Distinct contributions of Brodmann areas 1 and 2 to body ownership.

Although body ownership-i.e. the feeling that our bodies belong to us-modulates activity within the primary somatosensory cortex (S1), it is still unknown whether this modulation occurs within a somatotopically defined portion of S1. We induced an illusory feeling of ownership for another person's finger by asking participants to hold their palm against another person's palm and to stroke the two joined index fingers with the index and thumb of their other hand. This illusion (numbness illusion) does not occur if the stroking is performed asynchronously or by the other person. We combined this somatosensory paradigm with ultra-high field functional magnetic resonance imaging finger mapping to study whether illusory body ownership modulates activity within different finger-specific areas of S1. The results revealed that the numbness illusion is associated with activity in Brodmann area (BA) 1 within the representation of the finger stroking the other person's finger and in BA 2 contralateral to the stroked finger. These results show that changes in bodily experience modulate the activity within certain subregions of S1, with a different finger-topographical selectivity between the representations of the stroking and of the stroked hand, and reveal that the high degree of somatosensory specialization in S1 extends to bodily self-consciousness.

Ownership Effects on Unrelated Diversification: An Institutions' Perspective

Purpose To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure. Methodology/approach We draw on longitudinal data and use a panel analysis specification to test our hypotheses. Findings We find that unrelated diversification destroys value; pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners in a firm’s equity reduce unrelated diversification, whereas pressure-resistant domestic owners increase unrelated diversification; the greater the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the negative effect of pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners on unrelated diversification. Research limitations/implications We contribute to corporate governance and strategy research by bringing in owners’ institutional origin as a shaper of owner preferences in particular with regards to unrelated diversification. Future research may expand our investigation to more than one home institutional context, and theorize on institutional origin effects beyond the dichotomy between Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American (not oriented toward shareholder value maximization) owners. Practical implications Policy makers, financial analysts, owners, and managers may want to reflect about the implications of ownership structure, as well as promoting or joining corporations with particular ownership configurations. Social implications A shareholder value-destroying strategy, such as unrelated diversification has adverse consequences for society at large, in terms of opportunity costs, that is, resources could be allocated to value-creating activities instead. Promoting an ownership configuration that creates value should contribute to social welfare. Originality/value Owners may not be exclusively driven by shareholder value maximization, but can be influenced by normative beliefs (biases) stemming from the institutional context they originate from.