Forecasting nano law: defining nano

Law and science have partnered together in the recent past to solve major public health issues, ranging from asbestos to averting the threat of a nuclear holocaust. This paper travels to a legal and health policy frontier where no one has gone before, examining the role of precautionary principles under international law as a matter of codified international jurisprudence by examining draft terminology from prominent sources including the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (UK), the Swiss Confederation, the USA (NIOSH) and the OECD. The research questions addressed are how can the benefits of nanotechnology be realized, while minimizing the risk of harm? What law, if any, applies to protect consumers (who comprise the general public, nanotechnology workers and their corporate social partners) and other stakeholders within civil society from liability? What law, if any, applies to prevent harm?

Strong reciprocity or strong ferocity? A population genetic view of the evolution of altruistic punishment.

Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism. However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial structure) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our analytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them), strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombination can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves kinship (be it genetic or cultural).

Perturbation expansions of multilocus fixation probabilities for frequency-dependent selection with applications to the Hill-Robertson effect and to the joint evolution of helping and punishment.

Natural populations are of finite size and organisms carry multilocus genotypes. There are, nevertheless, few results on multilocus models when both random genetic drift and natural selection affect the evolutionary dynamics. In this paper we describe a formalism to calculate systematic perturbation expansions of moments of allelic states around neutrality in populations of constant size. This allows us to evaluate multilocus fixation probabilities (long-term limits of the moments) under arbitrary strength of selection and gene action. We show that such fixation probabilities can be expressed in terms of selection coefficients weighted by mean first passages times of ancestral gene lineages within a single ancestor. These passage times extend the coalescence times that weight selection coefficients in one-locus perturbation formulas for fixation probabilities. We then apply these results to investigate the Hill-Robertson effect and the coevolution of helping and punishment. Finally, we discuss limitations and strengths of the perturbation approach. In particular, it provides accurate approximations for fixation probabilities for weak selection regimes only (Ns < or = 1), but it provides generally good prediction for the direction of selection under frequency-dependent selection.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.