent que le comportement des clients et les décisions des prestataires présentent une forte "dépendance au sentier". En outre, nous montrons que les décisions des prestataires font converger l'attente moyenne pondérée vers l'attente de référence du marché. Finalement, une expérience de laboratoire dans laquelle des sujets jouent le rôle de prestataire de service nous a permis de conclure que les délais d'installation et de démantèlement de capacité affectent de manière significative la performance et les décisions des sujets. En particulier, les décisions du prestataire, sont influencées par ses commandes en carnet, sa capacité de service actuellement disponible et les décisions d'ajustement de capacité qu'il a prises, mais pas encore implémentées. - Queuing is a fact of life that we witness daily. We all have had the experience of waiting in line for some reason and we also know that it is an annoying situation. As the adage says "time is money"; this is perhaps the best way of stating what queuing problems mean for customers. Human beings are not very tolerant, but they are even less so when having to wait in line for service. Banks, roads, post offices and restaurants are just some examples where people must wait for service. Studies of queuing phenomena have typically addressed the optimisation of performance measures (e.g. average waiting time, queue length and server utilisation rates) and the analysis of equilibrium solutions. The individual behaviour of the agents involved in queueing systems and their decision making process have received little attention. Although this work has been useful to improve the efficiency of many queueing systems, or to design new processes in social and physical systems, it has only provided us with a limited ability to explain the behaviour observed in many real queues. In this dissertation we differ from this traditional research by analysing how the agents involved in the system make decisions instead of focusing on optimising performance measures or analysing an equilibrium solution. This dissertation builds on and extends the framework proposed by van Ackere and Larsen (2004) and van Ackere et al. (2010). We focus on studying behavioural aspects in queueing systems and incorporate this still underdeveloped framework into the operations management field. In the first chapter of this thesis we provide a general introduction to the area, as well as an overview of the results. In Chapters 2 and 3, we use Cellular Automata (CA) to model service systems where captive interacting customers must decide each period which facility to join for service. They base this decision on their expectations of sojourn times. Each period, customers use new information (their most recent experience and that of their best performing neighbour) to form expectations of sojourn time at the different facilities. Customers update their expectations using an adaptive expectations process to combine their memory and their new information. We label "conservative" those customers who give more weight to their memory than to the xiv Summary new information. In contrast, when they give more weight to new information, we call them "reactive". In Chapter 2, we consider customers with different degree of risk-aversion who take into account uncertainty. They choose which facility to join based on an estimated upper-bound of the sojourn time which they compute using their perceptions of the average sojourn time and the level of uncertainty. We assume the same exogenous service capacity for all facilities, which remains constant throughout. We first analyse the collective behaviour generated by the customers' decisions. We show that the system achieves low weighted average sojourn times when the collective behaviour results in neighbourhoods of customers loyal to a facility and the customers are approximately equally split among all facilities. The lowest weighted average sojourn time is achieved when exactly the same number of customers patronises each facility, implying that they do not wish to switch facility. In this case, the system has achieved the Nash equilibrium. We show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of risk-aversion and system performance. Customers with an intermediate degree of riskaversion typically achieve higher sojourn times; in particular they rarely achieve the Nash equilibrium. Risk-neutral customers have the highest probability of achieving the Nash Equilibrium. Chapter 3 considers a service system similar to the previous one but with risk-neutral customers, and relaxes the assumption of exogenous service rates. In this sense, we model a queueing system with endogenous service rates by enabling managers to adjust the service capacity of the facilities. We assume that managers do so based on their perceptions of the arrival rates and use the same principle of adaptive expectations to model these perceptions. We consider service systems in which the managers' decisions take time to be implemented. Managers are characterised by a profile which is determined by the speed at which they update their perceptions, the speed at which they take decisions, and how coherent they are when accounting for their previous decisions still to be implemented when taking their next decision. We find that the managers' decisions exhibit a strong path-dependence: owing to the initial conditions of the model, the facilities of managers with identical profiles can evolve completely differently. In some cases the system becomes "locked-in" into a monopoly or duopoly situation. The competition between managers causes the weighted average sojourn time of the system to converge to the exogenous benchmark value which they use to estimate their desired capacity. Concerning the managers' profile, we found that the more conservative Summary xv a manager is regarding new information, the larger the market share his facility achieves. Additionally, the faster he takes decisions, the higher the probability that he achieves a monopoly position. In Chapter 4 we consider a one-server queueing system with non-captive customers. We carry out an experiment aimed at analysing the way human subjects, taking on the role of the manager, take decisions in a laboratory regarding the capacity of a service facility. We adapt the model proposed by van Ackere et al (2010). This model relaxes the assumption of a captive market and allows current customers to decide whether or not to use the facility. Additionally the facility also has potential customers who currently do not patronise it, but might consider doing so in the future. We identify three groups of subjects whose decisions cause similar behavioural patterns. These groups are labelled: gradual investors, lumpy investors, and random investor. Using an autocorrelation analysis of the subjects' decisions, we illustrate that these decisions are positively correlated to the decisions taken one period early. Subsequently we formulate a heuristic to model the decision rule considered by subjects in the laboratory. We found that this decision rule fits very well for those subjects who gradually adjust capacity, but it does not capture the behaviour of the subjects of the other two groups. In Chapter 5 we summarise the results and provide suggestions for further work. Our main contribution is the use of simulation and experimental methodologies to explain the collective behaviour generated by customers' and managers' decisions in queueing systems as well as the analysis of the individual behaviour of these agents. In this way, we differ from the typical literature related to queueing systems which focuses on optimising performance measures and the analysis of equilibrium solutions. Our work can be seen as a first step towards understanding the interaction between customer behaviour and the capacity adjustment process in queueing systems. This framework is still in its early stages and accordingly there is a large potential for further work that spans several research topics. Interesting extensions to this work include incorporating other characteristics of queueing systems which affect the customers' experience (e.g. balking, reneging and jockeying); providing customers and managers with additional information to take their decisions (e.g. service price, quality, customers' profile); analysing different decision rules and studying other characteristics which determine the profile of customers and managers.

Du capitalisme familial au capitalisme financier? : le cas de l'industrie suisse des machines, de l'électrotechnique et de la métallurgie au 20e siècle

L'objectif principal de cette thèse consiste à mettre en évidence la persistance du capitalisme familial en Suisse au cours du 20e siècle, et sa résistance aux capitalismes managérial et financier qui sont censés lui avoir succédé. Pour ce faire, nous avons retenu vingt-deux grandes entreprises du secteur des machines, de l'électrotechnique et de la métallurgie - principale branche de l'industrie suisse pour la période considérée -, pour lesquelles ont été recensés les membres des conseils d'administration et les principaux dirigeants exécutifs pour cinq dates- repère couvrant le siècle (1910, 1937, 1957, 1980 et 2000). Cette thèse s'inscrit dans une démarche pluridisciplinaire qui relève à la fois de l'histoire d'entreprise et de la sociologie des dirigeants, et fait appel à différentes méthodes telles que l'analyse de réseau et l'analyse prosopographique. Elle s'articule autour de trois axes de recherche principaux : le premier vise à mettre en évidence l'évolution des modes de gouvernance dans notre groupe d'entreprises, le second investit la question de la coordination patronale et le troisième a pour but de dresser un portrait collectif des élites à la tête de nos vingt-deux firmes. Nos résultats montrent que durant la majeure partie du siècle, la plupart de nos entreprises sont contrôlées par des familles et fonctionnent sur un mode de coordination hors marché qui repose notamment sur un réseau dense de liens interfirmes, le profil des dirigeants restant dans l'ensemble stable. Si la fin du siècle est marquée par plusieurs changements qui confirment l'avènement d'un capitalisme dit financier ou actionnarial et la mise en place de pratiques plus concurrentielles parmi les firmes et les élites industrielles, le maintien du contrôle familial dans plusieurs entreprises et la persistance de certains anciens mécanismes de coopération nous incitent cependant à nuancer ce constat. - The main objective of this research is to highlight the persistence of family capitalism in Switzerland during the 20th century and its resistance to managerial and financial capitalisms that succeeded. For this purpose, we focus on twenty- two big companies of the machine, electrotechnical and metallurgy sector - the main branch of the Swiss industry for the considered period - whose boards of directors and executive managers have been identified for five benchmarks across the century (1910, 1937, 1957, 1980 and 2000). This thesis relates to business history and elites sociology, and uses different methods such as network analysis and prosopography. It is articulated around three main parts. The aim of the first one is to identify the evolution of corporate governance in our twenty-two enterprises, the second part concentrates on interfirms coordination and the objective of the last one is to highlight the profile of the corporate elite leading our firms. Our results show that during the main part of the century, most of the companies were controlled by families and were characterized by non-market mechanisms of coordination such as interlocking directorates ; moreover, the profile of the corporate elite remained very stable. Although some major changes that took place by the end of the century confirmed a transition towards financial capitalism and more competitive interaction among firms and the corporate elite, the persistence of family control in several companies and the maintaining of some former mechanisms of coordination allow us to put this evolution into perspective.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

The conditions for the reproduction of the SAGUAPAC water cooperative in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia : discourse analysis

The SAGUAPAC cooperative in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Eastern Bolivia) is regularly presented as an example of cooperative successes regarding water supply and sanitation. Its efficiency, both economic and technical, is widely considered as the main reason for its attractiveness. However, without denying its importance, we show, through a discourse analysis from and about SAGUAPAC in local media, that moral and non-instrumental factors are crucial in the reproduction of the cooperative. These factors create attachment and affection toward the cooperative, through a storytelling using a four-dimensional rhetoric (mythification, identification, emotionalisation and personification). This storytelling technique, internalized in the local media discourse and materializing the so-called new spirit of capitalism, exploits the affects and instrumentalisation of local myths and legends, as well as the 'camba' ethnic identity. In that, it tends to retain SAGUAPAC members and to canvass new ones, by providing them with recognition in their quality of local community members. However, the mobilisation of social norms and power hierarchies might end up reinforcing the social exclusion of Andean non-camba immigrants, inspite of an a priori inclusive and democratic organisation.

A rationalist perspective on the autonomy of international sport governing bodies : towards a pragmatic autonomy in the steering of sports

International sport governing bodies (ISGBs) are built on the foundations of freedom of association and traditionally enjoy a large degree of autonomy in their decision-making. Their autonomy is increasingly confined, however, and their hierarchical self-governance is giving way to a more networked governance, in which different stakeholders exert power in different ways and in different contexts in a complex web of interrelationships. Taking a rationalist perspective on the autonomy of ISGBs, this article demonstrates that ISGBs are deploying strategies to safeguard their waning governing monopoly over international sport. Opting for an inductive approach, the authors present four possible conceptualizations of autonomy as applied to ISGBs, namely political autonomy, legal autonomy, financial autonomy and pyramidal autonomy. For each dimension, they describe the different strategies ISGBs wield in order to safeguard different dimensions of their autonomy. This article uses governance theories to hypothesize that the autonomy of ISGBs can be understood as 'pragmatic autonomy' since ISGBs only cede certain aspects of their autonomy under particular circumstances and when being subject to specific threats. Acting in a rationalist manner, they are able to keep control over governance developments in sport by using indirect and more subtle forms of governance.