Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Do we fear tax competition among new and old European countries ?

The purpose of this paper is to study both theoretically and empirically tax competition in the enlarged EU and to provide some insights on ongoing reforms concerning business taxation. We support the idea that even if one can observe cuts in "new" members statutory business tax rates, this should not result in fiercer tax competition between the "core" and "the "periphery" since infrastructure endowments and the existence of agglomeration rents in the core of the EU may prevent (at least partially) activities to relocate to the "new" members.

Molecular interactions involved in the transactivation of the human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 promoter mediated by Tax and CREB-2 (ATF-4).

The human T-cell leukemia virus type 1 (HTLV-1) Tax protein activates viral transcription through three 21-bp repeats located in the U3 region of the HTLV-1 long terminal repeat and called Tax-responsive elements (TxREs). Each TxRE contains nucleotide sequences corresponding to imperfect cyclic AMP response elements (CRE). In this study, we demonstrate that the bZIP transcriptional factor CREB-2 is able to bind in vitro to the TxREs and that CREB-2 binding to each of the 21-bp motifs is enhanced by Tax. We also demonstrate that Tax can weakly interact with CREB-2 bound to a cellular palindromic CRE motif such as that found in the somatostatin promoter. Mutagenesis of Tax and CREB-2 demonstrates that both N- and C-terminal domains of Tax and the C-terminal region of CREB-2 are required for direct interaction between the two proteins. In addition, the Tax mutant M47, defective for HTLV-1 activation, is unable to form in vitro a ternary complex with CREB-2 and TxRE. In agreement with recent results suggesting that Tax can recruit the coactivator CREB-binding protein (CBP) on the HTLV-1 promoter, we provide evidence that Tax, CREB-2, and CBP are capable of cooperating to stimulate viral transcription. Taken together, our data highlight the major role played by CREB-2 in Tax-mediated transactivation.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Alleged Tax Competition: The Mysterious Death of Inheritance Taxes in Switzerland

Interjurisdictional competition over mobile tax bases is an easily understood mechanism, but actual tax-base elasticities are difficult to estimate. Political pressure for reducing tax rates could therefore be based on erroneous estimates of the mobility of tax bases. We show that tax competition provided the overwhelmingly dominant argument in the policy debates leading to a succession of reforms of bequest taxation by Swiss cantons. Yet, we find only very weak statistical evidence of a relationship between tax burdens on bequests and the concerned tax base of wealthy elderly individuals. Moreover, inheritance tax revenues are found to increase in inheritance tax rates even in the long run, and actual tax rates lie well below the revenue-maximising levels throughout. The alleged pressures of tax competition did not seem in reality to exist.

The Effect of Tax Revenue Budgeting Errors on Fiscal Balance : Evidence from Swiss cantons

This study is an empirical analysis of the impact of direct tax revenue budgeting errors on fiscal deficits. Using panel data from 26 Swiss cantons between 1980 and 2002, we estimate a single equation model on the fiscal balance, as well as a simultaneous equation model on revenue and expenditure. We use new data on budgeted and actual tax revenue to show that underestimating tax revenue significantly reduces fiscal deficits. Furthermore, we show that this effect is channeled through decreased expenditure. The effects of over and underestimation turn out to be symmetric.

Internationalization dynamics in the Swiss Corporate Tax Reform III

Over the last years, in a context of international tax competition, international and regional institutions such as the G20, the OECD, and the European Union are redefining what is acceptable in terms of corporate fiscal policy. Certain Swiss preferential tax treatments are considered by the above-mentioned institutions as harmful tax practices. As a consequence, the Swiss government has planned a third corporate tax reform (CTR III). The objective of this reform is to ensure international acceptability of the corporate tax system without prejudicing local public finances and Swiss corporate tax attractiveness. Therefore, we can posit that the CTR III is an internationalized object influenced by both regulation trends and tax competition framework. The main purpose of this paper is to provide elements of answer on how the currently discussed CTR III is influenced by the international environment, by focusing on its content as well as the reactions and positions of local stakeholders. With the help of internationalization literature, two distinct internationalization processes have been identified through the propositions of compliance measures with internationally-defined standards and competitiveness-enhancing measures. With regard to the configuration of local actors, the degree of conflict seems to be rather high. The current content of the reform is supported by the business community and right-wing parties and rejected by the unions and the Socialist Party.