28 resultados para crises organizacionais
Resumo:
Psychogenic non epileptic seizures (PNES) look like epilepsy, but are not accompanied by the electrophysiological alterations found in epilepsy. The diagnosis requires a complex process at the interface between neurology and psychiatry. Diagnostic restitution to the patient and treatment of the condition should be a collaboration between neurologist and psychiatrist including as much as possible a general practitioner. Vulnerability and triggering psycho-social factors, as well as frequent psychiatric co morbidity implicate that psychiatric-psychological care is needed in a majority of situations, however this cannot be done without a strong "somatic back-up" with rapid access to somatic facility for advice and care when needed. The neurological presentation of the disease, with psychiatric causes underlying the condition, bear the risk for the patient that neither neurological nor psychiatric care is offered. Current knowledge about the condition is still scarce, but the field is progressively enriched by studies with stronger methodologies. Recent neuroimaging studies open fascinating avenues on our understanding of the interplay between emotional regulation, representation of the self, and dissociative symptoms. These new avenues help our understanding of these disorders which challenge classical frontiers between neurology and psychiatry. In this paper we try to formulate a framework for the care of patient with dissociative disorders including NEPS.
Resumo:
In 1851 the French Social economist Auguste Ott discussed the problem of gluts and commercial crises, together with the issue of distributive justice between workers in co-operative societies. He did so by means of a 'simple reproduction scheme' sharing some features with modern intersectoral transactions tables, in particular in terms of their graphical representation. This paper presents Ott's theory of crises (which was based on the disappointment of expectations) and the context of his model, and discusses its peculiarities, supplying a new piece for the reconstruction of the prehistory of input-output analysis.
Resumo:
In der heutigen Welt sind die Reputation und das Image eines Landes als wichtige Faktoren für den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Erfolg angesehen. Jedoch ist die Pflege der Marke eines Landes komplex und führt zu zwei Positionen, die sich potentiell widersprechen: Einerseits kann ein positives Erscheinungsbild eines Landes durch aktive Massnahmen gefördert werden. Andererseits ist es schwierig, das Bild eines Landes abzugrenzen und es ist mit Klischees behaftet. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Auswirkungen von zwei grösseren Krisen auf das Image der Schweiz in den Vereinigten Staaten: die Krise um die nachrichtenlosen Vermögen aus der Zeit des 2. Weltkriegs im Jahr 2000 sowie die Krise um die UBS und das Bankgeheimnis im Jahr 2009. Die Studie zeigt, dass das Erscheinungsbild der Schweiz unberührt blieb, obwohl ein beachtlicher Teil der Bevölkerung und der Meinungsführer von beiden Krisen wusste. Dies stützt die Hypothese, dass das Image eines Landes eine hohe Beständigkeit aufweist. In today's world, country's reputation and image have become key issues, widely believed to be success factors both economically and politically. Nevertheless, managing a country's brand is complex and leads to two positions that are potentially contradictory: On the one hand, a country's image can be influenced either by promotional activities. On the other hand, a country's image is a construct that is very difficult to delimit and is highly stereotyped. This contribution study the impact of two major crises on the image of Switzerland in the United States: the unclaimed wartime deposits crisis in 2000 and the UBS and banking secrecy crisis in 2009. It shows that despite the fact that a substantial proportion of the public and of opinion leaders was aware of both crises, the image of Switzerland was unaffected, which tends to support the hypothesis of strong stability of a country's image.
Resumo:
Swiss municipalities are, to a large extent, responsible for their financial resources. Since these resources primarily depend on income and property taxes from individuals and enterprises, municipality budgets are likely to be directly affected by the current crisis in the financial sector and the economy. This article investigates how municipalities perceived this threat and how they reacted to it. In a nationwide survey conducted at the end of 2009 in all 2596 Swiss municipalities, we asked local secretaries which measures had been launched in order to cope with expected losses in tax income and a possible increase in welfare spending. Did the municipalities rely on Keynesian measures increasing public spending and accepting greater deficits, or did they try to avoid further deficits by using austerity measures and a withdrawal of planned investments? Our results show that only a few municipalities - mainly the bigger ones - expected to be greatly affected by the crisis. Their reactions, however, did not reveal any clear patterns that theory would lead one to expect. Preferences for austerity measures and deficit spending become visible but many municipalities took measures from both theories. The strongest explanatory factors for determining how/why municipalities react are: the municipality's level of affectedness followed by whether or not the municipality belongs to the French-speaking part of the country. Size also has an impact, whereas the strength of the Social Democrat party is negligible. Explaining what kind of measures municipalities are likely to take is more difficult. However, the more a municipality is affected, the more likely it is to stick to austerity measures.
Resumo:
Les communes suisses sont largement souveraines pour financer leurs activités. Leurs ressources proviennent avant tout de l'impôt sur le revenu et de l'impôt foncier prélevés auprès des ménages et des entreprises. Une crise, comme celle de 2008, qui touche la sphère financière et l'économie en général risque d'avoir des répercussions directes sur les budgets locaux. Dans le présent article, nous examinons la manière dont les communes perçoivent ce risque et y réagissent. Dans une enquête menée à l'échelle nationale fin 2009 dans les 2596 communes suisses, nous avons demandé aux secrétaires municipaux quelles mesures avaient été prises face aux pertes fiscales attendues et à la hausse possible des dépenses sociales suite à la crise de 2008. Des mesures keynésiennes ont-elles été prises, en augmentant les dépenses et en acceptant des déficits plus importants, ou y a-t-il eu tentative de limiter les déficits par des mesures d'austérité, notamment en restreignant les investissements prévus ? Nos résultats indiquent que quelques communes seulement (essentiellement les plus grandes) s'attendaient à être durement touchées par la crise. On n'observe cependant pas de tendance systématique et conforme à la théorie. Certes des mesures d'austérité ont été mises en place ou un déficit budgétaire a été provoqué, mais bon nombre de communes ont appliqué simultanément des mesures relevant des deux théories. L'impact perçu de la crise au niveau local et l'appartenance de la commune à la partie francophone du pays sont les principaux facteurs expliquant la réaction des communes et les raisons de cette réaction. La taille de la commune joue aussi un rôle. Mais l'influence du parti social-démocrate est négligeable. Le type de mesures que les communes sont susceptibles de prendre est plus difficile à expliquer. Cependant, plus une commune se sent touchée, plus elle s'orientera vers des mesures d'austérité.