The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data.

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated.Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as 'very good'. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves 'bad risks' also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance.

Do PES Improve the Governance of Forest Restoration?

Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are praised as innovative policy instruments and they influence the governance of forest restoration efforts in two major ways. The first is the establishment of multi-stakeholder agencies as intermediary bodies between funders and planters to manage the funds and to distribute incentives to planters. The second implication is that specific contracts assign objectives to land users in the form of conditions for payments that are believed to increase the chances for sustained impacts on the ground. These implications are important in the assessment of the potential of PES to operate as new and effective funding schemes for forest restoration. They are analyzed by looking at two prominent payments for watershed service programs in Indonesia-Cidanau (Banten province in Java) and West Lombok (Eastern Indonesia)-with combined economic and political science approaches. We derive lessons for the governance of funding efforts (e.g., multi-stakeholder agencies are not a guarantee of success; mixed results are obtained from a reliance on mandatory funding with ad hoc regulations, as opposed to voluntary contributions by the service beneficiary) and for the governance of financial expenditure (e.g., absolute need for evaluation procedures for the internal governance of farmer groups). Furthermore, we observe that these governance features provide no guarantee that restoration plots with the highest relevance for ecosystem services are targeted by the PES

Winner's curse in toll road concessions

We empirically assess the effect of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concessions, taking into account, to our knowledge for the first time, problems of commitment and enforcement, using a unique dataset of 49 worldwide road concessions.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Venture capital financing : screening and contracting under assymetric information

Structure of the Thesis This thesis consists of 5 sections. Section 1 starts with the problem definition and the presentation of the objectives of this thesis. Section 2 introduces a presentation of the theoretical foundations of Venture financing and a review of the main theories developed on Venture investing. It includes a taxonomy of contracting clauses relevant in venture contracting, the conflicts they address, and presents some general observations on contractual clauses. Section 3 presents the research findings on the analysis of a European VC's deal flow and investment screening linked to the prevailing market conditions. Section 4 focuses an empirical study of a European VC's investment process, the criteria it uses to make its investments. It presents empirical findings on the investment criteria over time, business cycles, and investment types. It also links these criteria to the VC's subsequent performance. Finally, section 5 presents an empirical research on the comparison of the legal contracts signed between European and United States Venture Capitalists and the companies they finance. This research highlights some of the contracting practices in Europe and the United States.

A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns

In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (a) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (b) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into account. Theory shows and experiments confirm that, even if fairness concerns were to exert only weak effects in one-shot interactions, repeated interactions greatly magnify the relevance of such concerns on economic outcomes. We also review evidence from laboratory and field experiments examining the role of wages and fairness on effort, derive predictions from our approach for entry-level wages and incumbent workers' wages, confront these predictions with the evidence, and show that reference-dependent fairness concerns may have important consequences for the effects of economic policies such as minimum wage laws.

Resilient housing : a new resource-oriented approach

The institutional regimes framework has previously been applied to the institutional conditions that support or hinder the sustainability of housing stocks. This resource-based approach identifies the actors across different sectors that have an interest in housing, how they use housing, the mechanisms affecting their use (public policy, use rights, contracts, etc.) and the effects of their uses on the sustainability of housing within the context of the built environment. The potential of the institutional regimes framework is explored for its suitability to the many considerations of housing resilience. By identifying all the goods and services offered by the resource 'housing stock', researchers and decision-makers could improve the resilience of housing by better accounting for the ecosystem services used by housing, decreasing the vulnerability of housing to disturbances, and maximizing recovery and reorganization following a disturbance. The institutional regimes framework is found to be a promising tool for addressing housing resilience. Further questions are raised for translating this conceptual framework into a practical application underpinned with empirical data.

Modeling and mitigation of supply-demand mismatches

In this thesis, I develop analytical models to price the value of supply chain investments under demand uncer¬tainty. This thesis includes three self-contained papers. In the first paper, we investigate the value of lead-time reduction under the risk of sudden and abnormal changes in demand forecasts. We first consider the risk of a complete and permanent loss of demand. We then provide a more general jump-diffusion model, where we add a compound Poisson process to a constant-volatility demand process to explore the impact of sudden changes in demand forecasts on the value of lead-time reduction. We use an Edgeworth series expansion to divide the lead-time cost into that arising from constant instantaneous volatility, and that arising from the risk of jumps. We show that the value of lead-time reduction increases substantially in the intensity and/or the magnitude of jumps. In the second paper, we analyze the value of quantity flexibility in the presence of supply-chain dis- intermediation problems. We use the multiplicative martingale model and the "contracts as reference points" theory to capture both positive and negative effects of quantity flexibility for the downstream level in a supply chain. We show that lead-time reduction reduces both supply-chain disintermediation problems and supply- demand mismatches. We furthermore analyze the impact of the supplier's cost structure on the profitability of quantity-flexibility contracts. When the supplier's initial investment cost is relatively low, supply-chain disin¬termediation risk becomes less important, and hence the contract becomes more profitable for the retailer. We also find that the supply-chain efficiency increases substantially with the supplier's ability to disintermediate the chain when the initial investment cost is relatively high. In the third paper, we investigate the value of dual sourcing for the products with heavy-tailed demand distributions. We apply extreme-value theory and analyze the effects of tail heaviness of demand distribution on the optimal dual-sourcing strategy. We find that the effects of tail heaviness depend on the characteristics of demand and profit parameters. When both the profit margin of the product and the cost differential between the suppliers are relatively high, it is optimal to buffer the mismatch risk by increasing both the inventory level and the responsive capacity as demand uncertainty increases. In that case, however, both the optimal inventory level and the optimal responsive capacity decrease as the tail of demand becomes heavier. When the profit margin of the product is relatively high, and the cost differential between the suppliers is relatively low, it is optimal to buffer the mismatch risk by increasing the responsive capacity and reducing the inventory level as the demand uncertainty increases. In that case, how¬ever, it is optimal to buffer with more inventory and less capacity as the tail of demand becomes heavier. We also show that the optimal responsive capacity is higher for the products with heavier tails when the fill rate is extremely high.

The Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks : The conventions-programs as a new partnership model for vertical cooperation ?

This research examines the impacts of the Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks which was accepted in 2004 and implemented in 2008 to "re-assign" the responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons. The public tasks were redistributed, according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Seven tasks came under exclusive federal responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two "common tasks" were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common tasks it wasn't possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order to deal with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the conventions-programs (CPs), which are public law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton. These CPs are generally valid for periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently being prepared. By using the principal-agent theory I examine how contracts can improve political relations between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (canton). I also provide a first qualitative analysis by examining the impacts of these contracts on the vertical cooperation and on the implication of different actors by focusing my study on five CPs - protection of cultural heritage and conservation of historic monuments, encouragement of the integration of foreigners, economic development, protection against noise and protection of the nature and landscape - applied in five cantons, which represents twenty-five cases studies.

Management Control for Corporate Sustainability Execution: The Role of Employee Compensation

The research described in this thesis examines the characteristics, the benefits and the challenges associated with the implementation of management accounting systems in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Applied to the CSR context, management accounting relates to the identification, elaboration and communication of information about an organization's interactions with the society and the environment. Based on this information, firms are able to make decisions to achieve social and environmental objectives and provide evidence justifying the benefits and the costs of such actions. The study begins by focusing on green management and exploring the characteristics of Environmental Management Accounting (EMA) systems within firms. The first chapter informs the reader about the growing body of EMA research and reveals unexplored relevant aspects that need to be further investigated. The work also emphasizes the importance of developing new theoretical hypotheses and appropriate research designs to empirically tackle new aspects of EMA and gain understanding on the use of these practices. Subsequently, given the acknowledged importance of control systems in influencing the behaviour of individuals within organizations, the remaining two chapters of the dissertation focus on the functioning of CSR-linked incentives assigned to employees in the form of compensation plans. The second chapter examines the determinants influencing corporate provision of incentives for the attainment of environmental targets. Empirical analysis of a sample of international firms reveals that companies are likely to use green incentives as mechanisms to increase the efficacy in contracting with their employees as well as to respond to social influences. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effectiveness of contracting associated with the use of CSR-linked executive compensation. Empirical analysis of a sample of US-based companies shows that corporate choice to tie senior executives' pay to CSR targets promotes the firm's CSR performance. Cette thèse examine les caractéristiques, avantages et défis associés à l'utilisation des systèmes de contrôle de gestion dans le domaine de la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE). Dans le contexte de la RSE, les activités du contrôle de gestion impliquent l'identification, l'élaboration et la communication d'informations qui concernent les interactions des organisations avec la société et l'environnement. Avec ces informations les entreprises sont en mesure de prendre des décisions visant à atteindre les objectifs sociaux et environnementaux de l'organisation et de documenter les bénéfices et coûts de ces actions. Dès le début, la thèse se concentre sur les caractéristiques des systèmes de contrôle de gestion environnementale au sein des entreprises. Le premier chapitre passe en revue la littérature existante et révèle des aspects inexplorés. Pour ce faire, le travail suggère le développement de nouvelles théories ainsi que l'utilisation de méthodes appropriées. Ces dernières doivent permettre d'aborder empiriquement de nouveaux aspects des systèmes de contrôle environnemental et faciliter la compréhension sur l'utilisation de ces pratiques. Considérant l'importance des systèmes de contrôle pour influencer le comportement des individus au sein des organisations, la suite du travail se concentre sur le fonctionnement des contrats de rémunération des employées liées aux résultats de la RSE. Plus particulièrement, le deuxième chapitre examine les facteurs qui influencent la décision des entreprises d'assigner des objectifs environnementaux aux employées. L'analyse empirique d'un échantillon d'entreprises internationales montre que les entreprises sont susceptibles d'utiliser des mécanismes incitatifs écologiques pour augmenter l'efficacité des contrats ainsi que pour répondre aux influences sociales. Finalement, le troisième chapitre analyse l'efficacité des contrats de rémunération des dirigeants liés aux résultats de la RSE. L'analyse empirique d'un échantillon de sociétés américaines indique que le choix de l'entreprise de lier la rémunération des dirigeants à des objectifs de la RSE favorise la performance RSE de l'organisation.