How important are interview methods and questionnaire designs in research on self-reported juvenile delinquency? An experimental comparison of internet vs. paper-and-pencil questionnaires and different definitions of the reference period

There has been relatively little change over recent decades in the methods used in research on self-reported delinquency. Face-to-face interviews and selfadministered interviews in the classroom are still the predominant alternatives envisaged. New methods have been brought into the picture by recent computer technology, the Internet, and an increasing availability of computer equipment and Internet access in schools. In the autumn of 2004, a controlled experiment was conducted with 1,203 students in Lausanne (Switzerland), where "paper-and-pencil" questionnaires were compared with computer-assisted interviews through the Internet. The experiment included a test of two different definitions of the (same) reference period. After the introductory question ("Did you ever..."), students were asked how many times they had done it (or experienced it), if ever, "over the last 12 months" or "since the October 2003 vacation". Few significant differences were found between the results obtained by the two methods and for the two definitions of the reference period, in the answers concerning victimisation, self-reported delinquency, drug use, failure to respond (missing data). Students were found to be more motivated to respond through the Internet, take less time for filling out the questionnaire, and were apparently more confident of privacy, while the school principals were less reluctant to allow classes to be interviewed through the Internet. The Internet method also involves considerable cost reductions, which is a critical advantage if self-reported delinquency surveys are to become a routinely applied method of evaluation, particularly so in countries with limited resources. On balance, the Internet may be instrumental in making research on self-reported delinquency far more feasible in situations where limited resources so far have prevented its implementation.

High prevalence of the metabolic syndrome in HIV-infected patients: impact of different definitions of the metabolic syndrome.

INTRODUCTION: This study describes the characteristics of the metabolic syndrome in HIV-positive patients in the Data Collection on Adverse Events of Anti-HIV Drugs study and discusses the impact of different methodological approaches on estimates of the prevalence of metabolic syndrome over time. METHODS: We described the prevalence of the metabolic syndrome in patients under follow-up at the end of six calendar periods from 2000 to 2007. The definition that was used for the metabolic syndrome was modified to take account of the use of lipid-lowering and antihypertensive medication, measurement variability and missing values, and assessed the impact of these modifications on the estimated prevalence. RESULTS: For all definitions considered, there was an increasing prevalence of the metabolic syndrome over time, although the prevalence estimates themselves varied widely. Using our primary definition, we found an increase in prevalence from 19.4% in 2000/2001 to 41.6% in 2006/2007. Modification of the definition to incorporate antihypertensive and lipid-lowering medication had relatively little impact on the prevalence estimates, as did modification to allow for missing data. In contrast, modification to allow the metabolic syndrome to be reversible and to allow for measurement variability lowered prevalence estimates substantially. DISCUSSION: The prevalence of the metabolic syndrome in cohort studies is largely based on the use of nonstandardized measurements as they are captured in daily clinical care. As a result, bias is easily introduced, particularly when measurements are both highly variable and may be missing. We suggest that the prevalence of the metabolic syndrome in cohort studies should be based on two consecutive measurements of the laboratory components in the syndrome definition.

Host and viral genetic correlates of clinical definitions of HIV-1 disease progression.

Background: Various patterns of HIV-1 disease progression are described in clinical practice and in research. There is a need to assess the specificity of commonly used definitions of long term non-progressor (LTNP) elite controllers (LTNP-EC), viremic controllers (LTNP-VC), and viremic non controllers (LTNP-NC), as well as of chronic progressors (P) and rapid progressors (RP). Methodology and Principal Findings: We re-evaluated the HIV-1 clinical definitions, summarized in Table 1, using the information provided by a selected number of host genetic markers and viral factors. There is a continuous decrease of protective factors and an accumulation of risk factors from LTNP-EC to RP. Statistical differences in frequency of protective HLA-B alleles (p-0.01), HLA-C rs9264942 (p-0.06), and protective CCR5/CCR2 haplotypes (p-0.02) across groups, and the presence of viruses with an ancestral genotype in the "viral dating" (i.e., nucleotide sequences with low viral divergence from the most recent common ancestor) support the differences among principal clinical groups of HIV-1 infected individuals. Conclusions: A combination of host genetic and viral factors supports current clinical definitions that discriminate among patterns of HIV-1 progression. The study also emphasizes the need to apply a standardized and accepted set of clinical definitions for the purpose of disease stratification and research.

Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.