The In Vitro Mass-Produced Model Mycorrhizal Fungus, Rhizophagus irregularis, Significantly Increases Yields of the Globally Important Food Security Crop Cassava.

The arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis is formed between arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (AMF) and plant roots. The fungi provide the plant with inorganic phosphate (P). The symbiosis can result in increased plant growth. Although most global food crops naturally form this symbiosis, very few studies have shown that their practical application can lead to large-scale increases in food production. Application of AMF to crops in the tropics is potentially effective for improving yields. However, a main problem of using AMF on a large-scale is producing cheap inoculum in a clean sterile carrier and sufficiently concentrated to cheaply transport. Recently, mass-produced in vitro inoculum of the model mycorrhizal fungus Rhizophagus irregularis became available, potentially making its use viable in tropical agriculture. One of the most globally important food plants in the tropics is cassava. We evaluated the effect of in vitro mass-produced R. irregularis inoculum on the yield of cassava crops at two locations in Colombia. A significant effect of R. irregularis inoculation on yield occurred at both sites. At one site, yield increases were observed irrespective of P fertilization. At the other site, inoculation with AMF and 50% of the normally applied P gave the highest yield. Despite that AMF inoculation resulted in greater food production, economic analyses revealed that AMF inoculation did not give greater return on investment than with conventional cultivation. However, the amount of AMF inoculum used was double the recommended dose and was calculated with European, not Colombian, inoculum prices. R. irregularis can also be manipulated genetically in vitro, leading to improved plant growth. We conclude that application of in vitro R. irregularis is currently a way of increasing cassava yields, that there is a strong potential for it to be economically profitable and that there is enormous potential to improve this efficiency further in the future.

When nightclub security agents assault clients more insight through a qualitative approach.

Between 2007 and 2009, aggressions by security agents of nightclubs on clients increased from 6% to 10% among community violence situations encountered at the Violence Medical Unit (VMU) at the Lausanne University Hospital in Switzerland. Most victims were young men who had been drinking alcohol before the assault. About one quarter (25.7%) presented with one or several fractures, all of them in the head area. (For more details, refer to the previous article "When nightclub security agents assault clients" published in 2012(1).) Following this first study, we performed a second qualitative study in order to bring more information about the context and highlight victims' behaviors and experiences. Four themes emerged: how the assault began; the assault itself; third-party involvement; and the psychological state of victims when they consulted the VMU. The findings of this second study complemented the statistical results of the first study by showing under what circumstances security agents of nightclubs respond with physical violence to situations they consider a threat to security. Furthermore, the study described consequences for the victims that could be quite serious. Our findings support the need for nightclubs to improve selection and training of security staff.

Information security and the enforcement of secrecy : the practical application of quantum key distribution

There is no doubt about the necessity of protecting digital communication: Citizens are entrusting their most confidential and sensitive data to digital processing and communication, and so do governments, corporations, and armed forces. Digital communication networks are also an integral component of many critical infrastructures we are seriously depending on in our daily lives. Transportation services, financial services, energy grids, food production and distribution networks are only a few examples of such infrastructures. Protecting digital communication means protecting confidentiality and integrity by encrypting and authenticating its contents. But most digital communication is not secure today. Nevertheless, some of the most ardent problems could be solved with a more stringent use of current cryptographic technologies. Quite surprisingly, a new cryptographic primitive emerges from the ap-plication of quantum mechanics to information and communication theory: Quantum Key Distribution. QKD is difficult to understand, it is complex, technically challenging, and costly-yet it enables two parties to share a secret key for use in any subsequent cryptographic task, with an unprecedented long-term security. It is disputed, whether technically and economically fea-sible applications can be found. Our vision is, that despite technical difficulty and inherent limitations, Quantum Key Distribution has a great potential and fits well with other cryptographic primitives, enabling the development of highly secure new applications and services. In this thesis we take a structured approach to analyze the practical applicability of QKD and display several use cases of different complexity, for which it can be a technology of choice, either because of its unique forward security features, or because of its practicability.

Requirement of glucose metabolism for regulation of glucose transporter type 2 (GLUT2) gene expression in liver.

Previous studies have shown that glucose increases the glucose transporter (GLUT2) mRNA expression in the liver in vivo and in vitro. Here we report an analysis of the effects of glucose metabolism on GLUT2 gene expression. GLUT2 mRNA accumulation by glucose was not due to stabilization of its transcript but rather was a direct effect on gene transcription. A proximal fragment of the 5' regulatory region of the mouse GLUT2 gene linked to a reporter gene was transiently transfected into liver GLUT2-expressing cells. Glucose stimulated reporter gene expression in these cells, suggesting that glucose-responsive elements were included within the proximal region of the promoter. A dose-dependent effect of glucose on GLUT2 expression was observed over 10 mM glucose irrespective of the hexokinase isozyme (glucokinase K(m) 16 mM; hexokinase I K(m) 0.01 mM) present in the cell type used. This suggests that the correlation between extracellular glucose and GLUT2 mRNA concentrations is simply a reflection of an activation of glucose metabolism. The mediators and the mechanism responsible for this response remain to be determined. In conclusion, glucose metabolism is required for the proper induction of the GLUT2 gene in the liver and this effect is transcriptionally regulated.

Selective requirement for c-Myc at an early stage of V(alpha)14i NKT cell development.

Valpha14 invariant (Valpha14i) NKT cells are a subset of regulatory T cells that utilize a semi-invariant TCR to recognize glycolipids associated with monomorphic CD1d molecules. During development in the thymus, CD4(+)CD8(+) Valpha14i NKT precursors recognizing endogenous CD1d-associated glycolipids on other CD4(+)CD8(+) thymocytes are selected to undergo a maturation program involving sequential expression of CD44 and NK-related markers such as NK1.1. The molecular requirements for Valpha14i NKT cell maturation, particularly at early developmental stages, remain poorly understood. In this study, we show that CD4-Cre-mediated T cell-specific inactivation of c-Myc, a broadly expressed transcription factor with a wide range of biological activities, selectively impairs Valpha14i NKT cell development without perturbing the development of conventional T cells. In the absence of c-Myc, Valpha14i NKT cell precursors are blocked at an immature CD44(low)NK1.1(-) stage in a cell autonomous fashion. Residual c-Myc-deficient immature Valpha14i NKT cells appear to proliferate normally, cannot be rescued by transgenic expression of BCL-2, and exhibit characteristic features of immature Valpha14i NKT cells such as high levels of preformed IL-4 mRNA and the transcription factor promyelocytic leukemia zinc finger. Collectively our data identify c-Myc as a critical transcription factor that selectively acts early in Valpha14i NKT cell development to promote progression beyond the CD44(low)NK1.1(-) precursor stage.

Improving telecommunication security level by integrating quantum key distribution in communication protocols

Résumé La cryptographie classique est basée sur des concepts mathématiques dont la sécurité dépend de la complexité du calcul de l'inverse des fonctions. Ce type de chiffrement est à la merci de la puissance de calcul des ordinateurs ainsi que la découverte d'algorithme permettant le calcul des inverses de certaines fonctions mathématiques en un temps «raisonnable ». L'utilisation d'un procédé dont la sécurité est scientifiquement prouvée s'avère donc indispensable surtout les échanges critiques (systèmes bancaires, gouvernements,...). La cryptographie quantique répond à ce besoin. En effet, sa sécurité est basée sur des lois de la physique quantique lui assurant un fonctionnement inconditionnellement sécurisé. Toutefois, l'application et l'intégration de la cryptographie quantique sont un souci pour les développeurs de ce type de solution. Cette thèse justifie la nécessité de l'utilisation de la cryptographie quantique. Elle montre que le coût engendré par le déploiement de cette solution est justifié. Elle propose un mécanisme simple et réalisable d'intégration de la cryptographie quantique dans des protocoles de communication largement utilisés comme les protocoles PPP, IPSec et le protocole 802.1li. Des scénarios d'application illustrent la faisabilité de ces solutions. Une méthodologie d'évaluation, selon les critères communs, des solutions basées sur la cryptographie quantique est également proposée dans ce document. Abstract Classical cryptography is based on mathematical functions. The robustness of a cryptosystem essentially depends on the difficulty of computing the inverse of its one-way function. There is no mathematical proof that establishes whether it is impossible to find the inverse of a given one-way function. Therefore, it is mandatory to use a cryptosystem whose security is scientifically proven (especially for banking, governments, etc.). On the other hand, the security of quantum cryptography can be formally demonstrated. In fact, its security is based on the laws of physics that assure the unconditional security. How is it possible to use and integrate quantum cryptography into existing solutions? This thesis proposes a method to integrate quantum cryptography into existing communication protocols like PPP, IPSec and the 802.l1i protocol. It sketches out some possible scenarios in order to prove the feasibility and to estimate the cost of such scenarios. Directives and checkpoints are given to help in certifying quantum cryptography solutions according to Common Criteria.

CYP3A7, CYP3A5, CYP3A4, and ABCB1 genetic polymorphisms, cyclosporine concentration, and dose requirement in transplant recipients.

Cyclosporine is a substrate of cytochrome P450 (CYP) 3A and of the transporter ABCB1, for which polymorphisms have been described. In particular, CYP3A5 *3/*3 genotype results in the absence of CYP3A5 activity, whereas CYP3A7 *1/*1C genotype results in high CYP3A7 expression in adults. Log-transformed dose-adjusted cyclosporine trough concentration and daily dose per weight were compared 1, 3, 6, and 12 months after transplantation between CYP3A and ABCB1 genotypes in 73 renal (n = 64) or lung (n = 9) transplant recipients. CYP3A5 expressors (*1/*3 genotype; n = 8-10) presented significantly lower dose-adjusted cyclosporine trough concentrations (P < 0.05) and required significantly higher daily doses per weight (P < 0.01) than the nonexpressors (*3/*3 genotype; n = 55-59) 1, 3, 6, and 12 months after transplantation. In addition, 7 days after transplantation, more CYP3A5 expressors had uncorrected trough cyclosporine concentration below the target concentration of 200 ng/mL than the nonexpressors (odds ratio = 7.2; 95% confidence interval = 1.4-37.3; P = 0.009). CYP3A4 rs4646437C>T influenced cyclosporine kinetics, the T carriers requiring higher cyclosporine dose. CYP3A7*1C carriers required a 1.4-fold to 1.6-fold higher cyclosporine daily dose during the first year after transplantation (P < 0.05). In conclusion, CYP3A4, CYP3A5, and CYP3A7 polymorphisms affect cyclosporine metabolism, and therefore, their genotyping could be useful, in association with therapeutic drug monitoring, to prospectively optimize cyclosporine prescription in transplant recipients. The administration of a CYP3A genotype-dependent cyclosporine starting dose should therefore be tested prospectively in a randomized controlled clinical trial to assess whether it leads to an improvement of the patients outcome after transplantation, with adequate immunosuppression and decreased toxicity.

Requirement for CARMA1 in antigen receptor-induced NF-kappa B activation and lymphocyte proliferation.

Ligation of antigen receptors (TCR, BCR) on T and B lymphocytes leads to the activation of new transcriptional programs and cell cycle progression. Antigen receptor-mediated activation of NF-kappa B, required for proliferation of B and T cells, is disrupted in T cells lacking PKC theta and in B and T cells lacking Bcl10, a caspase recruitment domain (CARD)-containing adaptor protein. CARMA1 (also called CARD11 and Bimp3), the only lymphocyte-specific member in a family of membrane-associated guanylate kinase (MAGUK) scaffolding proteins that interact with Bcl10 by way of CARD-CARD interactions, is required for TCR-induced NF-kappa B activation in Jurkat T lymphoma cells. Here we show that T cells from mice lacking CARMA1 expression were defective in recruitment of Bcl10 to clustered TCR complexes and lipid rafts, in activation of NF-kappa B, and in induction of IL-2 production. Development of CD5(+) peritoneal B cells was disrupted in these mice, as was B cell proliferation in response to both BCR and CD40 ligation. Serum immunoglobulin levels were also markedly reduced in the mutant mice. Together, these results show that CARMA1 has a central role in antigen receptor signaling that results in activation and proliferation of both B and T lymphocytes.

An assurance-based model to holistically assess the information security posture

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : Evaluating Information Security Posture within an organization is becoming a very complex task. Currently, the evaluation and assessment of Information Security are commonly performed using frameworks, methodologies and standards which often consider the various aspects of security independently. Unfortunately this is ineffective because it does not take into consideration the necessity of having a global and systemic multidimensional approach to Information Security evaluation. At the same time the overall security level is globally considered to be only as strong as its weakest link. This thesis proposes a model aiming to holistically assess all dimensions of security in order to minimize the likelihood that a given threat will exploit the weakest link. A formalized structure taking into account all security elements is presented; this is based on a methodological evaluation framework in which Information Security is evaluated from a global perspective. This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One: Information Security Evaluation issues consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the purpose of this research purpose and the Model that will be proposed. In this chapter we raise some questions with respect to "traditional evaluation methods" as well as identifying the principal elements to be addressed in this direction. Then we introduce the baseline attributes of our model and set out the expected result of evaluations according to our model. Chapter 2 is focused on the definition of Information Security to be used as a reference point for our evaluation model. The inherent concepts of the contents of a holistic and baseline Information Security Program are defined. Based on this, the most common roots-of-trust in Information Security are identified. Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the difference and the relationship between the concepts of Information Risk and Security Management. Comparing these two concepts allows us to identify the most relevant elements to be included within our evaluation model, while clearing situating these two notions within a defined framework is of the utmost importance for the results that will be obtained from the evaluation process. Chapter 4 sets out our evaluation model and the way it addresses issues relating to the evaluation of Information Security. Within this Chapter the underlying concepts of assurance and trust are discussed. Based on these two concepts, the structure of the model is developed in order to provide an assurance related platform as well as three evaluation attributes: "assurance structure", "quality issues", and "requirements achievement". Issues relating to each of these evaluation attributes are analysed with reference to sources such as methodologies, standards and published research papers. Then the operation of the model is discussed. Assurance levels, quality levels and maturity levels are defined in order to perform the evaluation according to the model. Part Two: Implementation of the Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) according to the Information Security Domains consists of four chapters. This is the section where our evaluation model is put into a welldefined context with respect to the four pre-defined Information Security dimensions: the Organizational dimension, Functional dimension, Human dimension, and Legal dimension. Each Information Security dimension is discussed in a separate chapter. For each dimension, the following two-phase evaluation path is followed. The first phase concerns the identification of the elements which will constitute the basis of the evaluation: ? Identification of the key elements within the dimension; ? Identification of the Focus Areas for each dimension, consisting of the security issues identified for each dimension; ? Identification of the Specific Factors for each dimension, consisting of the security measures or control addressing the security issues identified for each dimension. The second phase concerns the evaluation of each Information Security dimension by: ? The implementation of the evaluation model, based on the elements identified for each dimension within the first phase, by identifying the security tasks, processes, procedures, and actions that should have been performed by the organization to reach the desired level of protection; ? The maturity model for each dimension as a basis for reliance on security. For each dimension we propose a generic maturity model that could be used by every organization in order to define its own security requirements. Part three of this dissertation contains the Final Remarks, Supporting Resources and Annexes. With reference to the objectives of our thesis, the Final Remarks briefly analyse whether these objectives were achieved and suggest directions for future related research. Supporting resources comprise the bibliographic resources that were used to elaborate and justify our approach. Annexes include all the relevant topics identified within the literature to illustrate certain aspects of our approach. Our Information Security evaluation model is based on and integrates different Information Security best practices, standards, methodologies and research expertise which can be combined in order to define an reliable categorization of Information Security. After the definition of terms and requirements, an evaluation process should be performed in order to obtain evidence that the Information Security within the organization in question is adequately managed. We have specifically integrated into our model the most useful elements of these sources of information in order to provide a generic model able to be implemented in all kinds of organizations. The value added by our evaluation model is that it is easy to implement and operate and answers concrete needs in terms of reliance upon an efficient and dynamic evaluation tool through a coherent evaluation system. On that basis, our model could be implemented internally within organizations, allowing them to govern better their Information Security. RÉSUMÉ : Contexte général de la thèse L'évaluation de la sécurité en général, et plus particulièrement, celle de la sécurité de l'information, est devenue pour les organisations non seulement une mission cruciale à réaliser, mais aussi de plus en plus complexe. A l'heure actuelle, cette évaluation se base principalement sur des méthodologies, des bonnes pratiques, des normes ou des standards qui appréhendent séparément les différents aspects qui composent la sécurité de l'information. Nous pensons que cette manière d'évaluer la sécurité est inefficiente, car elle ne tient pas compte de l'interaction des différentes dimensions et composantes de la sécurité entre elles, bien qu'il soit admis depuis longtemps que le niveau de sécurité globale d'une organisation est toujours celui du maillon le plus faible de la chaîne sécuritaire. Nous avons identifié le besoin d'une approche globale, intégrée, systémique et multidimensionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information. En effet, et c'est le point de départ de notre thèse, nous démontrons que seule une prise en compte globale de la sécurité permettra de répondre aux exigences de sécurité optimale ainsi qu'aux besoins de protection spécifiques d'une organisation. Ainsi, notre thèse propose un nouveau paradigme d'évaluation de la sécurité afin de satisfaire aux besoins d'efficacité et d'efficience d'une organisation donnée. Nous proposons alors un modèle qui vise à évaluer d'une manière holistique toutes les dimensions de la sécurité, afin de minimiser la probabilité qu'une menace potentielle puisse exploiter des vulnérabilités et engendrer des dommages directs ou indirects. Ce modèle se base sur une structure formalisée qui prend en compte tous les éléments d'un système ou programme de sécurité. Ainsi, nous proposons un cadre méthodologique d'évaluation qui considère la sécurité de l'information à partir d'une perspective globale. Structure de la thèse et thèmes abordés Notre document est structuré en trois parties. La première intitulée : « La problématique de l'évaluation de la sécurité de l'information » est composée de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 introduit l'objet de la recherche ainsi que les concepts de base du modèle d'évaluation proposé. La maniéré traditionnelle de l'évaluation de la sécurité fait l'objet d'une analyse critique pour identifier les éléments principaux et invariants à prendre en compte dans notre approche holistique. Les éléments de base de notre modèle d'évaluation ainsi que son fonctionnement attendu sont ensuite présentés pour pouvoir tracer les résultats attendus de ce modèle. Le chapitre 2 se focalise sur la définition de la notion de Sécurité de l'Information. Il ne s'agit pas d'une redéfinition de la notion de la sécurité, mais d'une mise en perspectives des dimensions, critères, indicateurs à utiliser comme base de référence, afin de déterminer l'objet de l'évaluation qui sera utilisé tout au long de notre travail. Les concepts inhérents de ce qui constitue le caractère holistique de la sécurité ainsi que les éléments constitutifs d'un niveau de référence de sécurité sont définis en conséquence. Ceci permet d'identifier ceux que nous avons dénommés « les racines de confiance ». Le chapitre 3 présente et analyse la différence et les relations qui existent entre les processus de la Gestion des Risques et de la Gestion de la Sécurité, afin d'identifier les éléments constitutifs du cadre de protection à inclure dans notre modèle d'évaluation. Le chapitre 4 est consacré à la présentation de notre modèle d'évaluation Information Security Assurance Assessment Model (ISAAM) et la manière dont il répond aux exigences de l'évaluation telle que nous les avons préalablement présentées. Dans ce chapitre les concepts sous-jacents relatifs aux notions d'assurance et de confiance sont analysés. En se basant sur ces deux concepts, la structure du modèle d'évaluation est développée pour obtenir une plateforme qui offre un certain niveau de garantie en s'appuyant sur trois attributs d'évaluation, à savoir : « la structure de confiance », « la qualité du processus », et « la réalisation des exigences et des objectifs ». Les problématiques liées à chacun de ces attributs d'évaluation sont analysées en se basant sur l'état de l'art de la recherche et de la littérature, sur les différentes méthodes existantes ainsi que sur les normes et les standards les plus courants dans le domaine de la sécurité. Sur cette base, trois différents niveaux d'évaluation sont construits, à savoir : le niveau d'assurance, le niveau de qualité et le niveau de maturité qui constituent la base de l'évaluation de l'état global de la sécurité d'une organisation. La deuxième partie: « L'application du Modèle d'évaluation de l'assurance de la sécurité de l'information par domaine de sécurité » est elle aussi composée de quatre chapitres. Le modèle d'évaluation déjà construit et analysé est, dans cette partie, mis dans un contexte spécifique selon les quatre dimensions prédéfinies de sécurité qui sont: la dimension Organisationnelle, la dimension Fonctionnelle, la dimension Humaine, et la dimension Légale. Chacune de ces dimensions et son évaluation spécifique fait l'objet d'un chapitre distinct. Pour chacune des dimensions, une évaluation en deux phases est construite comme suit. La première phase concerne l'identification des éléments qui constituent la base de l'évaluation: ? Identification des éléments clés de l'évaluation ; ? Identification des « Focus Area » pour chaque dimension qui représentent les problématiques se trouvant dans la dimension ; ? Identification des « Specific Factors » pour chaque Focus Area qui représentent les mesures de sécurité et de contrôle qui contribuent à résoudre ou à diminuer les impacts des risques. La deuxième phase concerne l'évaluation de chaque dimension précédemment présentées. Elle est constituée d'une part, de l'implémentation du modèle général d'évaluation à la dimension concernée en : ? Se basant sur les éléments spécifiés lors de la première phase ; ? Identifiant les taches sécuritaires spécifiques, les processus, les procédures qui auraient dû être effectués pour atteindre le niveau de protection souhaité. D'autre part, l'évaluation de chaque dimension est complétée par la proposition d'un modèle de maturité spécifique à chaque dimension, qui est à considérer comme une base de référence pour le niveau global de sécurité. Pour chaque dimension nous proposons un modèle de maturité générique qui peut être utilisé par chaque organisation, afin de spécifier ses propres exigences en matière de sécurité. Cela constitue une innovation dans le domaine de l'évaluation, que nous justifions pour chaque dimension et dont nous mettons systématiquement en avant la plus value apportée. La troisième partie de notre document est relative à la validation globale de notre proposition et contient en guise de conclusion, une mise en perspective critique de notre travail et des remarques finales. Cette dernière partie est complétée par une bibliographie et des annexes. Notre modèle d'évaluation de la sécurité intègre et se base sur de nombreuses sources d'expertise, telles que les bonnes pratiques, les normes, les standards, les méthodes et l'expertise de la recherche scientifique du domaine. Notre proposition constructive répond à un véritable problème non encore résolu, auquel doivent faire face toutes les organisations, indépendamment de la taille et du profil. Cela permettrait à ces dernières de spécifier leurs exigences particulières en matière du niveau de sécurité à satisfaire, d'instancier un processus d'évaluation spécifique à leurs besoins afin qu'elles puissent s'assurer que leur sécurité de l'information soit gérée d'une manière appropriée, offrant ainsi un certain niveau de confiance dans le degré de protection fourni. Nous avons intégré dans notre modèle le meilleur du savoir faire, de l'expérience et de l'expertise disponible actuellement au niveau international, dans le but de fournir un modèle d'évaluation simple, générique et applicable à un grand nombre d'organisations publiques ou privées. La valeur ajoutée de notre modèle d'évaluation réside précisément dans le fait qu'il est suffisamment générique et facile à implémenter tout en apportant des réponses sur les besoins concrets des organisations. Ainsi notre proposition constitue un outil d'évaluation fiable, efficient et dynamique découlant d'une approche d'évaluation cohérente. De ce fait, notre système d'évaluation peut être implémenté à l'interne par l'entreprise elle-même, sans recourir à des ressources supplémentaires et lui donne également ainsi la possibilité de mieux gouverner sa sécurité de l'information.

Cytoskeletal and DNA structure abnormalities result from bypass of requirement for the cdc10 start gene in the fission yeast Schizosaccharomyces pombe.

The cdc10 gene of the fission yeast S. pombe is required for traverse of the start control in late G1 and commitment to the mitotic cell cycle. To increase our understanding of the events which occur at start, a pseudoreversion analysis was undertaken to identify genes whose products may interact with cdc10 or bypass the requirement for it. A single gene, sct1+ (suppressor of cdc ten), has been identified, mutation of which suppresses all conditional alleles and a null allele of cdc10. Bypass of the requirement for cdc10+ function by sct1-1 mutations leads to pleiotropic defects, including microtubule, microfilament and nuclear structural abnormalities. Our data suggest that sct1 encodes a protein that is dependent upon cdc10+ either for its normal function or expression, or is a component of a checkpoint that monitors execution of p85cdc10 function.